

The Regional competition for the leadership of the Middle East region

(Yet “leadership” is a highly subjective word. What kind of “leadership?” and from whose perspective?)

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Abstract: Two of the dominant themes of discussion in international relations scholarship over the last decade have been global governance and rising powers. Underlying both discussions are profound ethical questions about how the world should be ordered, who is responsible for addressing global problems, how change can be managed, and how global governance can be made to work for peoples in developing as well as developed states. Specially the Middle East. Yet, these are often not addressed or only briefly mentioned as ethical dilemmas by commentators. Never have so many crises engulfed the Middle East at the same time. From the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, to the deteriorating security situation in Egypt, the region is in an unprecedented state of flux. At the same time, there is a deep feeling among many Arab states that the United States has lost interest in, if not effectively withdrawn from, the region. For Gulf States in particular there is a fear that Washington has struck a Faustian bargain with Tehran, ceding it regional primacy in return for a nuclear agreement. The region of the Middle East is highly conflict-loaded. The absence of one distinct regional power may be considered both cause and consequence of this structural feature. At the same time, there are significant power gaps between states in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Iran among the most powerful actors and accordingly defined as a potential regional power. Due to the specific empirical setting of the Middle East region, an analytical design emphasizing relational and procedural dynamics is required. In attempting to develop such a design, this paper utilizes three well-established schools of thought of international relations: (neo) realism, institutionalism, and constructivism. These three schools of thought are further used for developing hypotheses on both Arab regional policy and its effects on the Middle East. After illustrating these hypotheses in relation to four periods in the contemporary history of Arabs in Middle East, theoretical lessons to be learned for the analysis of regional powers in other world areas are presented.

Keywords: Middle East, potential regional power, leadership, competition.

Introduction

In addition to the historic political change occurring within the major states of the Middle East, there is a transformative process underway remaking the dynamics among the states of the region. Here I would ask? What role the United States will play in a “new Middle East” is the subject of intense debate among Americans, The Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and Iran and the Turks on the other side. Nevertheless, it is clear that with all the problems regional powers have confronted trying to shape the politics of the region, American leadership will continue to be indispensable. The idea that the United States is leaving the region is widespread. Stinging critiques of American policy and charges that the Obama administration has failed to lead can be read and heard across the Middle East. This perception in the region is understandable. After the failed project in Iraq and more than a decade of conflict in Afghanistan, as

well as the Syrian crisis, the American people have expressed their exhaustion with the military engagements of the 2000s[1].

We will discuss the scenarios of the rise or the absence of a regional power in the region, on the basis of a set of elements (components and constraints) that determine the chances of each state. These elements are in the state's ability to assume leadership, based on the elements of strength that they possess (geographically it is, or politically, or militarily, or economically) the degree of political and security stability, and balance the historic leadership, and influence the symbolic (cultural and religious), and its position on the core issues in region (the Palestinian issue, regional resistance movements, the Iranian nuclear file, the Arab Spring), the extent of the regional acceptance of the leading role of each country and its relations with some international rising powers like Russia and China.

In the third scenario, we will try to apply the criterion of the nature of the relationship with the United States, we cannot imagine the rise of regional countries in the Middle East without American approval for this role, which means that the ingredients and constraints of each country is not enough on its own to determine the future trends for the region, where the external factor (the United States) keeps overwhelming regional interactions.

Meanwhile, within many Middle Eastern capitals, concern about U.S. plans to abandon the region are paired with criticism that U.S. policy is increasingly weak and feckless anyway. There are long-running criticisms of Washington's handling of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as well as newer complaints about the deterioration of the Iraqi security situation.[2] From a particular Arab – and Israeli – perspective, Hosni Mubarak's fall, the protracted nature of Syria's civil war, Libya's potential disintegration and Iran's nuclear technology all represent American leadership failures. There remains a belief, for example, that through some undefined type of support, the United States could have forestalled the ignominious end of Mubarak's almost 30-year-long rule. American reluctance to intervene militarily in Syria is also a point of contention for its Arab and Turkish allies, who believe that Washington has missed an opportunity to stem Iranian influence in what has become an arc from Tehran to Beirut then to Yemen in the south of the region. In the eyes of regional contenders and the Israelis, the United States has consistently failed to appreciate the extent and depth of Tehran's malevolent intent in the region. [3] As a result of these views, Washington's regional allies have come to the conclusion that they are essentially on their own. Their subsequent effort to shape the Middle East to their own specific geopolitical needs and benefits has only intensified rivalries among the Qataris, Turks, Saudis, Emiratis and Iranians, and it has had a deleterious effect in various arenas – notably Egypt and Syria – where this competition is playing out.

The Middle East is undergoing a period of Saudi and Emirati ascendancy. This is not to suggest that their collective approach to the myriad problems confronting the region is wise or that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will be successful everywhere they seek to shape the region – Syria being a glaring example of failure. Yet both countries working in concert or in parallel have demonstrated an ability to influence developments in ways that no other contender for regional power and influence has. In general, the interests of the Saudis and Emiratis track closely: stability in the Gulf region and in their respective countries, containment of Iranian power and stable energy prices.[4] Moreover, some analysts in the Gulf believe that Saudi and Emirati policy is based on “panic” over a regional atmosphere in which

threatening versions of political Islam surround them, Iranian power is unchecked and the United States has turned its back on longtime regional allies. Whether the result of panic or not, King of Saudi and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, have responded with a rational and coherent policy to confront the twin – and in places interrelated – challenges of Iran and Islamist movements in an environment where they perceive American leadership to be absent.

The situation in Syria would put the region under estimation of more competition, hence Saudi Arabia views the conflict in Syria in starkly sectarian terms, and Iranian leaders tend to see the crisis through the lens of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. As one Iranian official put it: “Today we fight in Syria for interests such as the Islamic Revolution. Our defense is to the extent of the Sacred Defense.” The reference to “Sacred Defense” also has a sectarian undertone, but Iran's policy is more consistent with maintenance and extension of its existing interests and influence in the Arab world. It is through Syria that Iran supports Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and, prior to the Syrian civil war, Hamas and the Huthies in Yemen. If Assad fell, Tehran's influence in Syria and the Levant would change dramatically and at Iran's expense. Recently, Iran and Saudi Arabia have signaled some tension at diplomatic relations. Still, Saudi Arabia and Iran will find it difficult to reach common ground on Syria and many conflicted issues in the region. Both countries are heavily invested in an outcome to the conflict that disadvantages the other.[5] The tenuous diplomatic opening aside, Riyadh continues to call for Assad's ouster, and Iran has only stepped up its support for the Assad regime since 2011.

In Turkey, the macroeconomic stabilization and increasing role of the private sector will be instrumental in economic growth. The plans of the country's leadership are that by the republic's centennial in 2023, the country will be among the world's 10 largest economies (today, it is 17th in the world in terms of GDP). Irrespective of whether or not Turkish leaders manage to carry out this ambitious plan, it is clear that the country has embarked on the course of quite sustainable and dynamic economic growth and has consolidated its status in authoritative international communities, such as the G-20. The investment rate exceeds 21%, and the volume of direct foreign investment has increased.[8] The key risk factor for Turkey is the considerable role of foreign financial resources. The current account deficit in the balance of payments in 2008 reached US\$42 billion against US\$1.5 billion in 2002, and forecasts are that it will be around US\$60 billion by 2025. This trend against the backdrop of aggravating financial problems in Western countries makes Turkey more vulnerable to any expansion of the world financial and economic crisis. On the other hand, an indication of the level of

industrial development in Turkey is the successful performance of its military industrial complex, which is producing aviation and missile materials, large warships and submarines, and electronic warfare weapons, [9].

