

National Identity/Security Temporality in the E Conduct of War among Non Democratic States

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Abstract: This paper examines the construction of the identity of the security actors in some countries at war, and the sense that these actors give to the concept of temporality. The first section discusses the concept of "the mentality of Pearl Harbor" as structuring repository culture of security actors. The second section discusses the contribution of the concept of "partitioning" in the work of construction of identities of the actors. The third section puts into perspective the product of the confusion between the concepts of strategy and tactics of these actors and its impact on temporality. These three combined sections provide an analysis grid on the dynamics that continue to cross some non democratic African States on security issues decades after independence.

Keywords: Identity, security, temporality, construction, war.

INTRODUCTION

In his book with a revealing title: *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Yosep Lapid argues that "culture and identity are making a dramatic return into the theory and practice of social science in the late twentieth century." This point of view is shared by Martha Finnemore for whom international relations are conditioned by a set of beliefs, norms of institutions and shared values in an inter-subjective way.

The concept of identity according to Alex Macleod refers to a simple question: "who are we?" "And the answer to that question is less clear because it depends on the posture of the researcher and the unit of analysis the researcher intends to promote. At the national level, identity refers to a set of beliefs, attitudes and opinions towards oneself and the other, shared by a large majority of members of the national entity. These beliefs, attitudes and opinions include, among others, values, norms, culture, and role perceptions that his state plays in international politics and the status that it claims to occupy among other states [1]. This design identity from the perspective of Paul Kowert. An internal identity "describes the cohesion and consistency of parts of a nation-state and in particular how such cohesion is manifested in the fidelity to the Nation-state" and external identity, one that revisits "the distinctive character of a Nation-state in relation to other Nation-states."

Security and defense issues are with no exception influenced by this consideration, including the meaning attributed to certain variables, their importance or their relativity. This is the time of the temporality of events, the meaning given in the conduct of social activities and even military as the conduct of armies on the battlefield. If it is true that time is the product of a cultural process, the question that arises is how identities structure the interests of the state security reducing temporality to a residual position in favor of other variables?

In strong democratic countries, the meaning given to temporality in war reflects a set of democratic practices related to parameters such as the weight of public opinion, and the existence in the State of other centers of power. All this helps to structure the interests of security players by giving them a prominent place to time, the same temporality in military operations. This is what explains the fact that the deployment of the armed forces generally takes during a specific time space on theaters. If as suggested by Susan Strange, democracies do not make war, they nevertheless make war, either as part of interventions for peacekeeping operations or for certain Assistance and or stabilization. Thus, these interventions are framed in a politically constructed and designated temporality and beyond which any justification becomes difficult. Time is the subject of special attention. Elsewhere, we observe that the emphasis on the time variable is less pronounced.

The time is considered here as an available data, abundant, resilient in the conduct of military activity. This is actually a long, indefinite time. Everything happens as if in fact there is no time limit when the armies are deployed. The requirements mentioned in democratic context do not seem to make sense. And if one continues the analysis based on the authors mentioned above, we can logically deduce that the relative importance of temporality is also the product of an identity, a culture, the construction process is interesting to analyze. And to address the process that led to the construction of an identity, a culture that develops in a particular way temporality in wartime, we chose three wars on African soil. The Chad-Libya war, caused by the border dispute band Aouzou. The Cameroon-nigerian war over the Bakassi peninsula. And finally, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict for control of Badme village in the Tigray region.

The interest to analyze the process of construction of identities and temporality as a product of this process in these three conflicts is that they gave us the image of endless wars, not circumscribed offensives in a temporal space defined. It seemed that the military deployment just had to limit the adversity of the enemy, and the only important goal is the destruction of tactical targets. The armed conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria (De koning,) was spread over a year, from 1993 to 1994, is offensive and against-offensive. The Chad-Libyan war took place in four stages, respectively in 1978, 1979, 1980-1981, 1986-1987 and then by the incursions of the Libyan army in Chad territory, finally an offensive by the Chadian army, ended the fighting. The Eritrea-Ethiopian war, offers the most impressive example of the long time in the conduct of a war between two non-democratic states. This war begins in 1999 and still goes on today despite the lull, with 500 000 troops massed along the disputed border [2], facing each other.

The purpose of this paper will therefore to look at the different factors that shape the identities of the actors in charge of security matters [3] and how this process minimizes the time while reproducing this marginality on the operational level in wartime.

