

## **Strategies and Pitfalls of Agro-Pastoral Conflicts Prevention in the Bamenda Grass fields of Cameroon under British Administration**

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**Abstract:** The early 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed an influx of Fulani cattle herders into the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon where they met already established ethnic groups which had each developed a socio-economic and political stratum. These groups were predominantly crop cultivators with a minor level of livestock farming. Struggles by the Fulani (new comers) to settle and integrate among these groups encountered resistances resulting from diversity in cultures and economic determinants that translated into Agro-pastoral conflicts. To ensure cohesion, British administrative authorities took certain half-baked measures which unfortunately did not yield dividends. This paper expounds on the different strategies put in place by the British Authorities to prevent conflict between the Fulani (pastoralists) and the indigenous people (agriculturalist). Through an integrated approach, the paper brings on board the pitfalls suffered by the different strategies employed by British authorities. It argues that the efforts made by these authorities were more often than not challenged by each of the groups because they were considered as a ploy to reap benefits from both sides. Consequently, the tension between the Fulani and indigenous people continued unabated.

**Keywords:** Cohabitation, Divergence, Enhancement, Farming and Grazing

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### **Introduction**

The advent of the Fulani in the Bamenda Grassfields in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century introduced ethnic pluralism and economic divergence in the area emanating from the fact that the Fulani who were culturally Muslim dominated and economically pastoralists met in the Bamenda Grassfields a population composed of the Tikar, Widikum, Chamba, Ngemba and supposedly Munchi[1] who were predominantly cultivators practicing shifting cultivation. The dominant economic activities of the two groups, that is, farming and grazing quickly exposed them to rivalry over parcels of land. Considering that both parties depended on traditional methods of their respective activities which required the exploitation of vast lands, the available land now became insufficient to satisfy the desires of the different groups. This basically established the ensuing Agro-pastoral conflicts which were in the long run exacerbated by physical as well as human and economic factors peculiar to the area.

As far as the physical factors were concerned, climate as well as the relief of the Bamenda Grassfields attracted Fulani settlement. The topography of the area is generally rough with steep hills separated by narrow valleys which are averagely between 2500m to 5000m wide. The soils of the slopes are very thin and highly leached. This was a problem to both farmers and graziers considering that, graziers who were known to

occupy the hills descended to the lowland areas generally occupied by farmers to carry out their grazing activities[2]. Though this is a common practice in the dry season, it resulted in the destruction of farmers' cereals such as cassava, cocoa yams, potatoes, thereby causing economic friction. During the rainy season, steep slopes were very slippery. Again, the graziers were uncomfortable with the hills as animals easily lose balance and fell off, sustaining injuries and others dying. Considering the small nature of the valleys (lowland areas) there was bound to be serious competition between cattle herders and the indigenous crop cultivators over land. This competition at times led to violent clashes between herders and crop cultivators with the latter considering the former as alien invaders and demanding the liberation of their land.

Moreover, climatic variation was another problem posing issue in Agro-pastoral relations. The entire Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon has two main seasons; the dry and the rainy seasons. With the practice of transhumance and shifting cultivation, graziers who depended on the rains for pasture regeneration and farmers who depended on the rains for planting their crops are bound to clash over the small pieces of land in the valleys that are often punctuated by streams. This apart, the raffia palms grew around these valleys and with their fibrous roots, they drew up water from the soil which they stored and kept the nearby lands wet throughout the year. It was around these wet areas that

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women (particularly in Aghem) planted their vegetable for dry season consumption. When cattle came from the hill tops for water, they trampled on the crops and destroyed them. This often resulted to conflicts after inadequate compensation or none at all[3].

In terms of human and economic factors, poverty, population increase, archaic farming methods were all influential in the uncordial relations that existed between farmers and graziers[4]. In the light of this, the income levels and living standards of most of the people of the locality were low making it impossible for them to exploit security measures such as barbed wire and paddocks that could help avoid trespassing. Population increase was caused by migration of people especially the advent of the cattle Fulani which coincided with the introduction of new medical knowledge brought about by colonization that increased life span[5]. Also, the attitude of herdsmen further aggravated the situation; they abandoned their flock of cattle, letting it stray into peoples' farms[6].