For instance, relations between Turkey and Iran, publicly, prominent people do not hesitate to criticize each other with the harshest speech. However, one needs to be a true expert on the Middle East to understand what Ankara and Tehran think of each other. Beyond such public criticism, various interest-based relations continue.

Naturally, the regional leadership competition generates a highly hypocritical foreign policy discourse. Political leaders who are relatively polite at the foreign policy level do not hesitate to criticize other states as part of their domestic politics. There is a simple logic here: Foreign policy has become a key aspect of domestic politics in the region. Naturally, political actors are happy to provoke their constituency over foreign policy, [10].

A quick perusal of Saudi, Iranian or Turkish media is enough to detect this fact. Reminiscent of Cold War patterns, any person who has a different perspective in foreign policy is quickly accused of treason. In 2013, throughout the whole region, people who have different views of foreign policy are potential "traitors" in the eyes of their governments.

In short, the regional states' bids for leadership are not taking place on a polite track. Historically speaking, this is not new. For ages, Middle Eastern powers have had no tradition of integration. Since the days of the Ottomans, the usual way has been to wage war to annihilate or subjugate the competitor. As a part of this, powers that compete for a regional leadership role simultaneously start hunting for the "enemy collaborators" at home. In other words, Middle Eastern regional politics as a rule is the politics of a regional cold war. [11], Once your government initiates a policy of claiming regional leadership, as a citizen (or subject) the only alternative is to support the government in its "holy war." Any other alternatives will quickly make you a domestic collaborator with the enemy.

Today, we are witnessing another regional leadership competition among states like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. As usual, it is again transforming the region into a chaotic place as the competition weakens rationality in all fields. Unlike in the West, competition does not always bring perfection in the Middle East. Dozens of Muslims were killed in various bombings in Iraq and Syria; dozens of Muslims also lost their lives in traffic accidents during the recent Eid al-Adha religious holiday in Turkey. However, any other issue is secondary given the high priority of the government's bid for leadership. Therefore, the number

of people killed in bombings or traffic accidents is merely a simple detail of news programs.[12].

The Scenarios of rising power in Middle East.

History provides a sobering lesson about western involvement in the Middle East. It is that Scenarios, when superpowers drift away, peace, progress, moderation and stability do not necessarily follow in their stead.

A historical back ground to the scenario of rising power comes from the securing the support and sponsorship of a Great Power had been a cardinal tenet in the strategy of the Zionist movement ever since its inception at the end of the nineteenth century. At first the Zionist leaders looked to the Ottoman Empire which controls the Middle East, for support, then to Great Britain which held the mandate for Palestine after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Following the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, Zionist leaders began to look increasingly towards the United States which was in the process of replacing Great Britain as the pre-eminent Western power in the Middle East.[13], There was a short interlude during which the newly-born state officially adhered to a policy of 'non-identification', of not taking sides in the Cold War between East and West. But following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Israel adopted an openly pro-Western orientation. In the early 1950s, Israel lobbied to be included in successive Western plans for the defense of the Middle East but it was repeatedly rebuffed. These plans, culminating in the ill-fated Baghdad Pact in 1955, were all directed against the Soviet Union and they required the cooperation of the Arab states if they were to have any chance of success. From the point of view of the Arab states, however, the real threat to their security emanated not from the Soviet Union but from Israel. Consequently, they were not prepared to join any defense organization of which Israel was a member.[14].

The concept of regional power has only recently been developed, which is why it is not yet a full-fledged theoretical approach. Rather, a basic idea exists which stipulates that conflicts regarding the emergence of regional powers—that is, (state) actors whose power is based to a great degree on leadership in the world area they are situated—have been significantly increasing since the end of the twenty-first century. Many researchers share the belief that the state of the international system creates a significant need for regional powers—and, therefore, scientific research should be conducted in this field, which has so far been under researched.

At the same time we could emphasize upon the fact that, from the perspective of theoretically oriented Middle Eastern studies, the question which arises is how to position this world region within the context of

the emerging research on regional powers. In order to cover Middle Eastern regional policies (and potentially regional policies in other world areas), a concept emphasizing relational or procedural dynamics is necessary. This is due to the fact that in the Middle East—and potentially also in other world areas—there is no one single regional power. If at all, research focusing on one single actor and measuring its power capabilities would only make sense if a given actor dominated a given world region. However, the political situation in the Middle East is characterized by the fact that there are several actors whose power capabilities are superior to those of the weaker actors in the region.[15]. Thus, there can be hardly any doubt that Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are much more powerful than Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, and Yemen. Yet, none of the actors from the first group is superior to such a degree that its capabilities clearly outweigh those of all others. The research concept apt for analyzing a region in which power is more or less dispersed must be dynamic rather than static. Thus, the perspective developed in this paper is not to count and describe the power capabilities of a specific regional actor which is believed to be superior to the other actors of the region. Rather, the paper takes the approach that in order to analyze a given actor, one ought to examine its policies in the region—and beyond—as well as the dynamics triggered by it.

Even more, The Arab world, and the Middle East, in general, has not experienced such a major geopolitical upheaval since the early 20th Century, when Ottoman territories were divided among old colonial European powers, all the way to War World II. The outcome of this upheaval is likely to be as earth shattering as these past experiences, if not more, due to the popular element in these conflicts.[16].

But one of the most defining shifts of "Arab Spring" priorities is the reversal of the narrative from its basic, innocent, unifying, empowering and popular articulation, into a complicated, cunning, disuniting, disempowering and elitist one, where the people do not matter, in the least.

However, the importance of the petroleum-exporting Arab countries in the Gulf will certainly increase. Their aggregate GDP should by 2020 reach US\$2 trillion, which will make up 1.7% of the world GDP. The situation in this region is determined by the fact that Arab regimes are faced with a choice of the following options in their economic policies: either the promotion of large-scale economic development programs while allowing relatively slower political shifts, or, alternatively, the acceleration of political reforms if economic policies prove to be less successful than expected.[17].

Here, I would say that, the social and economic problems and some economic scenarios in the Middle East are the main issue if we consider specific aspects in the development of the region that will occur under any scenario, we might include high rates of population growth, in the short-term (with some exceptions, for example, Turkey), continued aggravation of environmental problems, and shortages of resources, agricultural land and fresh especially water. With the exception of Turkey, all countries in the region are faced with an extremely low level of water supply that acts as a brake on agricultural development.

The region has to import considerable amounts of food products and fodder grain. Due to the fresh water shortage, the development of agriculture requires considerable investments. Furthermore, economic development overall in these conditions, including, along with agriculture, urban infrastructures and certain water-intensive industries, calls for the construction of an adequately equipped industry for fresh water production, which includes water desalination and transportation, all of which are capital-intensive endeavors.[18].

Over the past four decades, the share of young adults in the population of Arab countries has been growing steadily. Projections by World Bank experts envision an excess of 30% by 2015. Given the limited opportunities for the growth in manufacturing and agriculture, this process will generate a high level of unemployment, and this above all affects young people. Youth unemployment in the Middle Eastern countries is at present more than 25%, which is one of the highest in the world.[19]. This, in turn, determines the quite high growth rates of regional labor resources: 3.3% in the period of 1980-2010 (2.1% in South Asia and 1.5% in East Asia).

