

Post-War and Development of a Historical Curriculum in Somalia

Fawzia Osman Essa¹, Abdulai Abukari¹, Byabashaija Deusdedit^{2*}

¹The British University in Dubai

²Kampala International University, Uganda

DOI: [10.36347/sjahss.2021.v09i10.003](https://doi.org/10.36347/sjahss.2021.v09i10.003)

| Received: 22.08.2021 | Accepted: 30.09.2021 | Published: 14.10.2021

*Corresponding author: Byabashaija Deusdedit

Abstract

Original Research Article

This qualitative approach article assessed the relationship between post war and the development of a Historical Curriculum for secondary schools in Somalia. Relevant knowledge and understanding of history encourages reconciliation and unity. Besides, poor curriculum and inadequate pedagogical practices undermine the merit of the history curriculum as an educational timely intervention. This may be linked to the mismatch between theory and practice. The study was anchored on the Social Identity Theory. The semi-structured interviews were used to garner information for the research study. A total of 11 people participated in the interviews. Results reveal that history curricula of Somalia has no relevancy in terms of developing national social identity. Qualitative interviews discovered five themes that appeared to be traits of a good curriculum: Relevancy, Powerful Knowledge, Cause and Consequences, Change and Continuity, and Difficult History. The results enabled the curriculum developers to possess knowledge for the development of a historical thematic curriculum. It was concluded that establishing a national relevant curriculum may encourage national identity and patriotism. Therefore, there is need for the government to increase funding for the development of a relevant national curriculum for secondary schools in Somalia.

Keywords: Historical Curriculum, Post War, Development, Somalia.

Copyright © 2021 The Author(s): This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution **4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0)** which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial use provided the original author and source are credited.

INTRODUCTION

In 1897, Somalia was partitioned into five regions from north to south: French Somaliland, British Somaliland protectorate, the Italian colony of Somalia, British Northern Kenya, and Ethiopian Ogaden (Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2004; William & Cummings, 2015). In the context of Somalia, Sayyid Muhammed Abdillahi Hassan's nationalist movement (1900-1920) was the first political movement against colonization powers in Somalia during the colonial period in Somaliland from 1900-1959. Then SYL was modern national movement to have independence. The colonial secretary shared with Somali representatives that 1 July 1960 was the proposed independence date for Somaliland. Somalis protested and caused serious trouble in protectorate. Britain delayed the proposed date to 26 June 1960 to prevent further confrontation. Five days later, South Somalia declared independence and joined Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia (Abdi, 1981; Egal 1968; Farah, Hussein & Lind, 2002; Dawson, 1964; Laitin, 1979; Lewis, 2002; 1960; Reyner, 1960; Sheik-Abdi, 1977).

The SYL had national agenda to form a Greater Somalia. Upon Somali national desire, Somali

entered the Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1978. Despite early victory, the national army could not sustain it because of limited resources and enormous support that Ethiopia had received from Russia. Withdrawal of Somali forces caused national trauma, and extreme consequences profoundly aggravated partitioning inside Somalia (Lewis, 1982).

Yihun (2014) affirms that bankruptcy of the dream of Greater Somalia certainly paved the way for rebel uprisings and later to the destabilization of Somalia. Lewis (1982) commented that Somalia was at a stage of "bankruptcy and collapse". The Ogaden war was a turning point in Somalia. Fierce nationalism fired back at the cultural traditional system. In 1991, Somalia had a civil war known as the Clan War.

State-collapse and violent conflict in 1991 shed light on the dynamic nature of national identity in Somalia. The past history showed strong nationalism while the civil war and disintegrated state showed the identity crisis. Hence, it is important to identify the causes of change and continuity in Somali national consciousness, especially that Somalia is known as a mono-ethnic community that endowed Somalia with

Ethno-nationalism for ages. Connor (1992) believed that ethno-nationalism stems from ethnic ties, kinship that forms social-psychological bonds.

Frustration and anger of Somali upon the national army's defeat in the Ogaden war, and the impression they had to lose Ogaden for a second time led to Somalis' anger and prejudiced attitudes. Indeed, any analytical approach should address the in group relationship that is frequently associated with sentiments and emotions stemming from blood-ties.

Somalia is one of the few genuine nations in Africa. Being a mono-ethnic community distinguishes Somalia from the rest of the other African states that struggled with multiethnicities to build the nation (Lewis, 2002 and 2004; Loubser & Solomon, 2014; Thomas, 2016).

Clan allegiance, shared blood, and clan affiliation have exclusively shaped social structure in Somalia. Lewis (2004) and Besteman (1993) described Somalian national genealogy as an "ethnic family tree" that consists of kinship and lineage. Clans and sub-clans formed "party-lineal lineages" which endowed Somalia with the ethno-nationalism that profoundly shaped Somalia national history.

Nationalism is a powerful phenomenon. The essence of that power stems from myth, memories, traditions, and symbols which significantly shape the national identity and feeling of community members (Guibernau & Hutchinson, 2004; Leerseen, 2006). Nationalism is a controversial and debatable phenomenon. On one hand, Guibernau and Hutchinson (2004) believe nationalism is a "historical phenomenon" while on the other hand, Smith (2000) advocates that nationalism is a historical phenomenon with multi-facets, such as affection or sentiments, political, and ideological movements. Smith (2000) defines nationalism as a "named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy, and common rights and duties for all members". Smith emphasizes the social and historical aspects of nationalism. In addition, nations and national identity are key components of the phenomenon (English, 2008; Guibernau & Hutchinson, 2004; Leerseen, 2006; Lewis, 2002; Smith, 1999).

Nationalism is a complex phenomenon with multi-facets. To reveal the complexity of historical/cultural nationalism, Smith (2010) critically analysed two paradigms. The first one is social constructionism that neglects or deliberately ignores the antiquity of nationalism. The social constructionists strongly argue that modernity or nationalism is a contemporary phenomenon. The second paradigm is ethno-symbolism. Nationalism scholars such as Smith, John Armstrong, and John Hutchinson proposed an

ethno-symbolic approach that advocates the past and "pre-modern" existence of a nation. When debating nationalism, social constructionist scholars argue against the antiquity of nationalism and claim it is contemporary. However, the ethno-symbolic approach advocates the antiquity of nationalism. A study of the pre-modern and past of nations is imperative to reveal the complexity of nationalism (Smith, 1999, 2000).

In the context of Somalia, Sayyid Muhammed Abdillahi Hassan's nationalist movement (1900-1920) was the first political movement against colonization powers in Somalia. Lewis (2002) described it as a national movement that was "culturally specific," as when leader and followers "swim within" a social culture of myth, memories, traditions, and symbols (English, 2008). Given this, cultural components are at the core of nationalism, notably, to demonstrate power and solidarity (Smith, 1999, 2010).

Smith also emphasized the nationalist role in history and the importance of constantly reflecting on their lives by "modern nationalist intelligentsias" (Smith, 1999). In spite of this, literature reviews have indicated that little or no attention has been given to the history of the Dervish movement as the most powerful national movement in Somaliland.

