

New Strategic Actors of African Military Leaders (NSAAML) in the Path of International Relations (PIR) versus Mechanisms of Western Neo-Colonial Actors (MWNA): The Case of Burkina Faso in the 21st Century

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| Received: 21.08.2023 | Accepted: 29.09.2023 | Published: 03.10.2023 |

Abstract: The History of Africa in International Relations (HAIR) put at the disposal of Post-Graduate Students and other readers is well intensive using scrutinized research work of the specialization to make an in-depth understanding of the happenings since the second half of the 20th Century and what is occurring in the 21st Century with new leaders cropping up with more pragmatic ideologies of chasing out neo-colonialist for the benefit of their specific countries. This situation is very welcoming in West African countries with specific strategic of using military coup d'états to flush out puppet Western leaders in the names of Head of States. The cases of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger among others caught our attention more recently. Our inspirations are drawn from published scientific works, documentaries, related books and specialized websites consulted online following the recent occurring with specific focus concerning Burkina-Faso where on September 30, 2022 a military coup took place in Burkina Faso. As a result, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was overthrown and Captain Ibrahim Traoré replaced him in power. The constitution was suspended, state institutions were dissolved, borders were closed and the army imposed a curfew throughout the country thereby urging the Departure and end of French neo-colonialism with cancellation of specific accords of cooperation signed at independence. This research is very interesting to students specializing in International Relations (IR) especially Africa in HAIR. However, a historical method was deemed necessary with statistical tables giving some important representations and commercial exchanges between Burkina Faso and France barely a year before the cropping of conflicting bilateral relations since 2022. Our experiences from lecturing IR and HAIR with specific questions frequently asked by Post-Graduates students is among the motivated factors thereby highlighting issues which can be more valuable to other research axes related to the present.

Keywords: Burkina Faso, Exploitation, International Relations, New Strategic Actors, Africa Military, Exports-Imports, Neo-Sovereignty, Developed, Underdeveloped, Poverty.

INTRODUCTION

Burkina Faso has an area of 274,200 km². It is one of the least-developed countries on the African continent. Currently estimated at around 10.5 million, its population is increasing at a rapid 2.8 per cent per year. The result is that more than half of the Burkina population is now under 20 years of age. The country has limited natural resources and is exposed to the vagaries of the Sahelian climate, which means insufficient and uneven rainfall. It is also land-locked. Its economic infrastructure is under-developed and many remote regions are virtually isolated during the rainy season (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso). However, the country's positive actions in defense of National Sovereignty and to boost Africa's position in IR engagement during the 21st Century is giving a new

course of the Continent's strength with examples likely to be copied by her neighbours and beyond. Those factors facilitate us to link the previous subjective and recent objectives agenda in relations to the neo-colonial manifestations and relative attempts to counteract them those challenges for the betterment of Africans using realist reflections as it is already happening in West African countries. On 2 August 1984, on President Sankara's initiative, the country's name changed from "Upper Volta" to "Burkina Faso", or land of the honest men; the literal translation is land of the upright men. The presidential decree was confirmed by the National Assembly on 4 August. The demonym for people of Burkina Faso, "Burkinabè", includes expatriates or descendants of people of Burkinabè origin (Jaffré Bruno, 2009). The country Burkina Faso includes the folk music of 60 different ethnic groups. Burkina Faso is a

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Citation: Njuafac Kenedy Fonju (2023). New Strategic Actors of African Military Leaders (NSAAML) in the Path of International Relations (PIR) versus Mechanisms of Western Neo-Colonial Actors (MWNA): The Case of Burkina Faso in the 21st Century. *Cross Current Int Peer Reviewed J Human Soc Sci*, 9(9), 155-181.

multilingual country. The official language is French, which was introduced during the colonial period. French is the principal language of administrative, political and judicial institutions, public services, and the press. It is the only language for laws, administration and courts. Altogether, an estimated 69 languages are spoken in the country. The Mossi people, centrally located around the capital, Ouagadougou, account for 40 percent of the population while, to the south, Gurunsi, Gurma, Dagaaba and Lobi populations, speaking Gur languages closely related to the Mossi language, extend into the coastal states. In the north and east the Fulani of the Sahel preponderate, while in the south and west the Mande languages are common including Samo, Bissa, Bobo, Senufo and Marka (Skinner, 1989).