It was in such circumstances that British authorities met the Bamenda Grassfields in a web of an unharmonious relationship that existed between the Fulani and the indigenous people of the area. Therefore, hardly had the British settled down in the Bamenda Grassfields than they were faced with the problem of dealing with this divergence. In an effort to enhance co-habitation, British officials introduced new modes of land management which were however received with mistrust. It was in the light of this that the different policies, schemes and decisions that were introduced in the hope of enhancing cohabitation between the Fulani and the indigenes failed to attain set goals. This paper is therefore a historical attempt to the question why British efforts to enhance co-habitation between these groups were generally unsuccessful. In this direction, the paper identifies the different efforts made by these authorities as a means of enhancing cohesion and bringing on board their short comings.

### **The Land Demarcation Scheme**

As early as the influx of the Fulani into the Bamenda Grassfields generally, they attracted the interest of the British Authorities in the area. This was on the bases of two fundamental reasons. Firstly, the Fulani were of great contribution to the economy of the Bamenda Grassfields and secondly, their cattle was a havoc to farmers crops[7]. Concurrently, local chiefs welcomed these pastoralists' establishment on their chiefdom's territory as long as they paid tributes and acknowledged their hosts' territorial and political primacy[8]. These reasons accounted for British intervention in the enhancement of relations between the Fulani and the indigenous people of the area. Considering that the major problem opposing the Fulani and the indigenous people was that of land, the British began making efforts towards enhancing cohabitation by establishing land reforms. This saw the introduction

of the Land Demarcation Scheme in 1940. The Scheme was initiated to define clear cut boundaries between farm and grazing lands throughout the Bamenda Division. This did not receive any enthusiastic response from the indigenous people who saw the scheme as sharing their land with the Fulani. In the Nso Native Authority Council for instance, there was a stern objection to the scheme based on fears that it was intended to be a permanent alienation of indigenous land to the Fulani[9]. This attitude which the British described as unhelpful was recurrent throughout the Bamenda Division[10]. Yet, the British officials in Southern Cameroons continued to press for its approval.

In 1940, the SDO of the Bamenda Division, M.D.W. Jeffreys, secured the approval of his plan to demarcate the highlands; acting under the Inter-tribal Boundary Settlement Ordinance. By 1944, the only areas effectively demarcated were; Sinna, Nsob and Ngulu tribal areas, Wiya Native Authority Area and part of Nso[11]. The time spent in the demarcation of these areas is prove of shortage of staff for the demarcation exercise and difficulties of projecting both human and especially cattle population since cattle was still being trafficked[12] into the Bamenda Grassfields from Nigeria.

Therefore, if this exercise of land demarcation had any merits, they were conspicuous. This is because M.D.W. Jeffrey concentrated his thoughts on the problem of crop destruction without giving any consideration to the problem of soil exhaustion at all. In fact, wind erosion in the over grazed areas rendered the soil bare and cattle was bound to move to other pasture areas and as a consequence, they entered crop farms. Moreover, the exercise failed to take into cognizance the mutual benefits that farmer-grazier interchange could have conveyed, since it was aimed at keeping graziers separate from farmers[13]. Consequently the reform did not attain expectation attempts were made to keep indigenes away from the Fulani on land considered by the indigenous people as theirs.