The colonists in fragmented Somaliland strictly controlled nomad movements and, subsequently, deprived Somalians of freedom in their own land and left them with limited resources of water used primarily for sheep and camels in the harsh environment. Most importantly, the Ethiopian (Abyssinia) power dominated the Ogaden region; furthermore, the missionary schools in Somaliland caused a real threat to the Somali religion.

Lewis (2002), Jardine (1923), and Dawson (1964) affirm that these factors strongly fired Somali patriotism. Shortly, in 1900, Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan declared war against colonists in Somaliland, and Dervishism arose as the longest anti-colonial national movement.

In 1920, airplanes landed in Berbera and from there struck Dervish forts in Taleh. Sayyid Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan and the Dervishes were surprised by the new technology (Irons, 2013; Jardine, 1923; Lewis, 2002). Many Dervishes were killed, but Sayyid Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan survived and went back to Ogaden where he shortly died of a disease. Some said it was influenza; others said malaria. This was the end of the longest anti-colonial movement in Africa. It was the first time in Africa that Britain had used air forces to bomb an anti-colonial movement.

Jardine (1923) asserts that the British administration deprived Somaliland of acquiring Gordon College as was planned, declining to give

£20,000 to establish Gordon College in Somaliland. However, the HM government endorsed financial aid of £80,000 first and then £20,000 to found Gordon and Kitchen College in Sudan that significantly enhanced higher education in Sudan.

The British government lost millions of pounds in the war against the Dervish. The British administration, therefore, adopted an indirect policy to address territory internal affairs (Lewis, 2002) to prevent further confrontation with Somalis that might provoke violence as happened with Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan (Gesheker, 1985). Somalis described the British administration in Somaliland as a “deaf government that is not interested and does not want to spend money” (Gesheker, 1985, p.18). Subsequently, no serious attempt was made to improve Somali welfare (Lewis, 2002, Sheik-Abdi, 1977) in spite of the Berlin Act statement to improve social services in all African territories. Somalis criticized the passive approach and confirmed that British colonists failed to build even one railroad in Somaliland despite 75 years of colonization (Gesheker, 1985).

Internal disturbance paved the way for military officers who had waited for a long time to step in through military coup in 1969 (Laitin, 1976; Lewis, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1981). Military forces controlled strategic points and suspended the constitution. Parliaments were disbanded, the Supreme Court and political parties were cancelled, the national assembly was closed. The SRC “caught and locked up” parliamentarians (Lewis, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1981). Officials announced governance by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC).

On 1 November, the SRC revealed General Muhammad Siad Baree as the new president of the Supreme Council which consisted of two vice-presidents and 22 officers from different ranks (Lewis, 2002; Sheik -Abdi, 1977). Siad began his career in the police force and then he became a police inspector and a senior official in the British military administration who had been exclusively locally-recruited. During the Italian administration in 1950, General Siad had military training in Italy where he studied political philosophy (Lewis, 1982). Siad Baree planned strategically to attain the national agenda. Priority was given to resolve internal issues of the poor economy, development, and the fight against nepotism. Once these were in place, then irredentist issues and border disputes with Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland would be addressed (Lewis, 2002).

The coup's name was changed to “Kaan” in the Somali language which means “revolution” (Lewis, 2002, p. 209). One year later in celebration of the military coup, General Siad Barre declared scientific socialism to be the ideology of the SRC, “Kaan” in the Somali language (Lewis, 2002, p. 209). Siad was

remarkably talented and able to make socialism appropriate to the Somali context when socialism is successfully blended with Islam and influenced by nationalism (Laitin, 1979; Lewis, 2002; Sheik -Abdi, 1977).

Siad strongly supported developing close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in 1974, a successful relationship flourished in the “Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.” Upon signing the treaty, the Soviets used Somalia ports in Berbera and Kis-mayyo to build military bases (Laitin, 1976, 1977; Lewis, 2002). Somalia alone received generous grants of \$63 million. This was significantly larger than all financial aid to the rest of Africa that equalled \$67 million (Laitin, 1976, 1977; Lewis, 2002). Consequently, the economy was booming, several development projects were established such as milk factories, new schools, roads, hospitals, radio stations, and canning factories (Laitin, 1976, 1977; Lewis, 2002).

Ravenhill's (1980) study aimed to compare two types of regime—the civilian and military regimes. Ravenhill affirms that the Siad military government's performance was exceptionally good at improving the economic status and controlling the increase in food prices. However, military expenses slightly increased. Laitin believed the military regime of General Siad in Somalia was “honest and public” (Laitin, 1976).

Ogaden was geographically located in Somalia. In spite of artificial borders (Abdi, 1980; Gesheker, 1985), the two had cultural and ethnic ties. The name of the Ogaden region was derived from the Ogaden Somali clan (Lewis, 1981). Tekle (1989) emphasizes the emotional ties that Somalis have toward Ogaden because it is the “birthplace of Somali culture and nationalism.” Tekle points to Sayied Muhammad Abdillahi Hassan who was the leader of the Darwish religious movement in the nineteenth century (Lewis, 2002).

The British administration in Somaliland proposed the unity of Somalia to reinforce prosperity and economy growth. Ernest Bevin, the British prime minister, strongly advocated the “Greater Somaliland” dream; consequently, Bevin introduced a plan for Somaliland unification. Bevin shared the proposal with the four powers (USA, Britain, USSR, and France) at their Paris conference in 1946 (Abdi, 1981; Lewis, 2002; and Sheik-Abdi, 1981). This plan was strongly declined by France and the Soviet Union who claimed by such action the British Empire aimed for further expansion (Gesheker, 1985).

Upon the UN's failure to demark boundaries between adversaries Somalia and Ethiopia, the British re-affirmed Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1954/55 when British authority fully regained authority over the area and Haoud (Lewis, 2002). There is a general consensus

among scholars that the turnover profoundly impaired relationships between Somalia and Ethiopia (Abdi, 1981; Dawson, 1964; Geshekte, 1985; Jackson, 2010; Laitin, 1979/76; Lewis, 2002 and 1981; Reyner, 1960; Schwab, 1978; Sheik-Abdi, 1977; Tekle, 1989; Quirin, 1988; Yihun, 2014).

Lewis (2002) asserted that Siad's priorities for the first four years were to improve the economy and reinforce the authority of the military regime. Improvement of the internal situation encouraged him to resume diplomatic relationships with African neighbouring states as a part of the foreign policy of the new-state (Lewis, 2002; Laitin, 1977). Siad was actively involved in resolving African outstanding issues and mediated to resolve a Tanzania and Uganda dispute.

Tareke (2009) commented that in spite of Addis Ababa's mighty forces that consisted of 35,000 to 47,000 soldiers, the Ethiopian army was far behind. Supplied with poor, outdated, and discarded equipment, military forces also profoundly lacked well-planned strategic tactics. Somalis had modern weapons and well-trained forces. Tareke (2009) noted that Somali forces had a very high level of technical mobilization, in addition to armour and tanks. This certainly enabled Somali forces to tactically move 700 kms into Ethiopian land and capture 350,000 square kms of territory.