The problem of high unemployment in Arab countries is closely associated with the quality of labor resources, which lags considerably behind other developing countries. The share of the labor force in the low-skilled and unskilled bracket is around 60-65% of the economically active population in the Arab world, which, in turn is the result of low levels of education. The extreme poverty of the population in various countries in the region remains a critical social problem.[20].

A no less pressing problem for the Arab world is that chronic poverty affects broad strata of the population. The growing unemployment and rising prices of consumer goods (especially food products) have led to significant growth in the share of the poor in the population. Assessments that account for national criteria of poverty show that by the end of the 2000s the share of poverty reached an average of 40%, with 60%, as a case in point, in Yemen.[21].

Considering all of the above, we expect several scenarios for economic development in the region, depending on the political situation.

The first scenario is that “Political processes lead to an explosion in the region and its economy”. In this scenario, various conflicts will destabilize the socio-economic situation to such an extent that economic activities fall off sharply, business declines, and the economy suffers a deep setback in its level and scope of development. Examples of this scenario materializing today are Iraq and Libya.[22]

The second scenario is that “Economic processes abroad trigger a political explosion”. The world financial and economic crisis, the development of alternative energy technologies ranging from solar and wind energy to shale oil and gas, and a slowdown in China’s economic growth rates result in a sharp shrinkage of demand for the region’s staple exports – petroleum and natural gas. The dwindling of these countries’ economic opportunities will generate destructive processes in the political sphere.

The third scenario is “Sustainable development”. This scenario is possible both amid a positive development of the world economy and in the conditions of a world crisis if this crisis does not produce any considerable decline in petroleum and natural gas consumption in the fast growing economies of Asian countries. With the world economy growing, demand for oil and gas in various countries will increase, and this will stimulate the region’s development. The economic slump in Western countries following the world financial and economic crisis may lead to a decline in oil and gas consumption in this part of the world economy. However, the growing economies of China, India and South-East Asian countries will need additional amounts of fuel, especially for automobile transport, and these increasing oil and gas requirements in East and South Asian countries will sustain demand for Middle Eastern hydrocarbons.

Further more. The alternatives in the development of the political situation stands upon The stormy processes of transformation that of late have developed in the region’s countries (above all in Arab states), persisting old and emergent new threats to security, and unresolved conflicts (quite many of which are of global significance, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the situation in Sudan, Kurdish problem, activities of extremist and terrorist organizations, the situation in Syria and Yemen, unclear future of Iraq, situation in Egypt, etc.) are all reasons to expect the situation in the region to develop in a direction detrimental to peace and stability.[23].

One of the worst negative consequences of the turbulent developments in the past decade has been a sharp exacerbation of inter-confessional strife (between Muslims and Christians) and in-confessional strife (between Sunnites and Shiites) that in the near future has a tendency not only to continue, but also to grow worse. The alliance of Islamist Sunni regimes (or those that sympathize with Islamist patterns even while maintaining the secular character of their statehood, which, as a matter of fact, may erode) emerging in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Tunisia serving as its axis, will strengthen their desire to dominate regional politics and impose their agenda on their neighbors.

It is not clear whether the unexpected understanding and rapprochement of this group of states with the West, the U.S.A., in the first place, will continue for any length of time. These countries supported the Arab Tahrir-type revolutions and established cooperative relations with political Islam. However, they will probably not be able to overcome anti-American sentiments deeply ingrained in local societies and fueled, furthermore, by Washington’s unflagging support of Israel and the chronically smoldering Arab-Israeli conflict. Characteristically, even under conditions of the acute economic crisis, most of the Egyptians are opposed to the prospects of Western economic aid to be granted their country.[24] Furthermore, the Jihadist movement keeps up its strength and, in addition to dealing with domestic issues, does not (several of its member organizations, at any rate) relinquish its global agenda. At the same time, we should not rule out the possibility of the marginalization of extremist terrorist movements who are concentrated on winning influence in vulnerable “borderline” areas of the Greater Middle East (including Northern Africa). There are assessments that Al-Qaeda may transform into a network of affiliates, or “lone wolves”, or (in the event of successful counterterrorist pressure) into a network of units connected only by information communications and ideological linkages.[25].

On the whole, the potential of the Islamist movement in the coming period will be weakened by conflicts among the various factions of political Islam – the Muslim Brothers (and their offspring), Salafis and Jihadists. These disagreements will later on be used by regional actors to promote their own interests (as, for example, Saudi Arabia supporting Salafis, and Qatar – Muslim Brothers).

In general, we can expect with high probability that at least in the short-term, uncertainty and instability following the Islamists’ rise to power and fuelled by mass protest movements will persist in a large number of countries in the Middle East, [26].

Will Islamic political forces now in dominant positions in many countries (first of all, in Egypt, a leading country in the Arab world) and “power hungry”, as one of the participants in the events put it, manage to overcome the temptation to return to tested authoritarian methods of governance? Will their perception of their success as a result of “Divine predestination”, interfere with the fulfillment of their promises to remain committed to democracy and to follow the popular will? And the main thing, will they manage to cope with the formidable challenges of rehabilitation of the economies that were hit hard by the turbulent events of 2011-2012. [27].

In the mid-term, the confrontation of two trends in the evolution of political Islam is here to stay. One of these is modernization. This involves the adjustment of political Islam to present-day realities owing to the very responsibility that the faith has in ruling the country concerned, and, further, its increasing commitment to democratic standards following the pressure of majority public opinion expressed in the course of protest actions demanding civil liberties and social justice. The other is the encapsulation within itself, that is, an attempt to construct a system of standards and values that to a considerable extent are at odds with those predominant in most countries across the world, [28].

The partial radicalization of political Islam is already underway, and already in the near future this process will be instrumental in changing the image of such groups as HAMAS and Hezbollah. The HAMAS movement, which at present is supported not by Iran, but by conservative Arab regimes, will probably move towards peace with Israel. Its possible democratic transformation into a ruling political force of the entire Palestine Autonomy will create a new situation that both Israel and Western countries will have to take into account, [29].

The first scenario, The Rise of Arab Regional power in Middle East:

This possibility means the return of state from the Arab countries to play a leadership role in the region. The expected two countries are Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where despite the weaknesses experienced by both, they are only two countries which possess multi-national capabilities can produce effects and influence on the level of regional interactions, whole and varied.

Egypt seeks to address the elements of weakness that hit the political body, and balances the overall strength in the last years of the rule of Hosni Mubarak. The popular legitimacy that accompanied the victory of the revolution of January 25, the momentum that the Egyptian diplomacy is needed in order to restore regional positioning, by returning to play the primary roles in Palestinian negotiations between Fatah

and Hamas, and the Palestinian-Israeli relations - and on the course of events in Syria, and Iraq , and the security of the Gulf.

While the differing interests and attitudes impeded, during the rule of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood, a convergence Egyptian - Saudi because of what seemed aspiration of the group to build an Arab influence, and in a manner threatening the pillars of the presence of other Arab regimes, especially in the Gulf region , this discrepancy has exacerbated the growing influence of Entity in the Arab ruling elites and affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, it has been the center of Cairo - Ankara more coherent than the Egyptian - Saudi relations, or Turkish - Iranian, as well as apathy between Egypt and Iran, and between the latter and Saudi Arabia, for political and strategic reasons remain. It can be explained by the strength of the Egyptian - Turkish relations, the Islamic orientation of the two ruling parties, [29].