### **Fulani Development and Welfare Scheme (FDWS)**

When the shortcomings of M.D.W. Jeffrey's demarcation exercise were noticed, the Fulani Development and Welfare Scheme (FDWS) was introduced by N. Clark, a Senior Veterinary Officer. According to him, the scheme's major objectives were the preservation and protection of pasture land and the improvement of relations between the indigenous people and the Fulani[14]. Base on these objectives, he suggested that grazing areas in the Bamenda Division be leased to the Fulani Ardo of a given area who would be responsible for the proper use of the grazing land. This was to be accompanied by a certificate of occupancy. Once again, this was not in accordance with the aspirations of the indigenes who were not ready to see their land leased out to the Fulani. The idea of leasing out land to the Fulani actually worsened Fulani-

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indigenous relations as the indigenes believed that the Fulani were being favoured to their own detriment[15]. The act of giving the Ardo authority over land, which was considered indigenous property, was interpreted by the people of the Bamenda Grassfields as subordinating their chiefdoms to the Fulani who in the eyes of the indigenous people were aliens. This was another weakness that further necessitated reformation.

Also included in N. Clark's proposal was the idea of the enactment of Cattle Control Rules (CCRs)[16]. The proposal for the introduction of the CCRs was approved in 1947 following the failure of the FDWS[17]. This was so hastily done because the demarcation exercise carried out by M.D.W. Jeffrey and the FDWS were complete failures as both did not stop the destruction of crops by cattle. By this time, crop destruction that had been rampant in Nso and Nkambe areas had extended to the Menchum area. In approving the proposals for the enactment of CCRs the government ordered the cessation of all demarcation exercises and called on the Native Authorities to make grazing control orders under the Native Authority Ordinance of 1943[18]. According to the Native Authority Grazing Orders, cattle were to be limited by the Native Authority under grazing regulation. Cattle in overgrazed areas were to be removed and the remaining herds dispersed to other parts of the division. Large herds were to be reduced to 120 heads of cattle and subsequently to fifty. Two herd boys were to be in charge of the first fifty heads of cattle with an extra herd's boy for any additional fifty[19].

These rules which concentrated more on the question of number in relation to the size of land were ideal for the enhancement of Fulani-indigenous cohabitation in the Bamenda Grassfields. However, the rules could not be implemented as soon as the British officials had considered necessary. This was because they were hooked by two questions; that of the status of the Fulani and the effect the rules were to have on jangali. The question of Fulani status was centered on the controversy of whether they should be considered indigenes of the Bamenda Grassfields or not. This question came in order to be able to determine whether an individual qualified to own land in a given place or not.

The question of land posed a problem because prior to 1943, the British had decreed the Land and Native Rights Ordinance, of 1927 according to which a native had been defined as a person born of a parent who originated from the area in which he was living. The law had declared all lands in the Bamenda Division, Native Authority property, be it occupied or unoccupied. However, government owned land and patches of land granted to non-natives or interest therein under the 1916 Land Ordinance were exempted from this law. The striking issue here was that the right to transfer native land to non-natives became the

prerogative of the Governor General of Nigeria and the Cameroons. Nevertheless, such transfer had to be done in compliance with native law and customs[20].

The decision of conferring the rights to transfer land to the Governor General was very disastrous to Fulani-indigenous co-habitation. This was because, if the relationship ever had an iota of cordiality, it was as a result of the fact that the Fulani respected the indigenes as their landlords and paid allegiance to indigenous rulers on whom they depended to acquire and/or exploit land for grazing. The transfer of these rights to the Governor General completely made the indigenous rulers to lose their power over the Fulani. As Mark and Aniuska put it "the greatest colonial interest and capacity for administration encouraged policy making geared towards the intentional manipulation of African environment for a variety of purposes"[21]. This situation could be better examined in the drafting of new laws regarding land ownership by use of European style court system through which colonial regimes gained control over large areas of land in West Africa. Such lands were redistributed at the detriment of the indigenes to the advantage of those who served colonial interest. In this case, the Fulani who paid relatively higher taxes found favour in the eyes of the British authorities. Faced with situations of favouritism, conflicts were bound to be a major characteristic of relations between the Fulani and the indigenes of the Bamenda Grassfields. The consequence was division that continued to plague both groups.

