

## Role of Political Influence on the Effective Management of National Government Constituency Development Funded Projects in Kasipul Constituency, Homa Bay County, Kenya

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**Abstract:** Government of Kenya has historically responded to the emerging social and public problems through the establishment of various decentralized financing mechanisms. A prime example of this policy is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) launched in 2003. However, CDF operations have sometimes been controversial because they raise questions about the role of legislators in the management of the fund. This study employed mixed methods research design involving both quantitative and qualitative data to determine the role of political influence on effective management of National Government Constituency Development Funded projects. For the quantitative survey, a total of 400 respondents were sampled using multi staged proportionate random sampling techniques involving project beneficiaries, project managers, local governmental officials and the National Government Constituency Development Fund committee members. Qualitative data included Key informant interviews and focus group discussions with selected actors. Qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis and presented in terms of narrations and verbatim. Quantitative data was analyzed using statistical techniques with the help of STATA version 14 to explore in-depth description of political influence. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was adopted using Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) software version 23 in conducting bi-variate regression and hypothesis testing at five percent level of significance. Latent Variable Path Analysis (LVPA) was employed to explore the effect of political influence on the effectiveness of management of NG-CDF funded projects. The study found that political influence had a statistically insignificant and positive effect on the effective management of NG-CDF funded projects in Kasipul constituency with critical ratio of  $0.222 < 1.96$  and  $P=0.825 > 0.05$ . It was therefore concluded that political influence does not have significant role on the effective management of CDF projects in Kasipul constituency. The study recommended that law should be enacted to avoid abandonment of CDF projects after election of new Member of Parliament.

**Keywords:** Political Influence, Effective Management, National Government Constituency Development Fund, Structural Equation Modeling.

## INTRODUCTION

Every government in the world has a social contract with its citizens. It has the obligation to develop social and economic interventions in order to secure and guarantee the welfare of its citizens. The government is responsible for the development of social amenity infrastructure such as; transport systems, health facilities, clean and accessible water, and electricity. However, it is common to find that; the quality and access to these services is affected by governance, state policies and structure, and implementation strategies. Different countries adopt different development policies to fulfil their social contract. Some emphasize centralization where more decision making authority in regard to development is vested in government agencies; others adopt decentralization in which community involvement in development planning is emphasized [1].

Government of Kenya has historically responded to the emerging social and public problems through the establishment of various decentralized financing mechanisms to address the underlying causes of poverty and inequality [2]. After independence, the government established schemes such as the Kenya Tourism Development Corporation, the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation and the Industrial Development Bank, to provide financing solutions to deep seated problems and conditions in society [2]. The

government also came up with decentralization strategies such as, the District Focus for Rural Development, District Development Committees, to bring resources and services closer to the people. As noted by Roxana [3], over the last ten years, the Kenyan Government has intensified the use of decentralized programmes in its strategy to tackle poverty and reverse regional disparities. A prime example of this policy is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) launched in 2003. Kenya's Constituency Development Fund (CDF) programme has been applauded for taking essential development programs and services to Kenyans at the grassroots level by ensuring equitable distribution of resources. The policy of constituency development fund is to ensure that public money is awarded to benefit specific political subdivisions through allocations and or /spending decisions influenced by their representatives in the national parliament [4].

However, decentralized projects are inherently political product that ensures service delivery is close to the citizen they serve as such, they have some direct political implications. Political leaders may view it as an investment of their political careers with returns. According to Jowah [5] project management is heavily infiltrated by politics, as project manager's work in an environment with an authority gap which leaves project managers without much power. The presence of different groups with different personal and organizational goals working in one project, this coupled by the absence of clear leadership on pertinent issues resulting from the authority gap [5], levels of uncertainty in certain issues in the absence of powerful leadership, and differences of opinion on what is the 'correct way', becomes breeding ground for divergent political formations. The absence of both power and authority therefore results in a project manager with no stable power base. CDF is a creation of parliament by Members of Parliament who according to CDF Act 2013 are the patrons of CDF and also constituency political representatives. In the CDF committee there are also representatives from the wards who represent political interests. This setup predisposes CDF to political influence which extends to CDF projects. CDFs are also viewed by Baskin [4] as politically-initiated projects. He argues that it appears that they are politically driven development initiatives.