On the other hand, clearly it seems to Egypt during the reign of the current president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is trying a foreign policy toward more autonomy for the American traditional ally, where Egypt began seeking new alliances with emerging world powers, especially Russia and China, and to focus on relations with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf and to Algeria in the Maghreb, in order to resurrect the historic Egyptian perception in the political sense of reality, through the creation of an Arab foundations in the immediate region, and out of the logic of monopolistic relations with the United States but not others. From other international powers, which means looking for greater autonomy in decision-making, and empowerment of the larger wiggly room as well?

This ambition of Egyptian is faced with some of the structural barriers that reduce the sidelines of the Egyptian diplomatic maneuver. Egypt is in need of the return of security and stability in the boundaries, which reflected negatively on the financial returns of tourism basically, what made it dependent on loans granted by the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE). This vulnerability will not make Egypt able to return to play its role as a leader in the region, because another Arab competitor aspires to live up to this role,[30].

For its part, Saudi Arabia is trying to emerge in the status of the only Arab force in the Middle East, highlighting three factors that considerit capable of dedication as a rising power in the region:

First, Huge financial resources that the Kingdom possess to enable it to use diplomacy with a wider social impact through the provision of aid to other countries, and this leads to strengthening Arab relations

on the one hand and ensures the friendly relation to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

Second, The oil resources that make the Saudi Arabia the first source of oil in the world, and that mean the possibility of influence, relatively, in power strategies that rely on Saudi oil.

Third, The Islamic religion. By virtue of its administration of the Islamic holy places, it plays a chord on the religious sensitivity to ensure the loyalty of many human groups across the world, [31].

But the Saudi role that is hoped taken by the Saudis decision makers collide with many geopolitical factors, most notably Saudi rivalry - Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, and the adoption of Saudi Arabia on the US security umbrella, which hinders the independence of the decision-making security and Saudi strategic, and convergence - Israeli Saudi interests implicitly about the need to confront Iran's nuclear ambitions. Finally, the nature of the Saudi political system regarding the policy of peace, in fact, as it seeks to establish security for the peoples of the region and the world, [32].

All these factors make the possibility of the rise of an Arab regional power in a small area, given the structural constraints, and regional and international variables that prevent this. Thus, we can anticipate another scene which says the possibility of a strong rise in non-Arab region.

The second Scenario, The possibility of the rise of non-Arab regional power:

This scene is based on the assumption which excludes the rise of an Arab country, and from that comes to one of the three countries in the region non-Arab -actors in the Middle East regional system, namely Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Each of which has elements of the force, but there are also elements of the challenge of the possibility of its own leading role in the Region State.

Iran has the power of the geographical element, human, economic element, and military element which qualify it to play a primary role in the region, [33]. But it noted that elements of the Iranian power may turn at the same time to determine the nature of the obstacles to its relations with some regional and international actors function. Geographically, Iran excellent position on the Persian Gulf Arab transformed in the last decade to the point of weakness, the fact that US military bases surrounded by almost every aspect of (the Gulf Arab states, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan). Add to that the Iranian - Saudi competition for hegemony in the Persian Gulf, and the intensification of the conflict between the two countries on a number of strategic issues, including

the issue of Bahrain, and the protection of the Sunni minority in Iran, and the Shia in Saudi Arabia, and the collision of bilateral interests in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Strategically, Iran began a dialogue with warned Western powers, particularly the United States, on the nuclear issue. Iran has an entitlement possess peaceful nuclear energy, while rejecting the West, Israel and Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, any prospect of a nuclear Iran, even if under the principle of nuclear ambiguity. As it also works by Israel. Iranian rapprochement - American caution was its results at the level of the Saudi and Israeli scenarios for any prospect of full normalization between Tehran and Washington, and this makes the Iranian thorny issue for the future of the Arab - Israeli relations.[34] On the other hand, Iran can through implicit and understandings with the United States play the balancing role for the stability of Iraq, and Syria and facilitator to end the civil Syrian war, and the security chaos in Lebanon through influence in regional allies: Assad government in Syria, and Lebanon's Hezbollah.

At the Religious and symbolic level , Iran presents itself like a lawyer of Per Shiite Muslims in the region, which explains its relations with the former Iraqi government, led by Nuri al-Maliki, the Syrian government, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the opposition in Bahrain and even the Houthis in Yemen, all controversial issues with Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, so that accuses Iran of feeding the sectarian strife and conflict against the Sunnis in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen, which constitutes an existential threat for Saudi Arabia on a long time, [35].

With regard to the Iranian support to the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, and this is the bottom line in the contentious relations between it and Israel, the prospects for direct confrontation between the two sides keep little reference to the military weight of each, and the consequences of a possible war on the regional system, and even on the international system. And from it, the Iranian - Israeli animosity is nothing more than a war of words adduced by the parties purely for internal purposes, and that there were limited aspects of electronic wars, and assassinations of scientists and engineers, but they do not live up to the level of a declaration of war.

As for Turkey, in 2011, Turkey was seen as an unstoppable regional power and a rising star led by its Development and Justice Party (AKP). But the arrival of Arab uprisings heralded a deep change in the region. Turkey's prominence began to fade and Iran's potential appeared to be rising with the progress it is making in nuclear negotiations. Further developments in the region have continued to surprise observers, especially

the emergence of the ascendant force that is the Islamic State (ISIS),[36].

Until the Arab revolts began, many believed Turkey would enjoy a bright future as a leader in the region under the AKP. Most Arabs were eager to emulate the Turkish model of democracy and economic success. Many politicians established and named their parties after the ruling AKP, and Turkish products and soap operas were flooding Arab markets and homes.

With his charisma and rhetoric, former Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was seen by most frustrated Arabs as a savior, a leader who cared for his neighbors and had qualities their own dictators lacked – especially his open opposition to Israeli policies and practices against the Palestinians. Nonetheless, as the Arab uprisings continued, a shift began to take place,[36].

Turkey lost territory in Syria, upset the Gulf States, further strained its lukewarm relations with Iraq, entered into conflict with Israel and finally saw its relations with Egypt deteriorate. And Turkey's challenges didn't end at its doorstep. With the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and the 2013 corruption scandals involving a number of AKP ministers, the problems turned out to be domestic as well.

Moreover, it has tried since the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power, in 2002, a new policy, was the main architect Foreign Minister, Ahmed DoudAoghlu, and his theory of strategic depth, and make the issues of conflict zero. But the basic problematic for Turkey is its legacy and balance in the region, which is not necessarily positive. The Arabs see it as colonial rule for five centuries, while the Iranians see it as a mortal enemy, and ally of the West and Israel, being a member of NATO, while Israelis Turks is not trusted allies,[37].

It is true that the Turkish government has adopted several policies, tried through which re-gain confidence with all its neighbors, it has prevented the use of its territory for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and normalized relations with Syria, even Turkey has become a mediator between Damascus and Tel Aviv in the indirect negotiations in 2008, and rose up Prime Minister Rajab TayyipErdogan, in the face of Israeli President ShimounPeris at the Davos forum, launched a ship that sailed from Istanbul to break the siege on Gaza, and began building a Syrian four-Turkish strategic dialogue - Iranian - Iraqi - the year 2010, also supported the Arab popular uprisings, while called Arab Spring since the beginning of 2011.