This view has been supported by Jacobsen according to whom, Europeans imposed formal laws on societies that had developed generally informal but often quit sophisticated and complex systems of land use and tenure that were appropriate for local production styles and tended to incorporate farmer-herder interaction in the production process[22]. These resulting changes undermined this cooperative system, reduced farmer-grazier goal compatibility and weakened customary or informal land tenure and resource use. This is significant because such systems contained culturally specific and relevant procedures and mechanisms for dispute management. Among the numerous outcomes of the resultant state policy, ergo was an array of structural conditions conducive to intergroup conflicts between planters and graziers. For instance, apart from the sympathy which the British had for the Fulani, the delay to implement the Cattle Control Rules was further compounded by the fact that British officials feared that the implementation of the rules could lead to a massive exodus of the Fulani from the Bamenda Division. However, the British headquarters in Nigeria continued to deny the Fulani the status of a politically independent minority and classified them as 'strangers' rather than 'natives'[23] and since the Bamenda Grassfields was part of the mandated territory administered from Nigeria by the British, this law

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applied to the area. Thus British attitude towards the Fulani status was that of creating an avenue through which native lands could be privatized by colonial machinery and not absolutely an expression of concern for the migrant Fulani. Such a situation, it was clear, would devoid the area of its wealth which was going to be detrimental to British ambitions.

Therefore, the land privatisation policies pursued by colonial regimes not only reduced indigenous people's control of/and access to land but was also associated with environmental degradation.

According to Mark and Aniuska:

Exclusive property regimes have repeatedly resulted in the overuse of land resources – a design not generally favourable to traditional modes of grazing considering the negative effects of drought periods and the consequential increase in conflicts between herders and farmers[24].

In line with this, Ayurazaniin has argued that the privatisation of pasture land has been the subject of considerable debate owing to the need for maintaining flexibility of access to different pastures in the face of climatic variability and other risks[25]. Therefore the most preferred and objective line of thought in the Agro-pastoral conflict was not land reform but a change in the farming and grazing systems through encouraging the understanding of the benefits of compatibility. This is amplified by the fact that the more the land reforms, the more state authorities took control over land as a means of making it available to 'all'. Consequently, the indigenes of the Bamenda Grassfields found themselves moved away from having effective control over land. As such, they thought that the reforms were made to favour the Fulani generally made them unpopular among the indigenes. With the use of land as a basic means of managing the rising tension between farmers and herders, antagonism and disagreement between both groups continued to rise as each (especially the indigenes) felt cheated and therefore preferred to violate the roles.

Debates over Fulani status prolonged the implementation of grazing rules because while some administrators such as M.D.W. Jeffrey, stated that the Fulani were aliens in the Bamenda Grassfields, explaining that they were legally Nigerians because "they or their parents were born within the borders of Nigeria"[26], others like J.H.D. Stapleton, argued that the Fulani were not alien intruders but genuine, though late coming members of the indigenous population. He pleaded that the Fulani had no specific homeland of their own and had been wandering about the Western Sudan between the forest and the savannah wherever there was pasture for their cattle[27]. He further argued that the Fulani had reached a cultural crises caused by the 20<sup>th</sup> century transformation process which embodied the rise of modern states with distinct frontiers,

demographic explosions and the occupation of erstwhile empty land. To him, the Fulani were in the midst of these changes and were just powerless and helpless[28]. Implicitly, out of sympathy, the British introduced misleading policies towards the Fulani problem thereby rendering the indigenous people hopeless as they found themselves losers in the sympathy based approach to reformation as opined by J.H.D Stapleton.

Thus the major loophole of the Cattle Control Rules of 1947 was that they were centered on controlling the activities of graziers exclusively. Given that the farmers were often compensated in the Native Courts when their crops were destroyed by Fulani cattle, the former tended to open farms in areas designated as grazing land to trap cattle and benefit compensation. This situation was however checked in 1949 with the revision of Cattle Control Rules aimed at putting a check on farmers' activities. To this effect, farmers were prohibited from opening farms in grazing areas. Those who did so were to receive no compensation in the event of damage caused on their crops by cattle. This was however superficial considering that the land demarcation process had been abandoned and not all grazing lands had clear definitions.