The structure of the Constituency Development Fund has political influence as a central theme. Though the National Government Constituency Development Fund Act of 2015 spells out the role of the MP as purely oversight, their influence of project undertakings has remained vivid as observed by Nyaguthii E & Oyugi LA [6] in an exclusive study of Mwea Constituency Development Fund. According to Kenya Human Rights Commission [7] influence of politicians is evident during monitoring and evaluation of projects. The politicians have veto power to determine what aspect of project should be monitored and evaluated, which information should be disclosed for stakeholder consumption and some areas will be locked out of CDF projects. Therefore, the ranking of CDF projects will not focus on societal benefits but rather on political mileage. To the constituents, they will view the CDF projects as political goodwill and therefore they will continue to suffer on the mercy of their politicians. Projects with benefits that extend beyond host constituency will not be considered and this is worsened by fragile institutional framework thus they will not able to support implementation of such projects.

CDF operations have sometimes been controversial because they raise questions about efficacy of government service delivery, the extent which such service can be made accountable, the role of legislators in selecting development priorities and how public participation in policy making can be made more meaningful [8]. According to Okungu [9], 70% of the constituencies have reported mismanagement, theft, fraud and misappropriation, and that CDF issues are of political nature. Ongoya and Lumallas [10] were of the view that, CDF has the potential of being used by politicians to build their reputation in their constituencies and mobilize political support. The fund has no specific development agenda; hence, it stands out as a political tool according to Gikonyo [11]. Wamugo [12] further points out that the success of the fund is pegged on the character and the commitment of the area Member of Parliament to use the fund for general development in his constituency.

Despite the restructuring of the kitty administration through enactment of new policies, unfortunately the completion rates have not improved significantly. Similarly, while the new laws as enshrined in the CDF amendment Act [13] have curtailed political leaders from playing an important role in projects directly, the management of CDF has been facing both direct and indirect political influence where funds at times are used for political activities [13]. Kamau and Muturi [14] have indicated that there is political influence in project identification, funds allocation, staff appointment, monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects. Member of the public and civil society have raised serious questions on political influence and governance of CDF. This has resulted to misallocation of financial and human resources, abandonment of projects due to change of local leadership such as Member of Parliament (MP), prioritization of projects to certain area of the constituency and ghost projects.

Regardless of the abundance of research that has examined political intervention and project performance, there remain a number of gaps that form the basis for this study. The political influence was mainly use in conjunction with monitoring and influence. Further, there has been amendment in CDF Act the prefix National government has been added to avoid conflict of interest with county government projects. The MPs roles have been considerably curtailed as compared to when majority of the reviewed studies were carried out. It is imperative therefore, that the understanding of

political intervention as an antecedent of project implementation is enriched through extending the frontiers of research. The general objective of this study was to determine the role of political influence on effective management of National Government Constituency Development Funded projects in Kasipul Constituency, Homa Bay County, Kenya. The study is limited to evaluating the effective management of National Government Constituency Development Funded projects in the financial year 2013/2014- 2015/2016 in Kasipul Constituency, Homa Bay County, Kenya.

### **EMPIRICAL LITERATURE**

Studies in countries that are implementing CDF have sighted weaknesses in areas of project implementation, where CDF projects sometimes do not target the neediest and they do not reach all the community members. Instead project selection is driven by political factors. There are also challenges in monitoring the implementation of CDF projects. Furthermore, CDF may negatively impact on the relationship between MPs and their constituents. CDF may contribute to shifting the relationship between MPs and their constituents from its democratic basis to a financial basis [15]. The performance of MP is hinged on their effectiveness in the use of CDF. In Philippines, the performance of an MP is not pegged on the contribution to legislative motions as well as debate and their ability to make laws but on their capability in bringing developments that would benefit the constituents [16].

Ashaye [17] affirms that, political goodwill is the key to successful institutional projects development and implementation; conditions and participatory frameworks alone cannot render government bodies fully responsible. According to him, a country like South Africa had to do with inequality and populism. The pressures for clientelist distribution are the strongest in countries with very sharp class stratification, and where a large number of very poor people are left out of economic growth. Okonta *et al.* [18] observed political factors have largely been blamed hampering community participation in decentralized project. According to him bureaucrats and politicians are considered as crucial agent in public project delivery. However, it was noted that public projects frequently completed with poor quality or abandoned leading to loss of billions of dollars every year globally. The politicians can literally manipulate CDF as in most cases they determine which projects to fund in irrespective of the community priority and principle of checks and balances [15]. The MPs, according to law are required to be part of management, structure as well as oversight of CDF therefore, the CDF is at mercy of politicians. Therefore, as long as politicians have major stake in constituency development fund projects, they will use it for political survival through skewed choices [8]. Most the local people will not be aware of fund embezzlement and in cases where they are aware they cannot have the audacity to question the politicians or right channel to lodge their complaint.