The Long time in the conduct of military activities that we assume in these cases is only the phenomenological dimension of a distant and progressive process that we intend to analyze in the context of this text. The first part discusses the contribution of the "mentality of Pearl Harbor" in identity construction of relevant security actors. The second part will address the bulkhead as a relevant referent. And finally; the third part will discuss the widespread confusion about the concepts of strategy and tactics.

The "Pearl Harbor mentality" "in the structuring of identity in terms of States security.

First, give a definition to the concept of "mentality Pearl Harbor" (1) and then analyze how it contributes to the establishment of the identity of the security actors and marginalizing its effect on the concept of temporality (2).

The « Pearl Harbor mentality »

Let's make a little bit of history. On the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 [4], submarines and bombers of the Japanese naval air attack by surprise the American fleet in the Pacific Pearl Harbor, one of the main naval bases of the United States in the peaceful, without a declaration of war. The material and human cost of this attack is very heavy. Eight US warships and ten other ships were sunk or severely damaged. About two hundred planes destroyed and nearly three thousand soldiers and sailors killed, wounded or missing. The Japanese attack will cause much excitement in American society and will justify its entry into war when they had hitherto refused in the name their traditional isolationism to engage in World War II.

The "Pearl Harbor mentality" "concept is from the American Joseph S. Nye in his book *The Paradox of American Power*. It aims to translate this attitude characteristic of US Governments consisting in being interested in solving a problem only when there are directly concerned.. For him, it is a culture that is prevalent in the American political class and crosses it since the Second World War and materialized in its foreign policy [5] with ideological and strategic grounds, known as "isolationism". The concern is not an international problem unless it directly threatens our interests or our security. This attitude is more than sixty years after when the United States will suffer the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, such a deadly scale than the December 7, 1941

The link between « Pearl Harbor mentality », identity, security and temporality.

If in the American context, isolationism was posed as a strategic principle here, one can hypothesize a form of isolationism that is similar to the principle of non-interference. Cameroon has this positioning and Chad also. Discursive posture of the political and military elite was moving in the direction of non-interference. And even in cases where these problems directly affect these countries (political instability in the Central African Republic), there was a commitment from them to minimum. The result of such a posture, of that mentality has gradually given way to a culture of the « wait and see » that is still observed in the international behavior of countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon [6], and less for Chad since 2011. The logic of such a posture is that the problems are addressed

only when as they arise. Therefore follows a lack of foresight and responsiveness. Since a crisis does not occur in its territory [7], or does not impact directly the sovereignty of these states, less caution is granted to such matters. Except that in this configuration, absence of security crisis shapes the identity of the actors in a perpetual lack of spirit .consequently relevant security actors routinely react when a security crisis occurs, hats is, the responses are the product of a mental construct that does not include foresight, but rather gives the importance to emergency as a reference in the resolution of conflicts.

Thus, in such context, a security crisis managed with emergency procedure will not be an easy task for the actors involve who will give a marginal place to temporality, duration of the intervention, they are obsessed by sense that the e achievement of tactical objectives, will the sole factor able to give them credibility. This is even more profound when the structures in charge of crisis management are hill prepared, due to a lack of foresight. A good illustration ias when the Nigerian army occupied three-quarters of the Bakassi Peninsula, by routing a portion of the Cameroonian army which has long been structured by the dynamics of non-interference. The actors at the strategic level have not forged a geopolitical vision of the hegemonic ambitions of Nigeria. The Chad also has long hesitated on the behavior of Libya before being surprised by the winning designs of the latter.

The responses of Cameroonian armies [8] and Chad [9] will be part of a dynamic of reclaiming lost spaces, despite the time taken for it. This takes into account relative temporality, it is also found in the attitude of Eritrea for which the recovery of the portion of land occupied by the Ethiopian army is an objective which should not be restricted in a specific temporality, except that, there it is another reference that take into account this elastic temporality. The time is here perceived as an abundant resource and virtually unlimited service of a larger goal. The same, the Nigerian army, deployed in the Bakassi Peninsula with the aim of occupying the maximum field goal not limited in time [10].. But as soon as a state of relative peace is achieved, also reinstalls for some states, the routine associated with this new reality. And relevant security actors and their states are moving in this iterative pace.