Though versed with the insufficiency of herdsmen to take care of the cattle, the Fulani on their part continued to resist the construction of fences to prevent straying of cattle. As the relatively few herdsmen got tired during the day and slept off at night, cattle strayed away and went into peoples' farms destroying crops. This was due to the fact that the Fulani had rejected the suggestion of hobbling and kraaling made to them by the Cattle Control Officer. This decision was reiterated by the Chief Commissioner of the Eastern Province in reply to a welcome address from the Fulani Council on December 26, 1950. According to him:

The law in every country is that a man must build fences against his own stock or control his own stock. Here in Bamenda province there is little fencing possible, so owners must control stock so that they do not harm. Peace and good relations with other people of Bamenda Province depend on you Fulani controlling stock. Hobbling and Kraaling are two effective means of controlling stock and hobbling is easy work to do as soon as animals are trained for it[29].

Apart from the reluctance of the Fulani to implement this proposal, and the unwillingness of the indigenes to accept it, there was also the problem of shortage of staff for the implementation of the CCRs that was responsible for difficulties in its implementation. In 1952 for instance the Cattle Control Staff for the entire Bamenda province was made up of



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one clerk, one office messenger, and five Cattle Control Assistants distributed as follows:

Office	One cattle control Assistant
With cattle control officer	One cattle control Assistant
Nsaw Native Authority	One cattle control Assistant
Menemo, Ngie and Ngwaw	One cattle control Assistant
Bali, Ngemba, Moghamo	One messenger as cattle control Assistant[30].

This distribution indicates gross insufficiency in staff especially as there was not even an assistant in the Menchum area where cattle were still entering and needed effective control from the very beginning. As such, the enforcement of hobbling which was considered an extreme method of treating cattle failed and reports of crop destruction continued to rise[31]. These state of affairs spurred the British authorities to introduce an alternative method which was to carral cattle at night but it was according to Awasom, also not favourable in an area where timber was scarce, and the indigenes preferred to reserve the little available timber for firewood[32].

#### **The British Livestock Mission Settlement Scheme for the Fulani**

In view of the fact that cattle destruction of crops were continuously reported and that the British viewed the Fulani and their cattle as an inevitable source of wealth for the Bamenda Province, the maintaining of cattle in the area continued to necessitate lots of reformation. However, by this time, it was generally accepted that the introduction of mixed farming was a better solution. With the difficulties of implementing the Cattle Control Rules visibly clear, the British continued to envisage relatively cheaper and more applicable ways of managing the ongoing undesirable situation. Thus in 1952, the British Livestock Mission suggested the settlement of the Fulani as a precondition for enhancing a large scale livestock industry and amelioration of farmer-grazier co-habitation[33].

The proposal to permanently settle the Fulani like was the case with other proposals felt short of a number of issues; the most prominent being the problem of altering the land tenure systems practiced by the Bamenda Grassfields people without provoking any noticeable disturbances from the indigenous society. On the basis of this and the fact that the Fulani did not desire to be more settled than they were (at least as the authorities had hoped), the DO of Wum Division, J.W. Griffith, countered the proposal for the settlement of the Fulani and emphasised that transhumance was the most recommendable method of pasture management. As he stated:

I cannot accept, however, the view that these dry season migrants are essentially nomadic in character as in my view, it is more of good common sense utilisation of grasslands.

Excellent pasturage is available on the plains and whilst cattle are 'down' the highland, grazings are being rested. It is also significant that the Fulani migrate to the same dry season grazing annually [...] and of course [...] return to their individual wet season grazing when the rains begin in the areas specified in their grazing permit[34].

In the DO's opinion therefore, the forceful settlement of the Fulani in the Bamenda Province was undesirable to both the Fulani and the indigenous people. He opined that, the Fulani did not desire to be more settled than they already were and the indigenes would react adversely to such a scheme since it would require the lease of large parcels of land to Fulani graziers[35].