Murray [19] asserted that elected politicians always have interest on the CDF funded project in their constituencies in bid to support their re-election in the next general election. This interest according to Murray [20] is not genuine and legitimate as they after seeking approval for re-election. This has resulted to conflict of interest between the constituents and the politicians as they make decision on how and when to spend public funds without consultations. CDF committee members are political appointee by the MP and in some cases, it has been reported that MPs have overly influence on the CDF committee so as to use them in rubberstamping CDF projects. This makes the CDF undisputed MP kitty irrespective of their competence in planning, implementation and development as well as failure to offer adequate checks to deter abuse. Furthermore, the governing structure of CDF is silent in providing adequate checks and balances for example, the Board of CDF is unwilling to hold rogue MPs to account. Murray [19] indicated the solution to this problem is to avoid MPs from the administration so as to avoid accountability and conflict of interest problems. This would allow the CDF funds to be sent directly to projects identified by constituents via recognized structures.

Locations where the MP does not enjoy much political support tend to be sidelined in project prioritization [21]. Infrastructure projects abandonment is evident of political clientele influence [22]. It is common in countries where politicians make sound promises for political interest that would benefit them but not their competitors. To get votes, the incumbent is force left project unfinished so that when they are re-elected they can complete them. However, the scenario becomes ugly when the competitor is elected and the unfinished projects are abandoned in favour of new project for their own political entrepreneurship.

Studies have indicated that political influence has mixed outcome on the performance of decentralized projects. In Brazil, Ferraz and Finan [23] re-election incentives force mayors to cut down on misappropriation of funds set aside for development projects as compared to those mayors who are not after re-election. In India, Iyer and Mani [24] showed that politicians use their influence to affect bureaucratic assignment in the public institutions. In Nigeria, Rogger [25] found that politicians who are facing high completion in politics prefer to delegate public project implementations in their political jurisdiction to more independent institutions to increase their chances of political survival.

Various authors have indicated that CDF has been mostly utilized for political patronage instead of local community development initiatives as envisaged in the CDF Act [26-28, 22, 11, 29]. There have been concerns that only selected persons close to MP have involved in the selection of projects to be implemented under CDF. A research by

Wambugu [12], in Dagoretti Constituency reveals that there is political intervention on the implementation of CDF projects which leads to underperforming of CDF projects in the period of study.

## MATERIALS

The study made use of mixed-methods research design where both qualitative data and quantitative data for triangulation purposes while examining the effectiveness of NG - CDF management in Kasipul constituency. The study targeted 254 projects in the Kasipul Constituency between 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 in the five wards. The projects were categorized as education, health, water, security, roads, sports and environment. These projects formed the unit of inquiry from which three beneficiaries were selected. The study therefore targeted 183,073 possible beneficiaries, 254 project managers, 10 NG-Constituency development fund committee and 7 government representatives (departmental heads from the respective represented sectors). From these universe populations, samples were drawn to collect relevant data for this study. Tools including questionnaires, focused group discussions schedules and interview guides were used to collect relevant data. Primary data was collected by use of questionnaires and interview guides while secondary was obtained from CDF project records. Further, primary data was obtained from the focused group discussions constituted of the beneficiaries.

A pre-field survey was conducted by the researcher to ascertain on some parameters during the proposal writing process in Kasipul Constituency. These parameters included: - Projects executed by the constituency administration within the study period, the type of projects done, the budget allocated. Informed by this pre-field study, this study sampled 77 NG-CDF projects from 254 projects. The sample size for the projects in this study was selected based on the criteria set by Roscoe's rule of thumb Sekaran [30] i.e. a sample that is larger than 30 and less than 500 is appropriate for most research. Also according to Mugenda & Mugenda [31] a sample size of between 10% and 30 % is a good representation of the target population while according to Dooley [32], a sample size of between 10% and 40% is considered adequate for detailed or in-depth studies hence the 30.31% of the NG-CDF projects was adequate for analysis. The sample size of 77 NG-CDF projects was obtained using coefficient of variation. Nassiuma [33] asserts that in most surveys or experiments, a coefficient of variation in the range of 21% to 30% and a standard error in the range of 2% to 5% is usually acceptable.