Ethiopia received consistently enormous military support from the Soviet Union. This was sufficient to defeat the Somali national army. Siad tried to cope with dramatic changes (Besteman, 1996; Dawson, 1964; Jackson, 2010; Laitin, 1979; Lewis, 2002; Schwab, 1978; Tareke, 2000). Ogaden was beyond military defeat. It was a national crisis (Geshekte, 1985; Laitin, 1979/76; Lewis, 2002; Tekle, 1989; Sheik -Abdi, 1977).

In Somalia, Siad denounced the friendship treaty with the Soviets and declined socialism ideology. Given this, Somalia was deprived of all military and financial aids (Gilkes, 1989). Siad developed relationships with the Arab world, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Their funds significantly contributed to sustain Somali development.

Somali were emotionally disturbed and became vulnerable to anger and frustration which provoked hidden clans and tribal ties that had been carefully controlled and temporality suspended by the Siad Regime (Lewis, 1981). This was strongly reinforced by the general feeling of insecurity upon the changing policy of the superpowers toward the Siad regime. The Soviets abandoned Somalia and the US did not show any interest in replacing the Soviet Union's role in Somalia; however, the US retained a strategic interest in Somalia. Britain was one of the important contributors to the EEC budget. Also, the EEC

established trade and other relationships that were highly developed. Given this, the Somali returned to advocating lineage and clan ties as the only source of security (Lewis 1981).

Fierce nationalism fired back at the cultural traditional system. Withdrawal of Somali forces caused national trauma, and extreme consequences profoundly aggravated partitioning inside Somalia (Lewis, 1982). Yihun (2014) affirms that bankruptcy of the dream of Greater Somalia certainly paved the way for rebel uprisings and later to the destabilization of Somalia. Lewis (1982) comments that Somalia was at a stage of "bankruptcy and collapse."

Yihun (2014) comments that after the defeat of the Somali national army, military officers, in particular, generals from the Mijertein clan, were outspoken in their criticism of Siad's mismanagement of the Ogaden War and shared this with the public. Yihun states they were encouraged by Mijertein who had been very powerful during the civilian leadership, whereas Abdul Rashid Shermake disagreed with Mijertein.

Upon this dissatisfaction, these officers attempted a military coup in 1978. This failed and was followed with another coup in 1980 (Lewis, 1981, 1982, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1981; Yihun, 2014). Siad survived the 1978 coup, and the dissident group escaped to Ethiopia and formed the Somali Salvation Front in Ethiopia (SSF). This caused instability in Siad's regime. Lewis (1982, 1982) and Michaelson (1993) confirmed that it was a fatal mistake, especially, when the majority of Mijertein joined the Somali Salvation Front, whereas the Mijertein clan was well-known to be the most militant and most fierce (Lewis, 1981, 1982, 2002). Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was appointed as military head of the SSDF when he arrived in Ethiopia after the abortive coup in Mogadishu in April 1978 (Yihun, 2014). Abdulahi Yusuf formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) after the Ogaden defeat. Then after ten years, the Isaaq clan-based group formed the Somali National Movement (Michaelson, 1993).

This situation overlapped with the paralysed Somalia economy due to the cut-off relationship with the Soviet Union who used to supply a substantial share of financial aid. European aid was insufficient (Bestemen, 1996; Lewis 1982).

Siad developed a relationship with Western communities such as the US when Siad signed a military pact in 1980. In return, the US acquired naval and air bases in Mogadishu and Berbera (Ododa, 1985; Tekle, 1989, p. 81).

Siad's expectation went beyond actual military support, whereas the US frequently imposed constraints

on Somali because of stressful relationships between Somalia and its neighbouring states Ethiopia and Kenya. The US administration promised to increase weapon support only in case Somalia became endangered (Laitin, 1977). Siad subsequently agreed to address internal issues to encourage the US to release the required amount of military aid (Lewis, 1982). Siad implemented minor changes to reorganise the government. Two prominent prisoners from the Isaaq clan were released. The first one was General Mohammed Abshir, Commander of the Police, and the second one was Mohamad Haji Ibrahim Egal, who occupied the prime minister post during Abdul Rasheed Sharmake's leadership. Lewis (1982) comments that Siad's goal was to please opponents from Isaaq.

There were clashes between Isaaq and Ogaden refugees. Further escalation occurred upon the SNM's failed attack on army forces in the airport and military headquarters. The army aggressively responded to SNM guerrillas and it was claimed that "mercenary pilots, former Rhodesians, flew bombing missions for the government" (Bestemen, 1996; Gilkes, 1989). In November 1988, the SNM managed to control strategic towns in the north of Somalia such as Borao and Hargeisa. In the South, Ethiopia encouraged rebels from Hawiye and Habr Gidir to destroy government infrastructure in Mogadishu (Bestemen, 1996; Gilkes, 1989; Michaelson, 1993; Yuhin, 2014).

Lewis (1982) says that civil clashes evolved when the SNM continued to hold operations against clan militia. The state government sent to Dolbahunta, the Daroud clan, for reinforcements, but Dolbahunta refused to participate or confront civilians not with the SNM. However, Ogaden responded with 8000 troops sent to Hargeisa (Bestemen, 1996). This immediate Ogaden response came based upon the strong influence of the Minister of Defence, Major General Adan Abdullahi "Gebiyu", from the Ogaden clan. Ogaden's immediate response provoked the anger of General Mohammed Siyad, known as Morgan. He had conflict with Gebiyu. As a resolution, Gebiyu was moved to the post of Minister of Information and Tourism. Morgan was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Defence (Bestemen, 1996; Gilkes, 1989).

Somalia also struggled with a poor economy, and the internal conflict made the collapse even worse. Violent confrontations with SNM militia absorbed the majority of government resources. Yihun (2014) states that Somalia could not pay back foreign debt which put future projects on hold due to lack of finance from the US and international donors.

The US extended the port area from the original location to accommodate larger ships. In 1987, military funds decreased to \$5 million and the US blocked \$55 million as a penalty for the government violating human rights (Gilkes, 1989). Consequently,

the economy collapsed. The terrible inflation increased food prices, and, in some cases, food items disappeared from the market. Oil prices greatly increased, and, in 1988, Somalia had frequent shortages of electric power and water supplies. These situations impeded Siad's regime and state government (Loubser & Solomon, 2014).

In August 1990, the SNM joined forces with two other recently formed opposition groups, the Ogadeni-based Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC). Siad, in his last speech on Mogadishu TV/Radio, sent a call to war leaders to leave innocent people alone as they did nothing to be punished for. Siyad reminded them of Somali kinsmen and nationalism and the religion of Islam.