This paper is very interesting to researchers specializing in the history of IR specifically to those focusing on Africa in IR from the second half of the 20th Century. The territory formerly known as Upper Volta achieved its independence from France with Maurice Yaméogo as the country's first President on 5 August 1960 with the name of the country known as Burkina-Faso. President Maurice Yaméogo declared a state-of-emergency on 1 January 1966. President Maurice Yaméogo resigned on 4 January 1966. Lt. Colonel Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana took control of the government and arrested Maurice Yaméogo then suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly on 5 January 1966, assumed the presidency on 7 January 1966. He further prohibited political party activities on 21 September 1966 and on 8 May 1969, sentenced to five years imprisonment the pioneer president of the country. More importantly, a new constitution providing for a civilian government and an elected assembly was approved in a referendum with 99 percent of the vote on 14 June 1970 (Chouli Lila, 2015). The new constitution went into effect on 21 June 21 1970. Former president Maurice Yaméogo was released from prison on 5 August 1970 (Sawo Adoulie, 2017). Legislative elections were held on 20 December 1970, and the UDV-RDA won 37 out of 57 seats in the National Assembly. The African Regroupment Party (*Parti du Regroupement Africain* – PRA) won 12 seats in the National Assembly. Gerard Kango Ouedraogo of the UDV-RDA formed a government as prime minister on 18 February 1971. President Aboubakar dismissed the government of Prime Minister Kango Ouedraogo on 8 February 1974 and dissolved the National Assembly then suspended the constitution on February 8, 1974. He appointed himself as Prime Minister on 11 February 1974, dissolved his cabinet on 29 January 1976, and announced a new cabinet on 9 February 1976, lifted the ban on political party activity on 1 October 1977. To that effect, a new constitution legalizing political parties was approved in a referendum with 99 percent of the vote on 27 November 1977 with legislative elections held on 30 April 1978 during which the UDV-RDA won 28 out of 57 seats while the National Union for the Defence of Democracy (*Union Nationale pour la Defense de la*

Democratie – UNDD) won 13 seats. He was again re-elected as president with 56 percent of the vote in the second round of presidential elections held on 29 May 1978. Given the chance to Joseph Issoufou Conombo of the UDV-RDA who formed a government as Prime Minister on 7 July 1978 (Chouli Lila, 2015).

In fact, President Aboubakar was deposed in a military coup led by Colonel Saye Zerbo on 25 November 1980 and the Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress (*Comite Militaire de Redressment pour le Progress National* – CMRPN) headed by Colonel Saye Zerbo took control of the government on 26 November 1980. Oncemore, the CMRPN suspended the 1977 constitution, banned political parties and dissolved the National Assembly on 26 November 1980. Colonel Zerbo formed a government as Prime Minister 7 December 1980 and was deposed in a military coup of 6-7 November 1982, resulting in the deaths of some 20 citizens. The People's Salvation Council (*Conseil du Salut du Peuple* – CSP) headed by Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo took control of the government on 8 November 1982 until Captain Thomas Sankara was appointed as Prime Minister on 10 January 1983. On his part, Major Ouedraogo was deposed in a military coup led by Captain Thomas Sankara on 4 August of the same year resulting in the deaths of 13 citizens. The National Revolutionary Council (*Conseil National de la Revolution* – CNR) chaired by Captain Thomas Sankara took control of the government on 5 August (Chouli Lila, 2015). The government suppressed a military rebellion from 9 to 10 August 1983, resulting in the deaths of two citizens. Captain Thomas Sankara formed a government as head-of-state on 24 August 1983. The government suppressed a military rebellion led by Colonel Didier Tiendrebeogo on 27 May 1984, and seven military officers were executed for their involvement in the military rebellion on 11 June 1984. Captain Thomas Sankara proclaimed the change in the name of the country to Burkina Faso on 4 August 1984. Three government soldiers were killed in a bomb explosion by government opponents at a military barracks in Ouagadougou on 31 May 1985. (Sawo Adoulie, 2017). Captain Thomas Sankara was killed during a military coup led by Captain Blaise Compaoré on 15 October 1987, resulting in the deaths of at least 80 individuals. President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo expressed support for Captain Blaise Compaoré on 26 October 1987. Captain Guy Lamoussa Sayogo, deputy commander of Bodo-Dioulasso military region, was killed by military personnel on 28 October 1988. On 28 and 29 December 1988, seven military personnel were executed for their involvement in the killing of Captain Sayogo. The Organization for People's Democracy-Labor Movement (*Organisation pour la Democratie Populaire – Mouvement du Travail* – ODP-MT) was established on 15 April 1989. The government suppressed a rebellion led by Major Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani and Captain Henri Zongo on September 18-19, 1989. The leaders of the rebellion and