$$S = \frac{N(Cv)^2}{(Cv)^2 + (N - 1)e^2}$$

Where

S = the sample size

N = the population size

Cv = the Coefficient of Variation

e = standard error

Therefore, the sample size was:

$$S = \frac{254(0.212)}{\{0.212 + (254-1) 0.022\}} = 76.87989019 \approx 77 \text{ NG-CDF Projects}$$

Further, the researcher adopted Yamane, (1967) formula that can be used to calculate a suitable sample for the study which comprised of all NG-CDF beneficiaries currently in the Wards.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}$$

Where

n = Minimum Sample Size;

N = population size;

- e = precision set at 95 % (5%=0.05)

183,073 (Study population) x0.5 =

n = 183,073

1+183,073(0.0025)

n = 399.11  $\approx$  400 Beneficiaries.

The projected sample size for the beneficiaries were 400 respondents from the 77 CDF projects, all the 10 NG - CDF committee members of Kasipul Constituency, 77 Contractors/project managers awarded contracts between 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 and 7 government representatives (departmental Heads). The researcher applied multi-stage sampling technique to select the 400 beneficiaries of 77 CDF projects. Initially, the researcher used proportionate sampling technique to get proportionate number of projects from each ward in the constituency. Then the researcher formed focused group discussions to get important information that needs clarification from the constituents. According to the Kenya national government constituencies Development fund Act 2015, NG - CDF committee at the constituency level should have 10 members. These 10 members represent general interests of the Constituency. The researcher used census sampling technique of all the 10 NG - CDF committee members to form part of the sample of interest to the study. The researcher targeted to interview the committee members from each of the NG-CDF projects sampled, contractors/project managers and government heads departments who also formed part of the sample of this study.

To enhance reliability, the researcher prepared questionnaires and interview guides and administer them to the similar respondents' in Kasipul Constituency for pre-testing purposes. These respondents were however not used in the main study. Approximately 15 participants were used for pilot study. This is according to Isaac and Michael [34] who suggested 10 – 30 participants is ideal in pilot study. To measure the reliability, the Alpha (Cronbach) technique was also employed. On the other hand, validity focused on how well a concept, idea, or behavior that is a construct has been translated or transformed into a functioning and operating reality [35]. The study uses 15 respondents in pilot study to ascertain validity. In addition, since all the respondents are relatively homogenous in terms of socio-culture and socio-economic, the results can be generalized to the entire population of the study.

Descriptive and inferential statistics techniques were used to analyze quantitative data. Descriptive statistics used included frequencies, percentages and mean. For qualitative data, information gathered was coded and analysis was done through narration of the voices from interviews conducted. Specifically, content analysis was used to test data that was qualitative in nature or aspect of the data collected from the open ended questions and interviews. Data were presented in themes using verbatim and narrations. Inferential statistics was used to test the associations and relationships between the moderating, independent variable and the dependent variable (effective implementation of NG - CDF projects) in Kasipul Constituency. The moderating effect of regulatory framework on the relationship between technical capacity and dependent variables was measured using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) which is best suited to analyze paths for latent variables.

SEM provides a more parsimonious representation of the constructs and a better way to account for the individual contribution of each item by more precisely modeling measurement error [45]. Respondents' responses to five items that measured technical capacity latent factor. The study considered other five items that were used to generate regulatory framework that was employed in moderating the model. For the dependent variable, six items derived from schedule, budget, scope, objectives and user satisfaction were used to create a latent factor of NG-CDF project management. Before carrying out path analysis, correlation analysis was performed through use of correlation matrix. This ensures that latent variables are not highly correlated. The following is the general model used for latent and quantitative procedures examining the relationship of unobserved variables;

$$y = \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 X_1 Z + \varepsilon$$

Where;

Y = Effectiveness of NG - CDF project management whereas

$\beta_1, \dots, \beta_2$  = Regression Coefficients;

$X_1$  = political influence;

Z = Regulatory framework;

$X_1 Z$  = interaction term between  $X_1$  and Z and

$\varepsilon$  = the error of term.