These forces had the upper hand in creating issues in Somalia. It was this alliance which ousted Barre in January 1991 (Gilkes, 1989; Michaelson, 1993; Yuhin, 2014), and led to violence that escalated to armed violence "which marked bloody history" mainly between clans and sub-clans. Somalia had violent conflicts which left Mogadishu in anarchy (Clarke & Serena, 1991-2010; Loubser & Solomon, 2014; Linke & Raleigh, 2011; Kapteijns, 2013; Thomas, 2016; Farah, Hussein, & Lind, 2000). The city lacked food, electricity, clean water, and eventually Somalia collapsed and had a terrible humanitarian crisis (Farah, Hussian, & Lind, 2000; Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 1991-2010).

In August 1990, rebel forces gained control over the majority of state lands. The SNM under Abdi Rahman Ahmed Ali controlled the North. The Somali United Congress under the leadership of Farah Aided controlled Mogadishu (the capital) and Baidoa. Kismayu was controlled by Omar Jese, the head of the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) (Farah, Hussian, & Lind, 2000; Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 1991-2010).

In the beginning, the goal was to overthrow Siad Barre. When it happened, the internal conflicts began between "non-state actors" for power. After the overthrow of Siad, the Hawiye claimed power and control of Mogadishu. Actually, this clan did not have an active role in the state collapse and only interfered a few months before the overthrow of Siad (Michaelson, 1993). The USC made an individual decision on the interim president without the rest of members' consent as per the August agreement.

When the USC shared the announcement of Ali Mahdi as the interim president, this resulted in an immediate split of the USC along sub-clan lines. The Habar Gedir-based faction, led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed and the Abgal-based group led by Ali Mahdi began a brutal intra-clan struggle for power (Michaelson, 1993). The "horrific feature" of this war

was the opposition leaders of SNM and Hawiye, the Ali Mahadi, and General Aideed who targeted Daroud-clan members inside Mogadishu and other areas (Farah, Hussein, & Lind, 2000).

One fact about the civil war when it erupted was that the Daroud clan was precisely targeted, killing innocent civilians. Later the war became known as the “cleansing war”. Kaptejins (2013) argues that the USC, SN, and SPF deliberately targeted Daroud from where Barre was descended. This anarchy was followed with the worst famine crisis in 1992. Mangistu left also in May 1991 (Farah, Hussein, & Lind, 2002). Shortly, Somaliland seceded from the Somalia Republic and the SNM announced Somaliland as a “self-declared” republic (Kaptejins, 2013; Loubser & Solomon, 2014; Linke & Raleigh, 2011; Luling, 1997; Thomas, 2016).

After the civil war, Michaelson (1993) comments there were several attempts by international communities, including the UN and the US, to actively become involved to support people in need and support peace intervention to resolve the clans' war. In spite of great effort, all these attempts neither made significant progress nor achieved any agreement. Gros (1996) attributes the failure of peace missions to inefficient polices. Gros (1996), Paul, Clarke, and Serena (1991-2010) criticised the role of the UN in Somalia in 1992, where the intervention was beyond UN mandate. The Somali mission failed because of so-called “mission creep,” meaning that the more limited objective of feeding starving Somalian was eventually superseded by others, such as disarmament.

In early 2000, for the first time in Somalia's post-collapse, there was a serious and peaceful attempt presented by Ismail Omah Guelleh, who was elected as the new President of Djibouti. This initiative was sponsored by IGAD and funded by the Gulf States, Libya and Egypt. The purpose was to form a central government of Somalia with a rigorous political configuration (Healy, 2011).

The Transitional National Government (TNG) was a successful outcome of Arta peace. The TNG was headed by Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. The Salat government was supported by a businessmen's association in Mogadishu and by Islamists. In 2004, Kenyan took the initiative to address Somalia's crisis. The Kenyan government called all clans to attend a peace conference held in Nairobi. This was considered to be significant progress when a peace agreement was signed and a “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) was declared. The peace agreement was known as the Nairobi Peace Accord. There were no further operational activities (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014). Eventually, a Somali parliament was designated, and seats were distributed equally among different clans. The Transitional Federal Charter stated a five-year plan aimed to strengthen the centralised government, draft

the constitution, and arrange for elections. Abdulahi Yusuf was appointed as TFG president, and Ali Mohammed Gedi was elected as prime minister. However, authorities of Somaliland remained out of the TFG (Healy, 2011; Menkhuas, 2009; Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014).

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was elected to be president of the TFG who called for unity and was “tasked with administering a five-year political transition.” But again, Somali were hesitant about the new government since Abdullahi Yusuf was an ally of the Ethiopian government, and the Mogadishu government at the time was dominated by the President's and Prime Minister's clans. Most importantly, Abdillahi Yusuf was known with animosity by political Islamists (Menkhuas, 2009).

Two years later in 2006, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (ICU) ascended to power. The ICU efficiently demonstrated leadership that manifested in successful practices to provide a secure environment, which brought back order to Mogadishu, the “reassertion of subnational governance in the country, private business security, and most importantly arming the vulnerable groups of agricultural communities” (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014) Because of ICU efforts, Mogadishu was safe for the first time since the civil war in 1991. Subsequently, business boomed in Mogadishu, where Islamist businessmen invested in public service projects such as hospitals and schools. Also, the ICU managed to re-open the seaport and the international airport (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014).

Eventually Somalia would have some stability upon signing the Kampala Accord in June 2011. According to the Kampala agreement, the TFG service period was extended one year to complete TFG tasks by 20 August 2012 (Loubser & Solomon, 2014). It also sought to achieve road map objectives of security, writing the constitution, emphasizing good governance, and promoting reconciliation. On 20 August 2012, the TFG was replaced with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). In 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Hassan Mohamud adopted a Six-Pillar plan, constituted of “revive unity, law and justice, the economy, build upon multinational relationships, and reconcile both security and service delivery” (African Union Peace and Security Department cited in Çancı & Medugu, 2015, p. 13). The Federal Republic of Somalia had a democratic election in January 2017. On 8 February 2017, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed won the election and became the ninth President of Somalia.

Paul, Clarke, and Serena (2014) were impressed by the way Somalia was improving. In spite of the challenges that Somalia had, there was a potential for further development where the state needed to build-up security forces to bring back peace and stability to

Somalia. Also, Hohne (2006) recommended that the new Somali government priorities needed to reinforce peace and security in the south; then later peace negotiations could start with Somaliland. After state collapse and civil war which disintegrated the cultural identity (Hohne, 2006), political identity became dominant in serving the state agenda as the re-emerged state of Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast, and Mogadishu. Each district emphasized clan identity as the Isaaq in Somaliland, the Majertin (Darood) in Puntland, and the Hawiye in Mogadishu (Hohne, 2006; Yihun, 2014).

Hohne (2006) argued that inconsistency existed between political institutions and clan-identity where Somaliland claimed ownership of the Sool and Sanaage regions which were inhabited by the Dholbahante. The author argued that the Sool and Sanaage did not belong to Somaliland. The Puntland government tried to persuade Dhulbahante and Wasrsangeeli as Hairti Darood to reinforce Puntland's claims to Sool and Sanaage lands in order to achieve unity of Somalia.

Hohne (2006) emphasized that formation of these states contributed significantly to slight stability. However, if one of these political identities tried to have full control, then Somalia might relapse into violent conflict.