But Turkey's error was the feeling of placebo surplus of power hold in Turkey, which authorizes intervention in the affairs of the region by the logic of

highness, since the support of the Atlantic intervention against Libya (2011), the political and the Syrian armed since March 2011, and the Muslim Brotherhood after their overthrow in Egypt and the opposition (July 2013), [38]. This idle surplus power was the main cause of wasting Turkey to gain strategic depth, and the theory of reset conflict. It has become Ankara's enemy in Damascus (Syria), and the problem in Iraq (the possibility of the independence of the Kurdistan region and its implications for Turkey's Kurds), and a competitor seeks to protect Sunnis in the region (Saudi Arabia), and another competitor seeks to present itself as a Muslim influential in the Middle East (Iran) , an ally and a half and a half at the same time the enemy (Israel), and the low level of relations with the Arab regional power (Egypt).

Israel remains the impossibility of consensus with regard to the possibility of leadership of the region; many objective obstacles inhibit its ability to play this role. Because of the leadership of the determinants of a regional system acceptance by the parties under the leadership of one of them, and its delivery influence, and the settlement of disputes within the system, and this is what is not available in Israel, because it is the first state occupies Palestinian territories, and Lebanon, and Syria, they usurped the international law of the State. On the other hand, with the exception of Egypt, Jordan, the Arab world, Turkey and regionally, the rest of the countries in the region do not recognize Israel, which seriously hinders the possibility to play the leading role,[39]. The Israeli political realism was, and still is, working on the balkanization of the region and distracting, in order to stand out is like a natural entity, amid entities generated from the womb of the fragmented Arab countries, according to the Giver of ethnic, religious, and even sectarian. And it can not to this logic turns into its opposite, Israel and become inclusive element, and not gathering and separating.

On the other hand, Egypt cannot accept the rise, led by the region capable of Israeli force, because it will be a threat to national security, and compete in the historic ambition to lead the region. While other Arab countries in the Middle East regional system cannot accept Israeli domination of institutional, make it a state leader, in this system. As Turkey and Iran, because they aspire to play this role, it cannot be for them to recognize the Israeli peace, even invoking Tel Aviv to possess nuclear weapons.

The third scenario, which the area will be without a commander state or without the strategic handling:

Based on the first and second scenarios, on the basis of the fact that the five mentioned countries do not possess the elements of power to ensure, rising regionally, and the availability of each of them on the obstacles in the end that it is impossible for any state mentioned , to lead the tasks of leadership in the Middle

East regional system, the likely scenario is a continuation of the impact contradictions in the area of wills countries aspiring to play the early rounds, and the continuation of American influence in each of these countries.[40].

The Palestinian issue will remain in the heart of the strategic concerns of the countries in the region, especially for Israel and Egypt, and will affect the nature of future relations between Israel and Arab countries, all the way to Turkey and Iran, in the case of breakthrough relations with the West. For its part, the Syrian civil war will affect the Turkish - Iranian relations by virtue of entrenched parties and belligerents in two different camps, as if Syria became Spain atheist and the twentieth century in a civil war where the warring armies of mercenaries and other countries, according to the interests and conflict ideologies. The political Islam is employed by Saudi Arabia, or Iran or even Turkey will continue embers ideological differences, sectarianism in several Arab countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, [41].

All these facts lead us to say that the Middle East will keep governed by the logic that contained in the philosophy of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes environment, as the various interests, and even contradictory, often will prevent breakthrough situation, and moving to an environment of thought, which looked to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, It is an environment where concerted efforts to build a stable system based either on individual leadership of the region, or a balance between the powers aspiring for leadership. The logical result will be the continuation of domination and influence of the Americans in the Middle East, not directly, as was the case for decades, but through a kind of strategic handling, and the division of labor at the regional level, where each of the five countries will have a specific role, according to the American agenda, the roles lead to the impossibility of the emergence of a dominant pole or state.[40] American national interests in the region will play a role for any ambitious regional brake to some extent to depart from the tendon regional contradictions in order to encourage a regional system in which each party to the other party departs, which ensures the continuation of American hegemony over Hoboz competitive environment.

Referring to the issue of handling the strategy, and the work of regional division, we put the hypothesis that each of the five states can do with the task, on the basis of the elements of regional power without tipping the obstacles, and this reference to the American incentives and brakes for the role of each regional actor. Saudi Arabia, for example, can be assigned a "purge" of political Islam, and the power of the Salafi ideology and jihadist elements of satisfaction, while Egypt will ensure Palestinian peace agreement - an Israeli limited

ceiling mission. As for Israel, it can be looming nuclear deterrence to dissuade any Iranian risk, in the event of failure to reach resolving the dispute between Iran and the West, while Iran could, in the event of a breakthrough relations with the West, rein in the armed Shiite movements, and the resistance in Lebanon, and to a lesser extent in Iraq and the sharing of roles with Saudi Arabia in order to ensure the security of the Arabian Gulf. Finally Turkey, , is wanted to the imposition of stability in the Kurdish areas that can dream of secession, both for Iraq, or even for the Turkish state, as Turkey will remain Islamic democracy is like the success of the model in an area some see it as bacillus on the transition to democracy.[42].

Finally, in dealing with Terrorism. Recent events have reinforced American awareness of terrorism as a security problem. Terrorism is a well-established mode of conflict on the Middle Eastern scene. We will continue to have a keen stake in limiting the threat of terrorism to friendly regimes and Western citizens and assets, as well as preventing the spillover of political violence emanating from the region. A variety of future regional conflict scenarios may stem from terrorist action, and counterterrorism is likely to be a motivating factor in many instances of U.S. and Western military intervention. Terrorism might also emerge as a tactic for regimes bent on more-traditional forms of regional aggression. In the future, U.S. strategy will need to address the problem of terrorism both as a stand-alone threat and as a "fifth column" or "asymmetric" risk in regional conflicts.

Geopolitical shifts and regional transformations

The declining appeal of the west is part of a broader transformation in the global order that is reconfiguring pathways of politics and development. Big geopolitical shifts, including the rise of Asia and the growing influence of the Gulf countries, are blunting the reach of traditional 'great powers' and making it harder to reach consensus on critical global challenges. Power and influence are increasingly diffuse, and distributed among a wider variety of often-competing state and non-state actors. This has contributed to a profound disjuncture between the intensely transnational nature of contemporary political and socio-economic problems and the breakdown in global cooperation necessary to address them. The results can be seen across a wide array of issues in the Middle East.

No longer can superpowers organize a comprehensive international conference as the United States and the USSR did in Madrid in 1991 to discuss the Middle East Peace Process. The achievements and impact of Madrid stand in contrast to the faltering attempts, a little over two decades on, by the US and Russia to convene the meeting of Syrian regime and opposition groups in Geneva and persuade all warring

parties and regional actors of the utility of joining in and reaching a negotiated settlement. In part, this reflects the multidimensional character of the contemporary global system, in which power is more intangible and refracted through overlapping layers of national, regional, and international interactions.[43] Thus, the Syrian conflict encompasses a state that has lost control over much of its territory and arguably over elements of the military chain of command, myriad local groups loosely aligned into a national opposition coalition, and jihadist cells linked to cross-border movements of men, weapons, and ideology, all in receipt of declared and undeclared support from various regional states, from Qatar to Turkey and Iran.