These analyses was done using STATA version 14 and the quantitative data was presented in terms of tables and figures. Note that both the constructs were measured in a five Likert scale. Discretion was strictly observed in the course of this research. All ethical considerations were considered. For confidentiality, the identity and privacy of the respondents was protected by the researcher. No pressure or inducements of any kind was applied to encourage the respondents to become participants in the research study.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Considering the instrument return rate, out of the 400 of the questionnaires distributed to NG-CDF beneficiaries the researcher was able to collect 321 questionnaire representing 80.25% and out of 77 distributed to NG-CDF contractors and project managers, the researcher was able to collect 71 back representing 92.2%. Out of the 10 questionnaires distributed to NG-CDF committee members all the questionnaires were returned giving a return rate of



100%. Generally, the return rate was high and able to answer the set objectives of the study. Mugenda and Mugenda [37] assert that a response rate of more than 50% is adequate for analysis. Babbie [36] also asserts that a 60% return rate is good and a 70% return rate is very good

### Political Influence

Political influence was operationalized along three dimensions such as political will, commitment level and political interest. Five statements were formulated to measure the political influence construct using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree and respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed to the statements. They included projects, existence of political will in the identification and implementation of NG-CDF projects, political leadership ability to stick to oversight role leading to effective management of NG-CDF projects, NG-CDF projects are successfully implemented due to positive political influence, Political interest does not affect implementation of NG-CDF projects in the constituency and that involvement of local members of parliament add value to the projects.

**Table-1: Political Influence**

Technical Capacity	Beneficiaries		Managers/ Contractors		NG-CDFC members	
	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Political will	3.90	0.87	4.15	1.06	3.70	0.82
Political leadership	3.70	1.06	3.70	1.41	3.50	0.85
Political influence	3.28	1.05	3.24	1.45	3.10	0.99
Conflict of interest	3.80	1.45	3.17	1.53	3.10	0.99
MP involvement	3.91	1.05	3.75	1.35	2.80	0.79
Overall Mean	3.72		3.6		3.24	

Source: Field Data (2017)

From the finding in Table, majority of the sampled beneficiaries agreed that there is political will in the identification and implementation of NG-CDF projects (Mean=3.90). Similarly, majority of the NG-CDFC members agreed that there is political will (Modal=4, SD=1.06) while the project managers/contractors strongly agreed (Mean=4.15, SD=0.82). The sampled beneficiaries also agreed that the political leadership stick to oversight role as indicated in the constitution which has resulted to effective management of NG-CDF projects although with significant deviation (Mean=3.70, SD=1.6) and the same results was replicated by NG-CDFC members (Mean=3.50). On the other hand, more sampled project managers/contractors strongly agreed that the political leadership stick to oversight role as indicated in the constitution which has resulted to effective management of NG-CDF projects with significant dispersion (SD=1.41) implies there significant deviation among the respondents The results further revealed that beneficiaries averagely confirmed that NG-CDF projects are successfully implemented due to political influence in their management (mean=3.28). The project managers/contractors and NG-CDFC members had same views as shown by means of 3.24 and 3.10 respectively although there was significant deviation in their response. In regard to conflict of interest, the sampled beneficiaries agreed that there is conflict in interest in the management of NG-CDF project as results of political influence resulting to effective management of NG-CDF projects (Mean=3.80, SD=1.45) which proves that there significant deviation on the conflict of interest. However, the sampled project managers and NG-CDFC members' average confirmed that political influence has resulted to conflict of interest in the management of CDF projects with significant deviation (SD=1,53). Lastly, sampled beneficiaries agreed that involvement of the Member of Parliament adds value to the project although with large deviation (Mean=3.91, SD=1.05) and the same results was replicated for project Managers/contractors (Mean=3.75). However, the NG-CDFC members averagely agreed that MP involvement add value to the management of CDF projects (Mean=2.80)

### Test of Hypotheses

The study sought to test **H<sub>0</sub>**: There is no significant relationship between political influence and effective management of NG - CDF funded projects. The study fitted Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) for hypothesis testing. The SEM is a general linear model extension that allows researchers to test more than one regression equation simultaneously. The structural model characterizes the relationships between the constructs or the latent variables and defines those latent variables that indirectly or directly cause alterations in the values of other latent variables in the model [38]. SEM allows examination of the indirect relationships between variables, an approach missing in previous studies. In SEM, the study assessed both the measurement model and the confirmatory structural model.