PARTITIONING AS A REFERENT OBJECT OF SECURITY IDENTITY

Security matters has always been essentially part of the reserved domain of the state trough specialized organizations. But in reality, security in the traditional sense and the number of those who are in charge differ according to context. In Democratic society wherein transparency is of great interest, and in

order to avoid a sensitive sector to become a monopoly of the executive power, it is expanded to other centers of power. It is different in non-democratic context where security actors are a minority (1), with an impact on the temporality (2)

Security an elitist prerogative

The partitioning is a practice for every segment of the state to take care of its activity while minimizing interactions, makes sense in the field of security in the countries of interest..The actors involved in defense issues here are often limited to a small group of stakeholders who hold either strategic positions or participating in security decisions [11]. The elite security is often around a few figures including the President of the Republic, his security advisers, the Defense Minister with his advisers and the General Staff of the army chief the police, the intelligence chief. The model provides that the number of those directly involved is very limited. This number tends to diminish sometimes by excluding even the role of the police when the action relates to conduct pure military activities. Decisions falling in the domain of strategy are also taken according to this scheme. Everything concerning the rules of engagement for troops, or areas such as reform of the armies are also managed by a minority of actors that shape and determine the referent object of security. Under these conditions, the flow of information does take place between these small groups, establishing long to own “habitus” to this “governmentality” [12] elitist.

The impact on temporality.

The partitioning is not only the retention of sensitive information for national security. It is also a set of practices that are not institutionalized. The major security actors, by their small number, and given the fact that they are those who produce security policies, build an institutional security model in their culture. These institutions have practices, attitudes derived from the instructions of these key players. The result of this is a poor interaction between the elite and other segments of society such as, the university world as far as current security issues and the introduction of new concepts that structure the role and deployment of armed forces in the theater of operations. Thus crises, security issues are just addressed in a military-centered perspective, given the fact that the army has always had a hegemonic approach when addressing defense issues at the expense of the civil one, this is true except for few key players as the President of the Republic and the ministers in charge of defense and security issues.

It is thus difficult to measure the sense that one invests on variables such as time, because the chain of relevant security actors is far from political concerns as is observed in democratic context, these being structured by a centralized dynamic power around a

strongman. Efforts will therefore be made to allow the military to achieve tactical objectives assigned to it in times of war. Temporality having a high political significance in a democracy, especially when military forces are engaged in a theater of operations, the relevant actors in the context this study, have an identity that places rather the achievement of tactical objectives, and time to achieve in a residual posture.

In the absence of a democratic political culture due to the lack of a democratic environment, including a public opinion which is obliged to extend credit for scrutinizing the slightest imperfection of any decision. This vision which relativise temporality, and registered long time in security practices, experiences of transfer process to the combating units in wartime and explain why it operate in a long time portraying the image of endless war. As far as the Cameroon-Nigeria dispute is concerned, the Nigerian army aimed to occupy all the Bakassi Peninsula, whatever the means used and the "time necessary The Chad had set a goal past the time to put an absolute reconquest of Aozou strip, while Libya has never given a time limit to occupy this territory. Ethiopia and Eritrea are still on a war footing in relation to the number of troops mobilized on both sides of the front line.

CONFUSION STRATEGY / TACTICS AS EXPLANATORY GRID.

How did it come to institutionalize the stretch of time in the conduct of military operations in war in some countries? This question in the first two parts of this text known a beginning of response. To this, it should be added the confusion between the concepts of strategy and tactics [13] that is found in, military system of some states. First, let's clarify these two both concepts (1), before seeing how this confusion plays a role in the construction of identity of the actors (2) with an impact on their perception of temporality.

Clarification and conceptual analysis

Regarding the strategy, a variety of work was done on the issue. However, in the context of this text, and for consistency purposes, we will adopt the definition given by the dictionary of American military origin under official military strategy whose content is much larger: "Art and science to develop and use political, economic, psychological and military means, in times of peace or war, in order to provide the greatest possible support for a policy to increase probability and favorable consequences of victory and reduce the risk of defeat"

Tactics however [14] is understood as a technical or science aiming at directing a battle by combining the action of the armed forces to achieve the objectives of a campaign or overcome the enemy.

Let's go over the contents of both definitions. On strategy, we note that it refers to a larger reality, including the coordination of political, economic, psychological strengths, and military either in wartime or in peacetime. The strategy refers to a more global dimension, which even concerns sectors that first glance have nothing to do with the war. The strategy is to start, it directs, gets overhang and guide the actions that follow. It is a compass, an instrument of anticipation and foresight.

So develop a strategic vision concerning the defense is a political exercise, which complexity relies in a long temporality, marked by a context wherein must interact several logics, with the final purpose dealing with the conception of a most harmonious public policy. Therefore developing a strategic vision, that is to say a document that shows the posture of a state and the direction he gives to security refers to a reality that goes beyond politics but even beyond the military. Thus in the United States, the National Security Strategy, which renews American strategic thinking [15]. After each four years. What must be said is that the document that records the strategy is only the instrumentum, the ultimate form of long reflection, a product of interaction between different actors, and philosophical approaches. We are in a perspective of building a world view [16] in the domain of peace or of war, and this building undergoes the cultural influence of the actors detaining decisional power.