two other individuals were executed on 19 September 1989. The government suppressed an attempted military rebellion on 24 and 25 December 1989, resulting in the executions of seven individuals and arrest of some 30 individuals. Captain Blaise Compaoré formed a transitional government on 16 June 1990. A new constitution allowing for a multi-party system, as well as an elected president and legislature, was approved in a referendum with 93 percent of the vote on 2 June 1991 (Sawo Adoulie, 2017).

On 30 October 2014, President Blaise Compaoré dissolved the government and declared a state of emergency following three days of violent protests, including damage to the National Assembly building in Ouagadougou. Later the same day, General Honoré Nabéré Traoré announced the dissolution of the National Assembly and the creation of a transitional government. President Blaise Compaoré announced his resignation from office on 31 October 2014, and he fled to Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire. On 1 November 2014, Lt. Colonel Isaac Zida, deputy commander of the presidential guard, was named as the transitional president. Following the signing of the *Charter for the Transition in Burkina Faso* on 16 November 2014, Michel Kafando was appointed as the transitional president (Engels Bettina, 2015). The 90-member National Transitional Council (NTC) was also established. On 18 November 2014, Michal Kafando was inaugurated as interim president. . On 16 September 2015, RSP soldiers detained interim President Michel Kafando and Prime Minister Isaac Yacouba Zida in the presidential palace in Ouagadougou. Members of the presidential guard clashed with protesters gathered outside the presidential palace in Ouagadougou, resulting in the deaths of more than ten individuals. President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was sworn in for a second term on 28 December 2020. President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré dismissed Prime Minister Christophe Dabiré and dissolved the government on 30 December 2020 (Engels Bettina, 2015).

The French foreign ministry said Thursday it is recalling its ambassador to Burkina Faso for consultations, one day after Paris decided to withdraw troops from the West African country following a demand by its military rulers. A top official at the foreign ministry said the decision has been made “in the context of the latest developments in Burkina Faso” in order to conduct “consultations on the state and perspectives of our bilateral cooperation” with Ambassador Luc Hallade. The official requested anonymity in line with the French government’s customary practices. Burkina Faso’s military junta had asked France to recall its ambassador earlier this month. France’s foreign ministry said Wednesday that French troops deployed in Burkina Faso will have left the country within a month, in line with Burkina Faso’s notification of the termination of the 2018 agreement on the presence of French troops on its soil. About 400 French Special Forces members were

based in the country as part of a broader military deployment aimed at fighting extremists in Africa’s Sahel region. Anti-French sentiment has grown in Burkina Faso, a former French colony, since junta leader Ibrahim Traore seized power in September. In fact, President Traore has been more overtly open to working with other countries, notably Russia. The move by Burkina Faso’s regime comes five months after France completed its withdrawal from Mali after nine years fighting Islamic extremists alongside regional troops. About 3,000 French soldiers are deployed in the Sahel region, most of them based in Chad and Niger (The Associated Press, Paris, 2023).

The course of Africa in IR owes its origins from through pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. Although, Africa’s contacts in the first two periods of history were that of subjectivities to their so-called masters of exploration, expropriation and exploitations which this study characterize as Western European manifestations of 3Es until the second half of the 20th Century when most colonial territories were granted superficial independence to obtain the status of a Nation-State or Country (Njuafac, 2020) with equivalent to adhere as a member of the United Nations Organisation (UNO). The paper then brings out issues ranging from Africa's place in IR, its strength; weaknesses beginning from the Second Half of the 20th Century to the effect of globalization of the 21st Century are topics of increasing importance and academic interests. However, prominent writers and Scholars of this domain and related fields of studies came out with interesting literatures which are relevant to our findings as background to what is happening in the 21st Century rampant military takeover not from foreigners but within Africans themselves. Why is it a provocation to the Western Neo-colonial Actors of the present Century when Africans in those countries have seen Western democracies and prescriptions as a failure and rendering peoples sufferings and under development? Are Africans not having the rights as full sovereign states? Whatever the degree of questions asked, the young Captain who was born almost towards the down of the Cold War with his generation got the experiences and lessons of Thomas Sankara with his people at heart cannot be indifferent from the development of their country. Therefore the Western outdated neo-colonial actors have to give them the chances to do so fearlessly. This makes Africa in IR of the 21st Century very interesting because the West should be ready to answer pertinent questions from young generation of African leaders who are not ready to remain on the position of subjectivity but focusing on objectivity to realistic agenda in favour of their population.