Knowledge of the proposed scheme for the settlement of the Fulani in Menchum and elsewhere in the Bamenda Grassfields built up suspicion in the area. To the indigenes, settling the Fulani meant granting them rights over large tracts of land thereby making them the biggest land owners in the area. This was aggravated by the fact that the Fulani who reached Menchum by this time were settled on farm lands not on the allocated grazing areas. It was therefore feared that if implemented, the scheme would deprive them of land for building and farming and therefore their children would have to buy land from the Fulani who would also need it for grazing[36]. According to the *bahtum* of Wanagwen, in the Aghem Federation of Chiefdoms "the ancestors of Aghem regretted having accepted the Fulani into the federation"[37].

Such feelings were not peculiar only to the Aghem as there was widespread phobia for the Fulani throughout the Bamenda Grassfields. Fulani rugas found within grazing zones on the lowlands were set on fire while crops planted by Fulani around their rugas were destroyed. In Nso and Nkambe, maiming of cattle became common[38]. In Kom, this desgruntleness was one of the major factors for the *Anlu*[39] uprising and its widespread anti-Fulani activities that later extended to Bu[40]. Such a situation was terrible for the Fulani; most of whom were born in the Bamenda Grasslands and knew no other place. They would neither be sure of, nor lay claim to the land on which they were permitted to graze in accordance with the 1947 Cattle Control Rules.

It was within this atmosphere that the third United Nations Visiting Mission came to the trust territory of Southern Cameroon in November 1955. Prior to this visit, the Fulani in the Bamenda Grassfields met in council under their president Ardo Sabga and drafted a petition to the Chairman of the mission in which they described their plight in the province. It read:

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We the 10 000 Fulani of Bamenda, have been residing in Bamenda for nearly forty years and most of the present Fulani population have been born in Bamenda.

We are a simple law abiding people, whose interest is entirely confined to the welfare of our cattle. The cattle tax we pay represent one half of the revenue of Bamenda.

In spite of this, we are considered to be strangers permitted to remain in Bamenda on sufferance. We have no security of tenure, not even in the compounds we have lived in and the grasslands we have grazed on for nearly forty years. In parts of Bamenda the native people are against even our building houses and planting crops

We ask that we may be treated as part of the community, as inhabitants of Bamenda who make a considerable contribution to the economy of Bamenda; and that we may be made to feel secure in the occupation of our grazing land and dwelling places[41].

In the light of this, the Fulani complained of their lack of security over land which did not encourage them to build houses and plant crops. To this effect and coupled with the fact that the plan for the implementation of mixed farming had failed, a United Nations expert on land affairs M.J.A. Brouwer recommended the lease of land to the graziers. According to him, the holding of land backed by a certificate of occupancy by the Fulani would serve as a form of incentive for the Fulani to improve on their grazing methods[42]. To ensure this, he proposed the construction of walls and the provision of better pasture and housing. Graziers holding such lease land would be considered settled and as such not subject to Cattle Control Rules[43]. Though the recommendation was quit laudable, it fell short of knowledge of conservatism earlier put up by indigenous people and the Fulani over land use and ownership. Worst still, the lack of funds and personnel on the part of the colonial authorities were other stumbling blocks to British success. Consequently, crop damages by cattle continued to rise and the British continued to look for further ways to maintain a peaceful stay of the two ethnically and economically divergent groups.

### **The Barbed Wire Scheme**

The failure of the Land Demarcation Scheme, the Fulani Development and Welfare Scheme, the Cattle Control Rules and the Fulani Settlement Scheme resulted in the introduction of the Barbed Wire Scheme introduced by E. O'Kelly in 1956[44]. The scheme was to provide women with barbed wire which was to be used for the protection of their farms. The barbed wire was to be supplied by the British though its implementation was complicated by the fact that it struck at the roots of the traditional land tenure system of Wum division. This was because the indigenous

people of the area saw the implementation of the scheme as a means of sharing their land with the Fulani. After serious sensitisation, the scheme was accepted. In Aghem, the execution or distribution of the barbed wire to women was left in the hands of Ardo Umaru Kanuru who called on the women for the distribution exercise; thus giving them the task of constructing the fences[45]. This was interpreted by Aghem women as their subordination to the Aku (Fulani) leadership worsened by what they considered a change of culture. It should be noted here that farming in the Bamenda Grassfields up till this point in time was largely in the hands of women. The fencing of the farmlands was the responsibility of men. To the women therefore, the distribution of barbed wire for women to do the fencing was an insult. They called on the male population to emulate the Fulani whose wives did not go to farm yet, the Fulani wanted Aghem women to make fences for their cattle. According to Eka:

[...] we could not understand why... how we had to do the fencing. The Fulani had the cattle and it was their cattle that were moving into our farms and destroying our crops. Again there were the Fulani that came here and we gave them our land why would they ask us – women to do the fence. Our general demand was that they go and see *dengkeghem* who gave them our land so he can do the fencing for them if they cannot [...] We informed them that the government was supporting them against us. That explains why they gave the wire but to Ardo Umaru because they wanted the Fulani to rule us instead of *dengkeghem*. Let them see the government to do it. Haa why could they not pay the money they gave as bribe for making of fencing? These were the reasons why we refused to do the fence[46].

This position taken by the Aghem women made the whole idea of the Barbed Wire Scheme inapplicable in the Aghem federation of Chiefdoms. The result was continuous reports against cattle destruction of crops. In areas like Nkambe, the scheme also witnessed a failure not as a result of resistance from the local population but because of insufficient barbed wire[47]. In a nut shell, the Barbed Wire Scheme was rendered inapplicable throughout the Bamenda Province by two principal factors. These were; the problem of shortage of barbed wire and resistance from the local people. Like all other efforts made by the British authorities towards enhancing cohabitation between the farmers and the herders in the Bamenda Grassfields, the Barbed Wire Scheme also failed. As British administration in the Cameroons ended, the struggle was carried on by the independent government considering that these relations continued to experience in-amicability.

### **Conclusion**

The paper has examined British policies that were geared towards enhancing cohabitation between the Fulani and indigenous people of the Bamenda Grassfields. The findings indicate that the British were exposed to the predicaments of implementing Indirect Rule in the Cameroons under British administration from their Nigerian experience wherein the status of the Fulani was not exactly similar with that in the Bamenda Grassfields. Through the different policies, the weaknesses were expressed as having been a result of grid, shortage of staff, short sightedness as well as the use of exclusivist policies on the part of the British administrative authorities. On the other hand, gross disrespect of policy on the part of both the Fulani and the indigenous peoples, fears of being usurped by the British to the vantage of the Fulani and conservatism on the part of the indigenous people were all justifications for the failure of the British to guarantee peaceful co-existence between the ethnically and economically diverse people. Absolutely, the different policies failed to handle the land problem as having economic, political as well as ethnical bases simultaneously. It was therefore this failure that resulted in the forwarding of the problem to the independent government.

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  33. NAB, Ab 17/4, file No 10068, Vol. III, Grazing of Cattle, p. 25.
  34. Ibid.
  35. Ibid.
  36. Interview with Christopher Mua Achuo (HRH)
  37. Ibid.
  38. Awasom;The Hausa and Fulani, p. 188.
  39. Ritzenthaler, Robert, Anlu: A Women Uprising in the British Cameroons", African Studies, No 19, Vol. 13, 1960, 19-52.
  40. For further reading on the Anlu (Kelu) in Bu see, Henry Kam Kah, "Women as Makers of History".
  41. RAB, file No B.2807/5, Petition to the UN, 1955, p. 29.
  42. Brouwer MJA; Proposal for the Settlement of Farmer Grazier and Related Problems, F.A.O. Rome, 1962, p. 9.
  43. NAB, Ab 17/4, file No 10068, Vol. III; RAB, file No B.2509, Survey of Land Utilisation Bamenda Division, 1946, p. 41
  44. RAB, file No 1400, District Officers Conference, 1952, p. 34.
  45. Ibid
  46. Interview with Rebecca Eka Ndumbong
  47. Awasom;The Hausa and Fulani, p. 195.