In spite of Lewis's endorsement of the clan cultural system, Lewis (2002) argues that internal politics of the state strongly influenced cultural identity. However, Loubser and Solomon (2014) emphasized the colonial role and stated that colonists deliberately manipulated the clan system in Somalia to serve the European Colonialism agenda. Colonists reinforced "hierarchical forms of tribe"; consequently, resources and power became privilege. Furthermore, "Every Somali had to be a legitimate subject of a chief in a hierarchical system of subject, tribe, chief, and colonial administration (Loubser and Solomon, 2014; p.3).

Doornbos and Markakis (1994) and Farah, Hussein, and Lind (2014) critically analysed the state collapse in Somalia in light of a nation-state concept and argue the traditional system, whereas there are extreme mismatches between the political system and the nature of Somali civil society and a traditional system.

Doornbos and Markakis (1994) and Farah, Hussein, and Lind (2014) argued that the concept of the nation which is a key factor of building states is not applicable to Somali because of its nomadic nature, especially, when nomads represent the majority of the population who lack essential skills to build state institutions. However, their cultural system enabled the Somali to practice democratic life to the limit of anarchy (Lewis, 1980).

Consequently, the urban minority elite who had Western educations or were "westernised" exploited the farmer and nomad. This paved the way for one political system to control the post-colonial state which is described as authoritarian and militarised. Doornbos and Markakis (1994) assert that the MOD which strongly encouraged political hegemony was a manipulative system that reinforced clan coalition.

Tripodi (1999) attributes poor relationships between civil society and state institutions to the colonial legacy. Tripodi (1999) comments that the Italian administration assigned to prepare Somalia for independence failed in this mission, and, most importantly, exported a poor state model that Somali leadership copied and was highly inefficient for the post-colonial state in terms of state institutions. Lack of education where the majority of the community were nomads and failed to have participatory role was also a serious problem.

Doornbos and Markakis (1994) recommend that the relationship between state institutions and civil society needed to be transformed carefully. Doornbos and Markakis concluded the importance of Somali adopting a creative approach that can be an assimilated feature of a traditional society which he called orthodox and "original thinking." This can construct a political system that can balance the power and organise the relationships between state institutions and a civil community. At the end, Doornbos and Markakis (1994) highly recommended such an initiative as the only one that could be appropriate in a "largely pastoral context."

Besteman (1980) believed that when a state has access to funds and weaponry without "internal constraints" which impose responsibility and accountability, this definitely harms the stability of states as in Somalia's case. Besteman asserts that state-building in some manner paved the way to class formation of elite urban business men who manipulated and controlled state power defined by race, status, region as "primarily and secondarily kinship" (p. 589).

Bestemen (1980) argues that civil war occurred not because there were "unrelated" factors. Kinship and segmentary opposition fought for power and "control of resources" in a highly militarised atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. Second was external influence such as "colonial policy, Cold War geopolitics, and donor funding."

Van Notten (2003) adopted a different path, where he advocated a historical path which predicts foreseen conflict. Van Notten asserts that what happened was to be expected as the consequences of the Ogaden War in 1978. The defeat of the Somali national army by Ethiopian forces with European intervention profoundly undermined the solidarity and unity of the

nation. Van Notten (2003) said that in a secure environment, the aftermath of the Ogaden War encouraged Somali to return to their traditional system of clan loyalty. Given this, Notten was one of few scholars who acknowledged the role of the Ogaden War as a main dynamic of state collapse.

Menkhaus (2009, 2007) advocated a broad perspective to identify internal and external factors and considers dynamic interaction between internal factors such as manipulative social strata and external actors' interests in regional stability. After the 11 September attacks in 2001, the term of "failed state" was widely introduced in the US. Call (2008) comments that failed state phenomena received wide attention because anarchy and insecurity strongly encouraged terrorism which threatened political stability in the rest of the world. Also, the term of "failed state" was a focal point of concern when the national state collapsed in Somalia in early 1990.

The term of "failed state" is controversial (Call, 2008; Christopher, 1997; Eriksen, 2011; Jones, 2008; Wolff, 2010) as there is no common definition, but generally states fail when "they are unable to perform these basic functions of providing territorial control or security, rule of law, basic social services, economic goods, and political services for long periods of time over a substantial portion of their territory" (Call 2008, cited in Clement, 2005).

Wolff (2010) argued the validity of a failed state definition in two dimensions — ends and means. Any state needs some sort of means preliminary to delivering the output or ends. Wolff asserts that failure of a state to provide essential means, ultimately cannot achieve goals (ends). Given this, Wolff argues that the definition of a failed state is a shallow one and does not reveal the complexity of phenomena.

Call (2008) believed that state failure can be described as a state that is unable to provide for the basic needs of citizens. It provides little or no benefit to explore a state which completely collapsed as the case of Somalia in 1991, either internally or externally for the international community for a long period of time where Somalia remained collapsed from 1991 to 2013 in the absence of an authorized regime and a recognized passport (Call, 2008). Somalia was the only state in the world that has remained collapsed for such a long period.

Further, Call (2008) argued the term of "failed state" is highly inefficient and works poorly. It lacks in-depth explanation of the phenomena where it explicitly ignores the dynamics of conflict. Therefore, Call (2008) and Wolff (2010) advocated an analytical approach on multi-levels that provide an in-depth understanding which may reveal the complexity of failed and fragile states. Wolff (2010) strongly recommends exploring the

region of the failed state as an important dimension in a failed state.

Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo (2010) disagreed with Call (2008) and Wolff (2010) and asserted that state failure is a multifaceted phenomenon and is based on a set of internal and external factors, structural and economic factors, social factors, and political and institutional factors that overlap in dynamic interactions. In spite of the variety of causes, Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo (2010) asserted that the colonial legacy of colonization was a prominent factor of state failure in Africa. This can be perceived in two ways.

First, colonists upon leaving Africa at the time of independence imported a colonial political configuration to post-colonial states to serve the colonial agenda. Their policy was to maintain the artificial borders that were always considered to be an inherited colonial legacy. This displaced people from their lands and formed a heterogeneous nation that had different ethnics, languages, and religions (Kimenyi, Mbaku, & Moyo, 2010).

The post-colonial regime used coercion to form the states as the only way to have authority which resulted in violent conflict on the Black continent. African governments failed to have full authority over "the territory of the artificial states, which they inherited from the colonialists. A good example is the DRC, whose government has been unable to extend its control to all parts of the vast country since independence from Belgian in 1960" (Kimenyi, Mbaku, & Moyo, 2010).

In the case of Somalia, the colonization process entailed the division of Somalia, giving Somalia's land through artificial borders to other countries who have different languages, state systems, and religious beliefs. The new state used coercion on Somalis to demonstrate national identification and loyalty to the governments of Kenya, Ethiopia, and France (Kimenyi, Mbaku, & Moyo, 2010).

States do not operate in isolation; instability among neighbours can destabilise the state. Hence, the neighbourhood in which the state finds itself is an important indicator of fragility. In Somalia's case, the border dispute and conflict caused tension in relationships between Kenya and especially the Ethiopian-Somali relationship because of the Ogaden dispute (Yihun, 2014).