The measurement model was used where the main concern was the measurement of the latent variables and their indicators. Factor analysis was used for dimension reductions to explore the underlying factors and unidimensionality of each construct [39]. Table 2 shows the results of the measurement including factor analysis results showed that all indicators of the 2 latent variables effective project management and political influence belonged to their relative latent

constructs. All the indicators of project management had loadings above 0.4 on the constructs. However, political will had factor loading less than 0.4 while the rest of political influence had above 0.4. The table also shows the assessment of validity and reliability of the measurements.

**Table-2: Measurement model summary**

Latent variable		Indicator	Factor Loading	Squared multiple correlations	AVE	Cronbach
Political Influence	PI1	Political will	0.320	0.049	0.709	0.645
	PI2	Political leadership	0.834	0.455		
	PI3	Political influence	0.575	0.160		
	PI4	Conflict of interest	0.668	0.490		
	PI5	MP involvement	0.758	0.356		
Effective project management	PM1	Set timelines	0.791	0.536	0.773	0.866
	PM2	Set objectives	0.731	0.517		
	PM3	Budget provisions	0.750	0.463		
	PM4	Technical requirements	0.778	0.491		
	PM5	Quality standards	0.792	0.558		
	PM6	User satisfaction	0.799	0.571		

Source: Field Data (2017)

Each latent variable showed reliability as shown by the Cronbach alpha statistics used to examine internal consistency. Project management latent variable in study had Cronbach alpha statistics greater than the 0.7 threshold while political influence had less than 0.7 but above 0.6. To assess construct validity, both convergent and discriminant validity of the data were examined [40]. The average variances extracted for each of the 2 latent constructs were above 0.5 implying convergent validity. The average variances extracted were also all found to be larger than the squared multiple correlations implying discriminant validity.

A correlation analysis of the latent variables was conducted and correlation coefficients obtained. This aids in assessment of the possible influence of the study variables on effective management of National Government Constituency Development Funded projects, as well as amongst themselves.

**Table-3: Correlations matrix**

		Political Influence	Effective project management
Political Influence	Corr.	1	0.738**
	Sig.		0.000
Effective project management	Corr.	0.738**	1
	Sig.	0.000	

Source: Field Data (2017)

Correlation analysis results for the 2 constructs are presented in table 3. The results indicate that political influence has a significant positive relationship with the effectiveness of project management ( $r=0.738$ ,  $p\text{-value}<0.05$ ). The significant value adopted for all the correlations was set at a  $p$  value of 0.05, implying that the relationships were significant.

A SEM was fitted and from the goodness of fit of the model, it was found that model fitted the data well given that the chi-square statistic with  $p$  value of 0.000. This was also confirmed by other criteria for model fitness such as Root Mean Squared Error of approximation which was found to be 0.064 which is adequately below the desired threshold of 0.08. The model also met the other fit indices requirements normed fit index (NFI), comparative fit index (CFI), goodness of fit index (GFI) and parsimony fitness PGFI and PNFI as shown in table 4.

The SEM fitted shows the extent of political influence on effective NG-CDF project management. Table 5 shows the regression coefficient estimated weights of the SEM fitted. The path coefficients of the estimated model were tested for significance to establish the significance of the causal relationships between the determinants and effective management of projects. The critical ratio of the fitted estimates follows a standard normal distribution thus considers 1.96 as the critical point at 5% level of significance.

**Table-4: Goodness of fit tests**

Index	Model		Desired (good fit) threshold	Status
Chi-square	Statistic	545.941	p-value <0.05	Good fit
	P-value	0.000		
NFI	0.905		≥0.9	Good fit
CFI	0.938		≥0.9	Good fit
GFI	0.905		≥0.9	Good fit
SRMR	0.056		≤0.08	Good fit
RMSEA	0.064		≤0.08	Good fit
PGFI	0.647		≥0.5	Good fit
PNFI	0.624		≥0.5	Good fit

Source: Field Data (2017)

**Table-5: Regression Weights:**

	Path		Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
PM	<---	PI	0.039	0.175	0.222	0.825
PI5	<---	PI	1			
PI4	<---	PI	1.303	0.135	9.654	***
PI3	<---	PI	0.808	0.108	7.477	***
PI2	<---	PI	1.048	0.097	10.791	***
PM1	<---	PM	1			
PM2	<---	PM	0.897	0.072	12.465	***
PM3	<---	PM	0.827	0.072	11.407	***
PM4	<---	PM	0.941	0.077	12.27	***
PM5	<---	PM	1.006	0.07	14.45	***
PM6	<---	PM	1.021	0.08	12.823	***

Source: Field Data (2017)

The critical ratio for the estimate of political influence (PI) was found to be 0.222 that have an absolute value less than 1.96 implying non significance at 5% (Estimate=0.039, P=0.825). Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted as there is no significant relationship between political influence and effective management of NG - CDF funded projects. This implies that political influence does not significantly improve the effective management of NG-CDF funded projects.