The Path of Africa in International Relations with Specific Perception Reflecting Challenging State to State Relations between Underdeveloped and Developed Neo-Colonial Embarrassing Countries of the 21st Century

The engagement of Independent African countries in IR since the second half of the 20th Century with unclear equivalents as the former colonial powers who transformed their activities into Hyper Neo-colonial Powers (HNP) of intensive and pitiless Expropriation, Exploration and Exploitation (EEEs-3Es) is an increasing important academic interest to Africans in the 21st Century due to circumstances emanating from the later actors in the conduct of aggravated mechanisms of 3Es. The fact the contemporary agents of Western European countries continue to be looking at Africans in a subjective position in the recent past, it therefore shapes the present situational uprisings and military takeover firstly by ousting out Subjective Minded Statesmen (SMS) in search of Objective Minded Statesmen (OMS) capable of bringing in realistic agenda in favour of local and national development. With the hopes to reduce the rate of poverty all the articles in this virtual special issue concern themselves in some way with the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world.

This in itself is not a striking claim for distinctiveness: it would be difficult to find any article – even on quite locally or nationally focused topics – that does not include some discussion of global politics or international actors, broadly defined (Carl Death, 2015). Writing on the state of African studies a number of years ago, and the various responses and resistances of the field to changes in the international environment, the postcolonial scholar (Bill Ashcroft, 2002) traced three main representations of the continent in scholarly writing. The first was defined by an emergent postcolonial agenda in African intellectual thinking, which, building on early post-independence nationalist projects and following contemporary trends in postcolonial analysis, focused on colonialism's legacies in shaping African subjectivities and societal structures. The second was structured by 'a discourse of Africa', based on a particular framing of what the continent was or was not, and which tended to represent the continent in essentialist terms. The third was a form of internationalism, which attempted to cast the continent's economic and political dynamics against a changing global reality. According to Ashcroft in 2002, all the representations contained some sense of ambiguity in relation to Africa's position in the world, consenting to a common notion that the continent was largely peripheral in a wider sociopolitical and economic reality. More than that, the study of the continent was preceded by a particular 'idea of Africa' – one that drew from colonialist imaginations and that projected the continent as 'the other', the antithesis of Western subjectivity and institutional order (Scarlett Cornelissen *et al.*, 2012).

According to Joshua D Lichterman, disasters occur from the impact of a variety of natural and technological hazards. This paper explores the kind of disasters we can expect in the coming century, the challenges they present to human societies, and suggests a few future coping strategies. It argues that some future disasters will occur as a result of slow onset of hazards such as Global Warming or Ozone Layer Damage (Joshua D Lichterman, 1999). Further it examines how the mechanistic-deterministic worldview derived from the Newtonian model has influenced the epistemology and methodology of IR (i.e., the idea that the world is constituted of independent fragments), and seeks ways to develop a new methodology for IR by drawing on the potential of a non-fragmented worldview. The author argues that it is this modern Western view of human beings (Elina Penttinen, 2013). Africa has the second largest territory with abundant human and material resources. Yet, it is a continent "at the centre of numerous international crises and opportunities" (Abrahamsen, 2017). In spite of its recognition in the global affairs, the dynamics of its domestic affairs, characterised by political unrest, economic stagnation, and mismanagement of the material resources, continue to weaken its power potentials (Kutlwano Ramaboa, 2019). As a continent of "lacks and absences, failings and problems, plagues and catastrophes" it has often had a certain kind of (in)visibility in terms of debates about statehood or globalisation, for example, and in writing this book I wanted to challenge that by placing Africa at the centre of my analysis. IR has typically focused on the way in which marginalised, poor and weak African countries are acted and impacted upon by great powers and international institutions (Beswick and Hammerstad, 2013; Abrahamsen, 2017) and consequently the agency and diversity of African state and non-state actors have often been neglected. The continent also provides an ideal vantage point from which to explore the intersections between geopolitics and development because of the idea that Africa is currently "rising", buoyed by relatively high levels of economic growth combined with the growing regional and even global political power of some of the continent's bigger player (Omololu Fagbadebo, 2019).