Other factors such as a poor economy, poverty, and over-all economic decline were identified as indicators of state-failure (Kimenyi, Mbaku, & Moyo, 2010). Every failed or failing state in the world today is a low-income country. States which are unable to provide well-being for the majority of its citizens over a prolonged period of time increase the likelihood of failure.

Christopher (1997) argued the concept of state in Africa. Christopher describes African states as “quasi-states” that failed to have full control or authority or sovereignty over territory. The discourse of “failed states”, “collapsed states”, and “quasi-states” does not provide a great help either to reveal the “nature” of states or state processes that lead to weakness or strength of states. Also, this discourse highly ignored the colonization influence on the formation of neo-colonial states in Africa.

Colonization undermined security and stability and disintegrated the nation—all of which contributed to state-collapse. Christopher (1997) argued that even upon the independence of a state, decisions were made to serve the colonists’ agenda. Christopher concludes that internal and external factors contradict each other. State internal and external dynamics contradict the idea of the state and undermine the potential of a state to achieve status of the ideal-modern state.

Christopher (1997) asserts that contemporary Africa's problems are rooted in the colonial era. The quasi-state is the only political form or structure that successfully serves colonial interests in Africa in the post-colonial period. One dominant aspect was that the authoritarian regime was inadequate to nation-building. The artificial boards divided ethnicities and caused disparity. Force or the employment of the force was the only way to unity; however, this is seriously undermined social development and, consequently, impeded economic growth.

One important aspect of being a quasi-state was that it never had an independent economy. For 30 years, it relied on financial aid and the support of post-colonial powers. Indeed, these funds were driven by strategic and economic imperatives designed to serve the agenda of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Michaelson (1993) describes what happened in Somalia as a tragedy that very rarely exists in other parts of the world. Somalia’s national tragedy was constituted of political anarchy, destroyed infrastructure, and devastating famine. Known as a terrible humanitarian crisis, approximately 300,000 have lost their lives since January 1991 because of famine and violence.

Shultz (1995) asserted that the post-Cold War complicated issues in Somalia. The author stated that Siad first received financial and military support from the Soviet Union first and then the US. When the Cold War ended, Somalia’s geo-politics importance declined. This was proportionate with military and financial aid. This weakened the Barea regime and provoked ethnic and clan faction violence which eventually led to state disintegration.

Gros (1996) asserts that the big powers of the US and the former Soviet Union had major roles in the failure of African states in Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia through economic policies that undermined economic growth. Gros (1996) also argues that “Fourth World, collapsed states” were the product of the US and the former Soviet Union’s manipulative policies.

Gros discussed the relationship between militarised states and the intensity of failure. Gros asserts that as much as a state is militarised that much failure is found. As an example, Somalia and Liberia were top recipients of US military aid during the Cold War. Gros (1996) assures that the Third World would be a “growth market for arms merchants.” This was supported by Samatar (1987) who attributes Somalia's collapse to over-dependence on foreign aid which subjugated and manipulated the state regime.

According to data pulled from the *1990 World Bank Development Report*, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti recorded some of the lowest growth rates between 1965 and 1988. Somalia was at 0.5% (Gros, 1996). Samatar (1987) recommends that Africa needed to reform their economic policy to have “self-reliance” to have control over its future. Most importantly, it has to give up the temptation of militarization.

State failure has increased rapidly in the international system (Tusalem, 2016). Many scholars strive to analyse or to uncover the causes of state failure. Recent research highlighted political instability, regime type, and economics which “strongly influence” state fragility and failure. Tusalem (2016) argues that research has ignored or given little attention to the historical background or colonial history that impeded state-building and undermined relationships between state and civil communities, especially “unique cases” of nation-states.

Tusalem (2016) advocated the “historical path dependency approach” to reveal the complexity of failed or collapsed states. Understanding the history of a state highlights past legacies and practices of colonists that contributed to current, inherited issues. This knowledge allows policy makers to adopt efficient methods and practices to resolve state issues such as instability.

Ahmad (2017) highlights the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the recent crisis in Middle East and North Africa as “non-state” armed groups, transnational movements, fragmented states, and identity-based conflicts. Ahmad argues that neither the ideal classic-state model nor international relationships will be able to resolve or explain on-going conflict-resolution processes which become “ill-suited” (p. 417).

Ahmad recommends that policy makers adopt the innovative approach of “forward-looking”, which uses critical and analytical skills to uncover the root dynamics of conflict and analyse state failure phenomena. The innovative approach needs to be a grounded multi-interdisciplinary approach that uses “instrumental tools” to examine identity-based conflicts.

Theoretical integrative review is conducted with the aim to propose an appropriate new history curriculum for secondary schools to deliver a new content and narrative that seeks to develop social cohesion and reconciliation to reconstruct national identity in post-conflict Somalia. The new content should be underpinned by powerful knowledge that will enable students to develop historical understanding of what happened in the past and make connections with the present to inform future actions. This meaningful knowledge will enable students to understand the civil war of 1991 from a historical perspective and use their understanding of the historical narrative surrounding civil war to take a stand on contemporary issues.

METHODS

The Eisner’s Connoisseurship and Criticism Model was adopted as a theoretical framework for qualitative data analysis. “It qualitatively describes history” programs, curriculum, and educational activities, and obtains educator perceptions and opinions about the history curriculum of secondary schools. This framework consists of four steps of description, interpretation, evaluation, and themes (Nordin & Wahlstrom, 2019; Stavropoulou & Stroubouki, 2014). Kavle and Brinkmann (2009) found that a “researcher may read through his or her interviews again and again, reflect theoretically on specific themes of interest, write out interpretation, and not follow any systematic method or combination of techniques”.

Interviews were recorded with each participant’s consent and then translated from Somali into English, and then were transcribed. This was an iterative process. The transcript of each interview was verified several times by listening to the interview recording. “The text of each interview was then coded. The researcher used ideas from literature and reading the transcript repeatedly to generate codes. Themes were then noted.

Based on the descriptive research design, the study was carried out using qualitative paradigm. In addition to this, semi-structured interview with 11 school heads were conducted to understand the history curriculum of secondary schools in Moqadishu, Garwe, and Hargeissa and analyze educators’ perceptions of the secondary school history curriculum. The researcher

employed cluster and purposive sampling strategies to choose participants to belong to the research study.

RESULTS

It was revealed that clan ties are significant aspects of Somali culture; tribal ties shaped Somali nationalism that has an important role in national building. Nationalism and national identification have changed over time. Civil war in 1991 was a turning point in the modern history of Somalia, despite being absent from current history curriculum because of exported curriculum. Teacher 2 stated:

“The current history curriculum does not talk about Somalia’s history, but the contents talk about the history of neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and East of Africa. This because the curriculum was exported from these countries during the collapse of Somalia. Curriculum exported from Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, their content talks about the history of the Arabian Peninsula”.