**DISCUSSION**

From the results, political influence has continued to produce mixed effect on the CDF project management with significant deviation from various population units in this study. It is evident that, beneficiaries, CDF project managers/contractors and NG-CDFC members had divergent views on the role of politicians in the management of CDF projects (SD between 0.83-1.53). This was supported from qualitative data obtained from interviews and focus group discussions where it was revealed that beneficiaries from MP areas, rate political influence highly as compared to those areas perceived to be opposition. The same was also revealed during FGDs where politicians influence award of contracts and membership of NG-CDFC. This had made it difficult for study to establish significant political influence on the CDF project management. From the findings, it is evident that there is wide problem of political accountability in terms of allocation of control rights in the context of incomplete contracts, where breaches of contract are observable, though not verifiable in administrative or judicial review. Despite the fact that political will to identify and implement projects; MPs oversight role and varying political interests that exists, all these do not significantly affect the outcome of CDF projects.

The findings revealed that politicians have a positive role but do not have significant effect on the effective management of National Government Constituency Development Funded projects. This in not in agreement with Kamau and Muturi [41] who established that there exists a weak and negative relationship between political interest and successful completion of CDF projects. Odhiambo [32] explained that reduction in political intervention and enhancing community participation is likely to have positive outcome on local development projects as the local can manage and control funds dedicated to these projects. Malala and Ndolo [42] revealed that political intervention directly affect CDF project performance which in turn has resulted into CDF projects in Kikuyu Constituency being rated by the public (as the evaluators) as being behind schedule (88 % percent of projects), with a paltry 12 % of projects being on schedule and no project was rated as being ahead of schedule (0 %).



Actually, the CDF is awarded at constituency level for devolved development; nevertheless, it is not free from political manipulations as descriptively demonstrated. For example, there is a revelation from governance point of view that the CDFC is composed of political cronies to the politicians, although they are qualified to be in the CDFC. For this reason, the CDFC as well as PMCs don't propagate projects the locals would wish to be funded but rather propagate those projects politicians need for their own political reasons; funding for projects is also lightly done leading majority of projects being in perpetual state of 'ongoing'. According to Tero [43] there is low level of transparency and accountability in the CDF projects in Nandi constituency due to interference by political leaders. We found evidence to suggest that, projects that had the support of the political class for example projects located in the support base had been completed in time compared to those that were not. This implies that even though the influence was not explicit it was implicit indicative of lapses in policy guidelines that needs further review. This compares favourably with Harris [44] in six constituencies of Rongo, Taveta, Njoro, Wundanyi, Webuye East and Tongaren where he found out that ethnicity is significant, politicians channelled CDF resources towards their community and their ethnicity hail CDF as helpful. However, in the absence of ethnicity supremacy, there is no ethnicity in resource allocation.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The study concludes that political accountability in the constituency is poor as it is particularly affected by the likelihood of corruption or capture by interest groups. While decentralized units may have better local information and accountability pressure, they may be more vulnerable to capture by local elites, who will then receive a disproportionate share of spending on public goods. The study found out that political influence has a relationship with effective project financing however, the null hypothesis on political influence was accepted and a conclusion drawn that political influence only have non-causal relationship with effective project management but has no significant direct influence on management of CDF projects in Kasipul constituency, Homa Bay County, Kenya. To ensure equity in successful project implementation across the constituency, the study recommends that the total mandate of managing CDF projects to be shifted from Members of Parliament to a vetted board in order to avoid failure of completion or abandonment of projects initiated during previous parliament. This action is not meant to undermine or downplay the capacity or the weakening the members of National Assembly but it is fundamentally about making governance of NG-CDF at the constituency level more responsive to the needs of the citizens. Further, the National government should enact laws that would ensure projects started in previous parliament are completed within stipulated time so as to avoid abandonment after general election as a result of new elected Member of Parliament.

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