Empire is one of the oldest forms of political organisation and has dominated societies in all parts of the world. Yet, despite the emergence of nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the apparent end of empire with the breakup of European colonial regimes and the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, empire remains powerful in the modern world (Matthew Johnson, 2014). Empire is one of the oldest forms of political organisation and has dominated societies in all parts of the world. Yet, despite the emergence of nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the apparent end of empire with the breakup of European colonial regimes and the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, empire remains powerful in the modern world (Russell Foster, 2013). One-quarter of the world's states

are African and can contribute to international relations theory and practice as the North enters a period of ambivalence and begins to retreat from positive global engagement. Each actor based in or concerned about the African continent, state and non-state alike, advances a foreign policy to reflect its interests, often in coalition with others. East-South relations and a non-Western world, as well as Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa, are important in international development and emerging powers in Africa (Timothy M Shaw, 2019). Africa's history is one of exploitation and marginalisation. This history, marked by the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the continent's colonisation by European powers and, thereafter, episodes of post-colonial inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts, as well as, hunger and disease, points to the roots of the continent's marginality in IR and consequently, that of its study, IR. As a result of this history sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have been on the margins of the international system for many years (Engel and Olsen, 2005). Concomitantly some analyses of Africa continues to depict the continent as largely peripheral to the main forces of change in global politics, a situation that has reinforced the idea of Africa's global marginality and lack of agency (Brown, 2006; Cornelissen, Cheru, and Shaw, 2012). The result of Africa's marginality has been a lack of theoretical interest in Africa's IR (Engel and Olsen, 2005). The IR literature on Africa is quite sparse and much of what does exist is on the continent's role in North-South relations, and here the emphasis is on the North (Brookes, 2007; Zartman, 2008). Added to this, Africa's intellectual exclusion from the IR mainstream debates has meant that little of the literature on African IR has had any explicit theoretical content (Croft, 1997). To this end, Africa has been taken as a passive actor even in some of the important events that are shaping the twenty-first century (Sidiropoulos, 2009). Supporting the above-mentioned views is the position taken by some of the most important thinkers in IR (Ronald Chipaike, 2018).

In addition, Africa Programme research and networks of governmental and non-governmental actors across Africa and around the world help to support a deeper understanding of the changing dynamics of African political economies and international relations. In 2019, the programme hosted its flagship conference in Addis Ababa, Africa's Future in a Changing Global Order: Agency in International Relations. The two-day conference was launched with a keynote address by Former President of Tanzania, HE Jakaya Kikwete. The Africa Programme focuses on Africa's changing relationship with the European Union, as well as the drivers and prospects of engagements between countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, the programme co-hosted Slovenia's eighth Africa Day Conference in Ljubljana. The UK's engagements and influence in Africa are analysed through work on UK Policy in Africa. Emerging economies around the world are developing their

political and economic relations with African states in pursuit of a number of strategic goals. The Programme's research shows the extent of the impact that Gulf region dynamics and links into the Horn of Africa has on outcomes in that region (Ronald Chipaike www.chathamhouse.org > structure online, consulted July 2020).