This implied that since these foreign content and textbooks do not reflect the context of Somalia it does not also highlight the clan system that is widely prevalent in the region. Thomas (2016) stated that clan system is essential for understanding the context of the country.

DISCUSSION

The findings revealed that history curriculum is not well structured, it is irrelevant, and lacks a national narrative of Somalia. The content reflects the history of other countries because of two reasons: first, school curriculum is exported from different countries. This finding is in consonance with the study conducted by Wiles and Bondi (2011) on curriculum development and relevancy in education. He found out that there is no curriculum for the national history of Somalia. The current one touches briefly on some aspects, but the majority of the content talks about history related to other countries which is irrelevant to the history of Somalia”.

It was also indicated that the state collapse contributed to poor curriculum development where the education system is completely ruined and lacks important resources. “Post-war, the education system collapsed. There was no attention given to secondary education, but the focus was on primary and middle school. Upon intervention of national and foreign agencies, they advocated for the importance of placing attention on secondary education” (MOE Advisor).

In addition, the MOE advisor also noted the absence of a well-structured curriculum in Somalia. The Advisor asserted that education was much better pre-collapse when there were intensive efforts to provide financial support for education development. “Before the war, education was better to a certain extent. Pre-collapse the government used to handle all education

affairs, exams, and monthly salaries for MOE employees". This was in agreement with the study conducted by Smith (2011) on hidden crisis and found out that the war in Somalia jeopardized the development of a relevant curriculum in education

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the proposed curriculum is to enhance the analytical ability among the students by establishing a strong link between the past events and the present context. It can also provide the students with better understanding of the history and develop national identity.

To address curriculum objectives, the new Integrated Thematic Curriculum (ITC) content should be organized around the overarching themes of: (1) relevancy; (2) substantive knowledge/powerful knowledge; (3) understanding cause and consequences of conflicts; (4) change and continuity; and (5) difficult history. This may provide students with a big picture of historical curriculum that may engender feelings of patriotism and national identity. These themes are derived from the systematic content analysis of the responses obtained from the research participants. The government of Somalia should increase funding for the development of a relevant curriculum for the ministry of education in order to encourage national identity and social cohesion.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, J., & Ryan, T. (1999). Constructing Knowledge, Reconstructing Schooling. *Educational Leadership*. Retrieved 19 March 2019, from.
- Abdi, S. (1981). *Northeast African Studies*, 2/3(3/1), 153-162. Retrieved 14 November 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org>.
- Abraham, G. (2007). "Lines upon Maps": Africa and the Sanctity of African Boundaries. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 15(1), 61-84. <https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2007.15.1.61>
- Adebajo, A. (2010). *The curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War* (p. 414pp). Columbia University Press.
- Ahmad, A. (2017). A twenty-first century foreign policy for Canada in the Middle East and North Africa. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 72(3), 413-423.
- Ahonen, S. (2014). Education in post-conflict societies. *Historical Encounters: A Journal of Historical Consciousness, Historical Cultures, and History Education*, 1(1), 75-87. Retrieved 25 December 2018, from.
- Allen, M. (2008). Promoting Critical Thinking Skills in Online Information Literacy Instruction Using a Constructivist Approach. *College & Undergraduate Libraries*, 15, 1-2, 21-38. Retrieved 19 March 2019, from.
- Andreasson, S. (2005). Orientalism and African Development Studies: the 'reductive repetition' motif in theories of African underdevelopment. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(6), 971-986. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500089307>
- Bah, A. (2012). State Decay: A Conceptual Frame of Failing and Failed States in West Africa. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, And Society*, 25(1/3), pp.71-89. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
- Bain, W. (2012). 'Repaying the National Debt to Africa': Trusteeship, Property and Empire. *Theoria*, 59(133), 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2012.5913301>
- Barakat, S., Connolly, D., Hardman, F., Lewis, A., Lineker, B., Menkhaus, K., ... & Shanks, K. (2014). *Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context*. Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, The University of York; Institute for Effective Education, The University of York; United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Retrieved from <https://www.york.ac.uk/media/prdu/documents/publications/Beyond%20Fragility-a%20conflict%20and%20education%20analysis%20of%20the%20Somali%20context.pdf>
- BBC Monitoring Africa. (2013). Implementation of Somalia's 'Go to School' campaign said challenging. London: BBC Worldwide Limited.
- Besteman, C. (1996). Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence: The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-State. *American Ethnologist*, 23(3), pp. 579-596. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
- Burde, D., Kapit, A., Wahl, R., Guven, O., & Skarpeteig, M. (2017). Education in Emergencies: A Review of Theory and Research. *Review of Education Research*, 87(3), 619-658. Retrieved 6 February 2019,
- Call, C. (2008). The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(8), 1491-1507. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802544207>
- Carr-Hill, R. (2015). Education of children of nomadic pastoralists in Somalia: Comparing attitudes and behaviours. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 40, 166-173. Retrieved 29 September 2019, from.
- Case, R. (1993). Theories of Learning and Theories of Development. *Educational Psychologist*, 28(3), 219-233. Retrieved 19 March 2019, from.
- Cassanelli, L., & Abdikadir, F. (2008). Somalia: Education in Transition. *Bildhaan: An International Journal Of Somali Studies*, 7. Retrieved 29 September 2018, from.
- Christopher, A. (1997). 'Nation-states', 'quasi-states', and 'Collapsed-states' in contemporary Africa. *Geojournal*, 43(1), pp. 91-97. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
- Crummey, D. (2003). The Horn of Africa: Between History and Politics. *Northeast African Studies*, 10(3), 117-138. Retrieved 14 November 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org>.
- Dawson, G. (1964). Education in Somalia. *Comparative Education Review*, 8(2), 199-214. <https://doi.org/10.1086/445062>
- Doornbos, M., & Markakis, J. (1994). Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia? *Review of African Political*