Decisions affecting conditions in Syria are as likely to be taken in Teheran, Istanbul, Riyadh, or Doha as they are in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, or Hama. In addition to the longstanding support given by the Iranian state (and its paramilitary and regional offshoots, including Hezbollah) to the Assad regime, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have played key roles in channeling political and military assistance to rebel groups. Meanwhile, Kuwait has emerged as a fundraising hub for both the government and the opposition (and their respective sectarian backers). But while these connections have added a degree of strategic depth to the competing rebel movements that has enabled them to fight the regime (and each other) to a stalemate, they also have imparted great unpredictability to the course of events within Syria itself. For example, it is doubtful that Kuwaiti, Qatari, or Saudi backers exercise any real leverage over the fighters they support, or even whether they are fully aware of which groups on the ground are benefiting from their aid.

This multiplicity of voices makes any consensual political settlement on Syria – or any other Arab Spring or international issue – very difficult to achieve. Solutions can no longer be imposed on recalcitrant societies by a dominant external player, as the Bush administration tried (and failed) in Iraq. Instead, the range of participants capable of exerting an influence on events is exacerbating the fragmentation of the international response to states in crisis or societies in transition. Post-Mubarak Egypt offers a prime example of the tangled and frequently competing agendas at play.

The three most noteworthy regional developments in 2015 were the formulation of the nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1, the Saudi and its alliance war in the Yemeni civil war, and the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war. Whatever its implications for Iran's nuclear program and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the nuclear deal also heightened concerns about Iran's capacity to pursue a

hegemonies agenda in the region. Like the Saudi intervention in Yemen, the Iranian nuclear deal must therefore also be viewed through the prism of an intensifying competition between regional powers – based on identity no less than on geopolitical interests – for preeminence in what seems like a region made increasingly chaotic by the weakening of central authority in various states and, as a result, the multiplication of local actors in regional alignments and balances. The third development, Russia's direct involvement in the combat in Syria, served as a dramatic reminder that the Russian new face of power has come back to the international seen as before, [44].

The future Strategic challenges to the Arab World.

It seems that the Arab region on a date with history with the dawn of each new century, but of the tragedy, with the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Arab region arena for fueling the conflict between European nations colonial greedy to extend its influence colonial to the Arab region, by working to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and heredity areas Arab under its control have emerged through the French campaign led by Napoleon Bonaparte on the east out of Egypt 1798, which Britain sought to be thwarted because the preparation has the upper hand in the European colonial era in the Arab region.

Implementation of this colonial schemes did not delay, but the emergence of the State of Mohammed Ali the Great in Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and the rise of his power to the extent that threatened the power of the same Ottoman Empire, especially after the advance of his armies against Astana, overcame the colonial West and to support the Ottoman Empire it temporarily in order to contain the rising power and returned to the inside across the borders of Egypt to the London Convention in 1840, [45].

This was the first step to weaken both the Ottoman and the State of Muhammad Ali as a prelude to pounce on them in the late nineteenth century after the departure of Mohammed Ali and the weakness of his successors of his sons in maintaining the strength of the state as well as the continued decline of the Ottoman Empire, which is now called «the sick man», thus opening the door for the progress of European colonialism, led by Britain and France to take over large areas of the Arab world and enabled them later, with the beginning of the twentieth century of the signing of Confidentiality Agreement (Sykes - Picot) between Britain and France and pave the way for implementation of the Zionist project in Palestine.

Thus, it was the turn of the century that saw the conclusion of the Sykes – Pico agreement in 1916 at the dedication of the era of implementation of the conspiracy major Western colonial to divide the Arab world and the creation of artificial borders between

regions so as to prevent Arab unity in no time with the purpose of Israel in the heart of the Arab world to ensure the continuation of the Arab East division for western parts, and to prevent the unity of the Arab nation.

It was through deception of colonial projects implemented by Britain against the Great Arab Revolt, led by Sharif Hussein Bin Ali from the land of Hijaz, and the primary objective of these schemes is to exploit the Arab nationalist aspirations of independence from the domination of the Ottoman Empire to weaken the Ottoman Empire and tore up starting, and then direction to divide the Arab world tearing itself and to prevent its unity and abort the revolution Sharif Hussein and aspirations of unity which is enshrined in the Sykes - Pico secret agreement in 1916, followed by the Balfour Declaration in 1917 for the purpose of the Zionist entity in the heart of the Arab world,[46].

It is already known, that the motive behind this colonial conspiracies was aware of the colonial West that the unity of the Arabs and the rise of their power through the creation of a unified state stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf will be the biggest threat to the dominance of the colonial West and civilization dominant on the world, because the Arabs with their based cultural, religious and wealth varied able to formulate an advanced civilization that can pose a real challenge to the influence of the West.

Although the independence of most Arab countries of the European colonization in the second half of the twentieth century, but everyone knows that Western plots to the Arab world have continued through the fueling conflict between the Arab states, and the bombing of border disputes among themselves, in addition to addressing all the power of the legislator former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to unify the Arab nation has been shown so clearly through Western support for Israel in its aggression against Arab states in 1967, and its occupation of land in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and the inaction of the West in the push for withdrawal from these occupied territories for more than 45 years.

The Division and Zionist schemes.

If the Sykes - Pico agreement in 1916-1917, as a project to divide the Arab world, has been often through maps based on geographical grounds wisdom colonial ambitions in that time, the new in Western plots to divide and split the Arab world with the beginning of the twenty-first century it is to put a damper on retail standards and fragmentation and disassembly and division in the map of the Arab world so moved divisive scheme of maps and borders between countries in the divisions within the borders of the states themselves.

Colonial borders drawn up by Sykes - Pico agreements is no longer a measure to keep the status of the current Arab countries, there is talk of converting the 22 Arab member states of the Arab League currently, to about 50 national and small states entity, being dependence at the division from the perspective of ethnic, sectarian and religious components according to the saying «the division of the divided, fragmented and segmentation».

In fact, there are ancient roots of such schemes deconstruction date back to the dawn of Arab independence in the era of the fifties, and in the wake of the emergence of the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine in 1948, and was a Zionist circles behind the promotion of such schemes designed to divide the Arab world into more sectarian, ethnic and sectarian entities.

Zionist plans have been focused in this direction since early in the fifties to start dividing Lebanon into sectarian entities, Zionist circles considers that it should start by seeking to create a Maroni entity in Lebanon, in preparation for the launch of the wheel circulator for more partition establishing a Druze entities, Shiite and Sunni in Lebanon also.

Many believe that the bombing of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 had been the scheme of an Israeli - US Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State then blessed it because he saw it as a way to weaken the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which had moved to Lebanon after Black September events in 1970 in Jordan, on the one hand, On the other hand turn Lebanon into a form of sectarian division in the region, including help Israel to stay in the region within the framework of the legitimate existential entity Jewish center map of fragmented by sectarian and sectarian and ethnic entities, plague the political map of the Middle East, as Israel can find through this ethnic and sectarian entities dwarf, willing to cooperate and an alliance with it in the face of other dwarf entities, thereby increasing the regional dominance of Israel in the region and also help it to fuel the conflicts between these dwarf entities to be the only player the beneficiary of the Network for Conflict Management between Dispersive entities region and meager, so as to ensure its hegemony and stay for a long time in the region. The project of establishing a Maronite entity in Lebanon was to implement this key strategic Zionist colonialism in the Arab region.

Meanwhile, the «Israel's strategy in the eighties», which was shown in the mid-eighties of the last century, almost, and that length about Israel's plans to divide the Arab region along sectarian, ethnic and sectarian grounds included the division of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and other countries.