Moreover, Africa's IR have often been defined and oriented by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day. In the aftermath of colonialism the Cold War became a dominant paradigm that defined the nature of the continent's relationship with the rest of the world. The contemporary forces of globalization are now exerting an undue influence and impact upon Africa's international relations. Increasingly, the African continent is emerging as a vocal and in some respects an influential, actor in international relations. There is a lack of analysis and research on this emerging trend. This timely book fills this analytical gap by engaging with a wide range of issues, with chapters written by experts on a variety of themes (Tim Murithi, 2013). The emerging political prominence of the African continent on the world stage is predicated on an evolving internal process of continental integration. In particular, there are normative and policy efforts to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism: the 21st century is witnessing the evolution of Pan-Africanism, notably through the constitution and establishment of the African Union (AU). Given the dearth of analysis on this phenomenon, this volume also examines the notion of Pan-Africanism through various lenses notably peace and security, development, the environment and trade (Tim Murithi, 2013). The volume will also engage with the emerging role of the AU as an international actor, e.g. with regard to its role in the reform of the United Nations Security Council, climate change, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the treaty establishing Africa as a nuclear-free zone, Internally Displaced Persons, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), international trade, the environment, public health issues, security, and development issues. This book will assess how the AU's role as an international actor is complicated by the difficulty of promoting consensus among African states and then maintaining that consensus in the face of often divergent national interests. This book will in part assess the role of the AU in articulating collective and joint policies and in making interventions in international decision and policy-making circles.

The *Handbook* will also assess the role of African social movements and their relationship with global actors. The role of African citizens in improving their own conditions is often underplayed in the international relations discourse, and this volume will seek to redress this oversight. Throughout the book the various chapters will also assess the role that these citizen linkages have contributed towards continental integration and in confronting the challenges of

globalization (Tim Murithi, 2013). Africa has often been defined and represented by outsiders. In International Studies (IS), the continent is frequently viewed as peripheral and uninteresting. This is clearly a problem and an increasingly apparent one as the number of courses on Africa and IS growing, both in Africa and beyond. Many academics that run these courses are keen to challenge the continent's traditional marginalisation and perceived dependency; however, they are limited by the resources available to them and the fact that many are establishing new courses from scratch. This article contributes to the literature by identifying key debates around teaching of African IR (Tim Murithi, 2014) setting of new positive developmental agenda in favour of their respective population thereby embarking on rapid strategies to oust the Western neo-colonial purported agents through un negotiated military coup d'états as it is happening in West Africa Region. However, it's our modest contributions from the reviewing of the above authors which links the reader of this research area to make use of the quoted authors and acknowledge them properly in any scientific academic works. The World of the 21st Century is quite different as compared to the 20th Century which was characterized by the Two World Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939- 1945 with the Cold War ideological confrontations of Capitalism and Communism taking the challenges till 1991.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union into Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) and hyper-power position dominated by the United States marked another new turn in the History of International Relations with African countries breathing hard from the challenges of neo-colonialism and the prescriptions of the New World Order which were later challenged by the framing of New Global Order in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack of the U.S. Presently, African countries are once more between the U.S, China and Russian international competitions following the dissolution of former specific or exclusive sphere of influences in terms of geo-political and geo-strategic games of the 21st Century. But the cropping of new military takeover in the recent times is a strong sign of kicking the Western democracies out of Africa due to harsh practices of 3 Es mechanisms in specific countries blessed with abundant natural resources which the citizens and the entire country continuing to be depriving from its revenues as contribution to National Income and helping in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These challenges among other have to be addressed by the young NSAAML in view of adjusting the activities of the MWNA taking the case of Burkina Faso in West Africa.

Ranks of Colonial Dominative Agents and Post-Colonial Foreign Representations

Until the end of the 19th century, the history of Upper Volta was dominated by the empire-building Mossi/Mossi Kingdoms, who are believed to have come up to their present location from present-day Northern Ghana. For centuries, the Mossi peasant was both farmer and soldier, and the Mossi people were able to defend their religious beliefs and social structure against forcible attempts to convert them to Islam by Muslims from the northwest. When the French arrived and claimed the area in 1896, Mossi resistance ended with the capture of their capital at Ouagadougou. "The Territory of Upper Volta was constituted by the grouping together of a number of circles of Upper Senegal -Niger, without any changes being made to the administrative structure of those divisions. As a result there are some overlaps among the ethnic groups living along the boundaries of the circles; this did not raise any problems when the area of settlement to either side of those boundaries fell under the responsibility of one and the same Governor, but creates more serious problems in the case of the boundary between the two Colonies. In 1919, certain provinces from Upper Senegal and Niger were united into a separate colony called the Upper Volta in the French West Africa federation (Skinner, E. P. 1989). In 1932, the new colony was dismembered in a move to economies; it was reconstituted in 1937 as an administrative division called the Upper Coast. After World War II, the Mossi renewed their pressure for separate territorial status and on 4 September 1947, Upper Volta became a French West African territory again in its own right. The indigenous population was highly discriminated against. For example, African children were not allowed to ride bicycles or pick fruit from trees, "privileges" reserved for the children of colonists. Violating these regulations could land parents in jail. Upper Volta there after Burkina Faso was a colony of French West Africa established in 1919 in the territory occupied by present-day Burkina Faso (M. Izard, 1970). It was formed from territories that had been part of the colonies of Upper Senegal and Niger and the Côte d'Ivoire [1]. The colony was dissolved on 5 September 1932, with parts being administered by the Côte d'Ivoire, French Sudan and the Colony of Niger. After World War II, on 4 September 1947, the colony was revived as a part of the French Union, with its previous boundaries. On 11 December 1958, it was reconstituted as the self-governing Republic of Upper Volta within the French Community, and two years later on 5 August 1960, it attained full independence. On 4 August 1984, the name was changed to Burkina Faso. The name Upper Volta indicates that the country contains the upper part of the Volta River. The river is divided into three parts, called the Black Volta, White Volta and Red Volta (Upper Volta, 1979).