- Economy*, 21(59), pp. 82-88. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
- Drake-Brockman, R. (1912). *British Somaliland*. [Ebook]. Retrieved 3 August 2017, from <https://ia801605.us.archive.org/17/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.81470/2015.81470.British-Somaliland.pdf>.
 - Du Preez, P. (2014). Reconciliation through dialogical nostalgia in post-conflict societies: a curriculum to intersect. *A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 44(1), 117-135. Retrieved 29 September 2019, from.
 - EGAL, M. (1968). Somalia: Nomadic individualism and the rule of law. *African Affairs*, 67(268), 219-226. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a095756>
 - Englebert, P. (1997). Feature review the contemporary African state: Neither African nor state. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(4), 767-776. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599714759>
 - English, F. (2008). *The Art of Educational Leadership: Balancing Performance and Accountability*. Sage publication.
 - ERIKSEN, S. (2011). 'State failure' in theory and practice: the idea of the state and the contradictions of state formation. *Review of International Studies*, 37(01), 229-247.
 - Gellner, E. (2006). *Nations and Nationalism* (2nd Ed.). Cornell University Press.
 - Gesheker, C. (1985). Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 18(1), 1. <https://doi.org/10.2307/217972>
 - Gilkes, P. (1989). Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime. *Review of African Political Economy*, 16(44), 53-58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056248908703810>
 - Gros, J. (1996). Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti. *Third World Quarterly*, 17(3), pp. 455-471.
 - Van der Leeuw-Roord (2009) Gross, M., & Terra, L. (2018). What makes difficult history difficult? *Phi Delta Kappan*, 99, 51-56.
 - HEALY, S. (2011). Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)*, 87(1 (January 2011)), pp. 105-120. Retrieved 14 July 2018.
 - Hohne, M. (2006). Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 44(No. 3), pp. 397-414. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Hussein, A. (2015). Educational challenges in post-transitional Somalia- Case Study Mogadishu. *Heritage Institute for Policy Studies*, 1-17. Retrieved 29 September 2019, from.
 - Irons, R. (2013). *Churchill and the Mad Mullah of Somaliland: Betrayal and Redemption 1899-1921* [Ebook]. Retrieved 8 August 2017, from <https://books.google.ae/books>.
 - Jackson, D. (2010). The Ogaden War and the Demise of Detente. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 632(1), 26-40. Retrieved 2 January 2018, from.
 - Jardine, D. (1923). *THE MAD MULLAH OF SOMALILAND* [Ebook]. Osmania University. Retrieved 2 July 2017, from <https://archive.org/details/TheMadMullahOfSomaliland>.
 - JONES, B. (2008). The Global Political Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique of the 'Failed State' Ideology. *Review of International Political Economy*, 15(2), pp. 180-205. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Kimenyi, M., Mbaku, J., & Moyo, N. (2010). Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The Case of Somalia. *Social Research*, 77(4), pp. 1339-1366. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Laitin, D. (1976). The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14(03), 449. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00053519>
 - Laitin, D. (1979). The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Rôle in Somali History. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17(01), 95. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x0000519x>
 - Leerssen, J. (2006). *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History* [Ebook]. Retrieved 6 September 2017, from https://books.google.ae/books/about/National_Thought_in_Europe.html?id=IxIW2GkelGAC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
 - Lewis, I. (1960). The New East African Republic of Somalia. *The World Today*, 16(7), 287-296. Retrieved 6 January 2018, from.
 - Lewis, I. (2002). *A Modern History of the Somali* Revised, Updated & Expanded (4th ed.). Ohio University Press.
 - Lewis, I. (2004). Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox. *Africa*, 74(04), 489-515. <https://doi.org/10.3366/afr.2004.74.4.489>
 - Linke, A., & Raleigh, C. (2011). State and Stateless Violence in Somalia. *African Geographical Review*, 30(1), 47-66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2011.10539135>
 - Loubser, H., & Solomon, H. (2014). Responding to state failure in Somalia. *Africa Review*, 6(1), 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2014.883753>
 - Luling, V. (1997). Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(2), pp. 287-302. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Mathison, S., & Freeman, M. (1998). *The Logic of Interdisciplinary Studies. Report Series 2.33* (pp. 1-36). Chicago: American Educational Research Association.
 - Menkhaus, K. (2009). Somalia: 'They Created a Desert and called it Peace (building)'. *Review of African Political Economy*, 36(120), 223-233. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240903083136>
 - Michaelson, M. (1993). Somalia: The Painful Road to Reconciliation. *Africa Today*, 40(2), pp. 53-73.
 - Miranda, J. (2011). Constructivism in the Non-Traditional System of Education. *Philippina*

- Sacra*, XLVI (137), 313-344. Retrieved 19 March 2019, from.
- Moyi, P. (2012). Who goes to school? School enrollment patterns in Somalia. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 32, 163-171.
 - Naylor, R. (2015). Curriculum development in fragile states to encourage peace and reduction of conflict. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.
 - Ododa, H. (1985). Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations since the Ogaden War of 1977-78. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 21(3), pp. 285-297.
 - Ornstein, A., & Hunkins, F. (2009). *Curriculum: foundations, principles, and issues* (5th ed.). Pearson.
 - Paulson, J. (2007). Policy, Education and Conflict. *Research In Comparative And International Education*, 2(3). Retrieved 25 January 2019, from.
 - Poulsen, J. (2013). What about Global History? Dilemmas in the Selection of Content in the School Subject History. *Education Sciences*, (3), 403-420. Retrieved 28 November 2018, from.
 - Price, E., & Richardson, R. (2015). Integrating the thematic approach into information literacy courses. *Reference Services Review*, 43(1), 125-136. <https://doi.org/10.1108/rsr-12-2014-0059>
 - Rappleye, J., & Paulson, J. (2007). Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: towards a common research endeavour. *Research in Comparative and International Education*, 2(3), 252-271. Retrieved 28 January 2019, from.
 - Ravenhill, J. (1980). Comparing Régime Performance in Africa: the Limitations of Cross-National Aggregate Analysis. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18(01), 99. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00009460>
 - SCHWAB, P. (1978). COLD WAR ON THE HORN OF AFRICA. *African Affairs*, 77(306), 6-20. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a096955>
 - Shanahan, T. (1997). Reading-writing relationships, thematic units, inquiry learning..in pursuit of effective integrated literacy instruction. *The Reading Teacher*, 51(1), 12-19. Retrieved 24 July 2019, from.
 - Sheik-Abdi, A. (1977). Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15(04), 657. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00002299>
 - Sheik-Abdi, A. (1981). Ideology and Leadership in Somalia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19(01), 163. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00054161>
 - Shultz, R. (1995). State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541, pp. 75-88. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Smith, A. (2011). *The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education..* Education for All Global, Unesco. Retrieved from https://www.ulster.ac.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0011/231968/EFA-2011-Think-piece.pdf
 - Smith, D. (2000). The Nation In History, Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and Nationalism Polity Press.
 - Tareke, G. (2009). *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* [Ebook]. Yale University Press, New Haven. Retrieved 14 November 2017, from.
 - Thomas, S. (2016). Somalia challenges and opportunities in peace-building. Retrieved 2 July 2016, from <http://www.cfpar.org>.
 - Tripodi, P. (1999). Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence. *The International Journal Of African Historical Studies*, 32(2/3), 359-380. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Van Notten, M. (2003). From Nation-State to Stateless Nation: The Somali Experience. *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione Dell'istituto Italiano Per L'afrika E L'oriente*, 58(2), PP. 147-157. Retrieved 14 July 2018, from.
 - Verdugo, R., & Miline, A. (2016). *National Identity: Theory and Research*. Information Age Publishing.
 - Wansink, B., Akkerman, S., & Wubbels, T. (2017). Topic variability and criteria in interpretational history teaching. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 49(5), 640-662.
 - Weldon, G. (2009). A comparative study of the construction of memory and identity in the curriculum in societies emerging from conflict: Rwanda and South Africa (ph.D). University of Pretoria.
 - Wiles, J., & Bondi, J. (2011). *Curriculum Development: A Guide to Practice* (8th Ed.). Pearson.
 - Yihun, B. (2014). Ethiopian foreign policy and the Ogaden War: the shift from "containment" to "destabilization," 1977-1991. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(4), 677-691.