It appears that tactic is solely the deployment of armies on battlefield in wartime; it is a sub-part of the strategy. Moreover, it is the strategy due to its panoramic vision that should guide the tactical action by inserting it into a space-time, well defined. Build a strategy implies also think strategically, with theoretical and operational concepts backed this idea. It is therefore a meaning and power construction process. Tactics, as in its definition, is a tiny part of the strategy, a variation that is responsible for the military aspect in relation to the operational deployment of forces in wartime. Tactic refers to patterns, attack plans, against attack. The tactic is flexible gasoline. A tactic used successfully can be adopted *mutatis mutandis* in another war. The Mongolian leader Genghis Khan chooses to defeat his enemy by destroying gradually and systematically its smaller formations. The Germans made use of this example to carry out their blitzkrieg during World War II [17]. In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban in power in Kabul, the US tactics against terrorists is structured around the deployment of small units of Special Forces.

A perspective of confusion.

It follows that the strategy is very complex, but the tactic is not. The strategy is comprehensive, while the tactic is more accurate since returning to the military in its operational dimension. The strategy is eminently

political, while the tactical concerns only the military structure.

The reasons for the confusion appear at the political level that is to say in the political structure of those States where one is supposed to build a strategy. As a matter of fact nothing of what is mentioned above is practiced by the relevant security actors.

This can be explained by the youth of these states, and the identities of their leaders who were shaped by struggles for independence and preservation of a power granted. In this perspective, strategic issues seem more distant, aerial. It takes a stopgap, that is to say the acquisition of the instruments of sovereignty. A culture of immediacy has gradually been developed in their state governance (still like the concept of urgency, of crisis management) to the extent that it has spread in the political class in these countries.

The renewal in homeopathic doses of the political elite [18] have been assured, the same thought patterns and habits related to the post-independence years are still deeply rooted in the conscience of the actors. The strategy as we have seen, is very complex [19], and can in no case be initiated and built unilaterally, in a perspective of centralization, or this is the problem in the countries we studying. For political systems that built their identities on authoritarianism, excessive centralization negation of otherness, opening strategic affairs to other political forces and other stakeholders in a royal domain is to break down, secret security and defense, as a sole governance model.

And so involve other stakeholders refers to the consideration of introducing unpredictability in an area where the leaders of these countries have built mechanisms of longevity in power.

Where this inaccuracy impact temporality, it is that a strategy that is built according to well developed principles such as the National Security Strategy, necessarily integrates temporality in its global and specific implementation. This document is prepared for a period of four years..The deployment of military forces on battle field goes in line with a specific temporality, as the war has a cost, economic, human, political, internally as internationally. All these settings cannot be managed in a very long time. A policy is intrinsically linked to time, in its design and in its implementation. Inaccurate statements coated tactical strategy elements which have accustomed us the leaders of the six countries at the time of these conflicts, let not the right place to temporality, as the development process is here early, non-participatory and is not part of an overall strategic vision of the establishment of a state on the world stage [20].

Generally, what passes strategy, as it is stated in the direction of the military in wartime, is perceived by them as guidelines that will accompany their tactics, because in many cases, they is asked to make every effort (no time limit) or to defend the national territory, or to correct a historical anomaly, a product of colonization. Thus the long time is the result of strategy which itself is the product of a political culture that shape the identities of the major actors in a repository that gives priority to tactic.

CONCLUSION

Our initial goal was to question the temporality in the period in battlefield of a conventional war between two states. Unlike other contexts that recognize that time is a scarce resource in the deployment of armies in conflict. It shows that the use of what is a scarce, valuable and politically framed in democracies context is rather proven almost as an unlimited resource in non-democratic context. However, long time, elastic temporality hardly gives it an undefined character, but its use is so loose that one wonders about its functionality. We explained this report "The Pearl Harbor mentality "compartmentalization, and the confusion of strategy and tactical concepts. These are the benchmarks that structure the perception of various security actors in the six countries that interested us and that make the meaning given to the temporality of time during war, is in the long time. All these three elements have helped to build and sustainably register long time in tactical practices of the armies of the countries we analyzed. Now the question that may emerge and be the subject of future research is whether, if compared to the practices of temporality in democratic context, which generalize and globalize, we are not here in what Zaki Laidi called "local rewriting of world time."

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