American historian and Orient list Bernard Lewis, who is professor of history at Princeton University, spoke and a close associate of the policies and the CIA-making in a number of studies circles about what he called the «redraw the map of the Arab and Islamic worlds» along sectarian and confessional and ethnic lines to implement the schemes of colonial Western as new efforts to break up the Arab world.

The chaos creative Attack and to draw attention to the neo-conservatives who took power in the era of George W. Bush were very excited to tighten US control over the Arab world through the implementation of sectarian and ethnic partition schemes from seeing Bernard Lewis of the map of the new Middle East, through the so-called «creative chaos strategy »and promoted by Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State under George W. Bush even that some people often double plan« constructive chaos » with kundeliza Rice, while it was a neo-conservative scheme which sought to occupy Iraq as a prelude to dividing it into sectarian and ethnic entities which was done strongly by Paul Premz, the US ruling to Iraq during the period of occupation, sought to devote through the Interim Governing Foundation and then in the Iraqi constitution and the political process that has been implemented in the framework and are still chapters coming in yet, so that is to talk about a unified Iraq return of a dream and a project and hope are being recovered from by the pan-Arab resistance forces in Iraq, [47].

The neo-conservatives talked in their writings effrontery about their plan, which aims to tear the major Arab states, Iraq will come after the turn of the division of all of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which they considered the grand prize for the evil plot.

The chaos that engulfed Iraq after the occupation, and the inability of US forces to control the situation there, and the outbreak of the waves of Iraqi resistance to the obstruction of the US expansionist project in Iraq, and not to the neo-conservative plan is completed in the extension to Syria have led, and emerged calling for ideas for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq after the increase in the cost of the US occupation there on the US economy.

The era of Barack Obama to inaugurate the idea of a gradual withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is clear that the US strategy and intelligence departments are still working on the implementation of the neo-conservative agenda to deepen divisions, sectarian, ethnic and sectarian divisions in the Arab region as a strategic blueprint for US circles help it extend its dominance on the Arab region, and serve Israeli targets aimed at further weakening the Arab world and completely eliminate the idea of Arab unity,[48].

We would say that, the US interests meet with the goals of Israeli strategic goals, Implementing rewrite the political map of the Arab region schemes towards further disassembly and division and fragmentation that achieve American and Israeli targets together in the continued hegemony over this region, and to prevent the emergence of a cultural project Arab unifying restores prestige of civilization of the Arab nation, that considers West and Israel and America fateful threat of Western colonial domination in the Arab region and the world.

In order to that policy, it has come in the newspaper «New York Times» American published a study prepared by the American researcher Robin Wright of the US Institute of Peace and published in September 2013 under the title: «Imagine the redrawing of the Middle East map ».The study explained very clearly about the scenarios that translate the United States seeking to divide the five Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq to 14 countries, and that this plan is what helps the US interests and objectives in the future service.

These scenarios include the creation of a state for the Kurds integrate the Kurds of Syria and Iraq with the Kurdistan named in northern Iraq and eastern Syria, also refers to the possibility of establishing a state called «sunniStan» include Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, through the cross-border merger between the two countries, and refers to the creation of the state «Shiites Stan »in southern Iraq, with the possibility of extension to parts of the Arab Gulf states later on sectarian grounds.

In addition, the possibility of establishment of the state in the southwest of Syria on behalf of (the Druze Mountain). The study also suggests the possibility of a return to the division of Yemen into two states in the north and the south, as well as the establishment of an entity of the Shia insurgency led by al-Houthi in the north of Yemen.It also refers to the possibility of the division of Libya into three states before independence of Tripoli in the west and Benghazi in the east as well as the Fezzan and Sabha in the south.As for Saudi Arabia it is divided according to a study reported into five states along tribal lines and sectarian states with the possibility of the establishment of an Islamic holy modeled on the Vatican in the holy places in Mecca and Medina, [49].

We must point out here, to the multiplicity of writings that talk about American and Zionist projects to try, the division of Egypt, and talking literature on the establishment of a mini-state in the east of Egypt includes Delta and Sinai under Zionist influence, and the establishment of mini-state of the Copts extending from the central level through the Western Sahara until Alexandria to Alexandria as its capital , in addition to

the establishment of a Nubian state in southern Egypt being attached to Nubia in northern Sudan to form a mini-state called (Nobustan) and of course the re-division of the Sudan, which is targeting the establishment of four countries at least the schemes stretch began with the secession of the south and the establishment of the State of South Sudan, In addition to Nobustan state in the north it is being set up an Islamic state Sudanese capital Khartoum which include the North Central and the capital currently, with plans to set up a state in Darfur in the west, and there is a talk of other entities set up in eastern Sudan on the border with Ethiopia as well as Kordofan.

Those Distributive schemes also include the Maghreb countries and centered on the establishment of the state of «Amazigh» or Berbers in the Maghreb countries, and the creation of a desert Polisario between Morocco and Algeria, countries and involving these schemes to reconsider some of the entities and the Arab countries list the possibility of integrated or attached to other entities list or being developed on a sectarian and confessional and ethnic lines include the Arabian Gulf and the Levant region in addition to the Maghreb.

Arabs and strategic challenges

In light of all this data, we have to refer to the following main points:

First, The US plans to bring the Arab world split are schemes formulated a strategy with the help of centers of academic research and strategic planning departments, and is clear to us that the schemes «constructive chaos» launched by the neo-cons are still continuing in the Arab region in the era of Democratic President Barack Obama, who said to adopt a strategy of withdrawal from the Middle East and the US it seeks to focus attention on the emerging conflict in the region politically and economically in the Pacific and East Asia.

But it is certain that any US administration would remain deeply engaged in the Middle East situation, even if American interests fell out, and that due to the influence of the Zionist lobby and the pursuit of America to protect Israel's security, not only for the protection of Arab oil interests in the region.

So we must take the US plans to divide the Arab world along sectarian and ethnic lines very seriously and we have seen a private direct result of that in Iraq, and US insistence on supporting the secession of southern Sudan.

Second, The concrete facts showed that lax or American inaction in the face of bloody massacres carried out by the regime of Bashar Assad against his own people in order to abort the Syrian Revolution, was intentional lax and deliberately, because it serves the

US goals in the emergence of crisis and worsening conditions lead to the division of Syria along sectarian and ethnic lines and doctrinal through fueling hatred between the Syrian people components, such as the emergence of talk about the creation of a top mini-state on the Syrian coast called «Allawis Stan», and set up mini-state for the Kurds in the east and the Druze in the south-west and facing years Syria Year Iraq to create a mini-state (Sunni Stan).

Thus, without the devastating civil war in Syria, it was difficult of the emergence of these ideas and put forward as solutions to the plight of the current Syrian.

Third, Which is the worst of the current Arab political scene, is America's success in exploiting aspirations of the Arab legitimate towards freedom, democracy and get rid of the tyranny to push Arab societies to engage in conflicts and wars devastating civil under which ground paving projects division and fragmentation of nations, and the formulation of new maps based on ideas promote division and encourage separation as a viable option to get out of the cycle of bloody conflicts in the Arab societies, especially in the countries of the so-called «Arab Spring.»[50].

The division of the region now poses as a practical solution to the Syrian plight, in the absence of the ability of all parties to resolve the conflict militarily, including the system which used every weapon of war and it has no ability to resolve the conflict, and in the failure of the West Syrian opposition support so that the Free Syrian Army «FSA» almost became the weaker party in the cycle of conflict in Syria now, with the rise of the armed forces, including the followers of the extremist organization «Qaeda» in the map of the conflict in Syria now.

In Yemen, while political forces succeeded in reaching a formula for the success of the national dialogue on the basis of the initiative Gulf, regional powers like Iran intervened to inflame the situation there by supporting the Houthis, so as Huthi rebellion knocking on the doors of the capital Sanaa, recently, that continued to preclude the maintain of unity national plan, and reshuffle the cards in the Yemeni arena, taking into account the reservations of some forces in the south, that receive support from Iran on the continuation of state unity, demanding the secession of the south.

Fourth, The US - Iran rapprochement will have the gravest consequences for the stability and the unity of the homeland in the Arab region, because both countries ,America and Iran have common interests to find their interest in fueling sectarian and religious conflicts in the Arab region, even there is a practical alliance between them for the rise of Shiite power in the region, which

practically emerged in the Iraqi arena shows in the US support for the Shiite protests in the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Hence, it is of critical importance to realize the consequences of that on Arab move to deal with the face of the US - Iran plans in this regard.

Fifth, It is noticeable that all the currents separatist and isolationist forces in the Arab world, and all who trade in the protection of minority rights and the cultural identities with Arab identity, such as the Nubian culture and rights issues are being Tamazight embrace supporters or claimants to in the West, particularly in America. Supporters of separatist are awarded Stays in America, being to facilitate their work and to provide material support to them to turn these demands limited to the major issues being adopted across the media circles, and research and academic centers in the United States, as the United States is putting pressure to protect its supporters within the Arab societies, was the exploitation of the recent Arab revolutions to show the separatist elements and promoted in the media and in political and party circles, which means that as the old European colonialism sought to exploit the slogans of protection of minority rights to intervene in the Arab countries during the reign of the Ottoman Empire and down to the occupation, the colonial West, led by America plays of a new paper which is the minority rights and aspirations of cultural work for tearing Arab societies and Arab states that were originated after their independence.

Sixth, One reason for the suffering of Arabs at the moment are the divisive trends, which is the decline of the Arab nationalist thought, thanks to fierce attacks on either internally or externally, and the enemies of Arab unity, [51].

Arab national thought with its vision and comprehensive unity has been able to contain the aspirations of sectarian and religious divisions and unify behind the quest for a unitary national project.

It is ironic that at one time, the Arab nationalist ideology was against the country and the state of hostility and showing it as an enemy especially in the fifties and sixties and considers it a major obstacle in the face of the national project, calling the country a unitary state as a colonial tool to abort the dream of Arab unity.

But for the time being, the greatest concern for us and the advocates of Arab national thought is how to maintain the current state of country and responding to attempts dismantled and fragmentation across the sectarian and ethnic strife and colonial schemes. It is important to maintain the current Arab state Entity in the face of the colonial schemes in order to avoid more

disasters and division in anticipation of better conditions that will lead to new Arabs renaissance, [52].

Conclusion:

From the above, it can be concluded that the most likely leadership style in the region is the absence of the emergence of a State or group of pole states that dominate the Middle East because of the unavailability of most of the elements of power in a particular country, as well as lack of desire and acceptance of each country for the rise of another country and its leadership of the region. In fact, the structural obstacles prevent the monopoly of a single state with the task of leadership, add to this the American role for each independent brake ambition, because it is not in the interest of the United States to be in the Middle East, an independent strategic force, that is away or independent of the American logic. Strategic handling that can be accepted by the United States, as a new regional engineering, does not mean the enjoyment of the five countries in a mentioned margin of maneuver allowed to climb regionally, because US interests in the region will keep affecting the future of the US handling of the Middle East for traditional accounts themselves (to ensure the flow of oil, Israel's security, and the fight against terrorism). These US restrictions on regional powers entail stimulating the engineering Eastern competitive Hobzah which each state and other states deviate, which means that the US strategic shift from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific is not synonymous with giving up its interest in the region, or for the management of its affairs, and that inaction the current US commitment to the region is only circumstantial failure to end the new Middle East regional system order. From here we see that there should not be any illusions about the strategic stability in the Gulf region if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. Where it will worsen the situation is fraught with multiple-serious crises-especially if other regional countries got nuclear weapons as well. Even if diplomacy by the United States-led forces in curbing Iran's nuclear capabilities succeeded; there will be a mutual relationship of distrust between the United States and Iran, as well as historical tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors in the Gulf region, and that case will not disappear overnight, and the feel of the Arab Gulf states are deeply concerned about the armed potential of Iran with nuclear weapons, but the most pressing now concerns the threat of Iran, of the quest for instability by creating internal unrest, and that Iran is starting to act as a responsible state; the remaining US forces and non-extended in strategic positions in the region Gulf; to inspect Iran, and to protect their common interests, and to reassure its friends in the Gulf that the nuclear deal with Iran will not allow Tehran to increase its influence in the region. In order to protect the interests of the United States; it should have to keep its military capabilities in the Gulf region, but in the era of isolation; the big challenge for Washington is to find the right balance between objective reassurance

requirements, the US strategic interests in the region and around the world, and the costs of the budget as the United States to deploy effective military capabilities are not enough; may increase the feeling of insecurity among the Gulf states, as well as a matter cast doubt on Washington, and sends a message to appease the Iranian hardliners, and possibly cause persist in the other direction, and with a huge US military footprint; in losses financial and possibly political, and undermine US efforts to encourage regional partners in the pursuit of defense and security reforms greater, as does not offer any solution to the threat of Iran, which can be treated more effectively through policy, security, economic, that promote internal stability of regional partners measures. In conclusion, I believe the Middle East represented a significant and costly challenge to the United States of America for the past two decades, with respect to those killed in the battles and wealth and international reputation. Despite that Washington can afford, whether to reduce its participation, or to address the region's problems, only from far. There is no way for the United States of America to be late for the implementation and development of the strategic redesigned design, the stability region regarding the status of their forces in the Gulf region, especially with the increasing global demand for complex, multiple security challenges, from the effects of the Syrian crisis and the Russian intervention in the region and the emergence of armed militias as Daash and the Houthis in Yemen and there is the emergence of new readings of militias that cannot be predicted, and then; Washington will not be able to afford the loss of its efforts wasted on less important than the fundamental priorities of the strategic priorities. Hence; the most important ever is the US defense strategy design in the Middle East, specifically the Gulf region, and relating to reassure its partners, and deter their opponents, and continue to carry out its tasks in the fight against terrorism, and to promote the necessary political development to cut tendons extremism, and promote internal stability.

It is also important to secure the new situation forces in the Gulf region to support its effective strategy, where this situation contributes to the best of its contribution in strengthening the military efforts regarding the protection of their interests, and promotion in the region is deteriorating and put them day after day, through betting on the continued superiority possibility of its existence, At the same time strengthen the maritime capabilities, and enhance the rocket attacks, and to achieve diversification and change, and activating participation in sharing expenses of the war of frightening terrorists ; the most important thing is that the United States must clarify its defense strategy, and the situation of its troops – for its alliances and its enemies as well, as it seeks to stay in the Middle East in order to consolidate its relations, building long-term relationships with its partners, associates, and those that contributed in shedding the

blood of its enemies during the operation, the military side-by-side of the Americans counterparts. The United States should make it clear that under any scenario that is adopted and disclosed; it will maintain a keen interest to its partners to achieve security in this vital strategic region.

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