Table 1: French Colonial Agents of the Upper Volta who moderated the activities of 3 Es 1919-1960

No.	NAMES OF AGENTS	PERIODS	PORTFOLIOS
1	Édouard Hesling	09/11/1919 – 07/08/ 1927	Lt.Gov
2	Robert Arnaud	07/08/ 1927 – 13/01/ 1928	A. Lt.Gov
3	Albéric Fournier	13/01/1928 – 22/12/ 1932	Lt.Gov
4	Gabriel Descemet	22/12/1932 – 31/12/ 1932	Lt.Gov
5	Gaston Mourgues	06/09/1947 – 29/04/ 1948	A.Gov
6	Albert Mouragues	29/04/1948 – 23/02/ 1953	Gov
7	Salvador Jean Étcheber	23/02/1953 – 03/11/ 1956	Gov
8	Yvon Bourges	03/11/1956 – 15/07/ 1958	Gov
9	Max Berthet	15/07/1958 – 11/12/1958	A. Gov
10	Max Berthet	11/12/ 1958 – 02/ 1959	HC
11	Paul Masson	02/1959 – 05/08/ 1960	HC

Source: With information from diverse sources: French Upper Volta, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Upper_Volta

Upper Volta (French: Haute-Volta) was a colony of French West Africa established in 1919 in the territory occupied by present-day Burkina Faso. ... Demyonym, Upper Voltese. History. Government. Governor 1948–1953.

Republic of Upper Volta, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Upper_Volta

Memorial of Burkina Faso | International Court of <https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204>

20 Apr 2011 — By an Order of the Governor-General of French West Africa dated. 17 November 1932, the territories of the colony of Upper Volta which had ... Images for list France Governors Upper Volta/burkina Faso.

Table 2: 13 Ambassadors of Upper Volta- Burkina Faso to France 1966-2023

No.	Names	Period of Accreditations	Portfolios
1	Henri Guissou	17/09/ 1966	Amb.
2	Pierre Claver Ilboudo	01/01/ 1974	Amb
3	Martin Parkouda	01/0 1/ 1981	CA
4	Serge Théophile Balima	20/12/ 1991	Amb
5	Ambroise Silga	01/0 1/ 1992	CA
6	Frédéric Assomption Korsaga	01/02/ 1993	Amb
7	Filippe Savadogo	17/10/ 1996	Amb
8	Firmin Grégoire N'Do Piabié	01/0 1/ 2007	CA
9	Luc Adolphe Tiao Beyon	15/09/ 2008	Amb
10	Joseph Paré	22/12/ 2011	Amb
11	Eric Yemdaogo Tiare	15/11/ 2013	Amb
12	Robert Compaoré	21/01/ 2016	Amb
13	Alain Francis Gustave Ilboudo	09/11/ 2016	Amb

Sources: By Us With Informations From Different Documents; Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, (October 2018) List Of ambassadors of Burkina Faso to France; Paris M (1966), Henri Guissou, Ambassadeur de Haute Volta à Paris, a présenté ses lettres de créance le 17.9. Robert Compaoré, (9 novembre 2016), JORF n°0264.

The Burkinabe ambassador in Paris is the official representative of the Government in Ouagadougou to the Government of France. There were three categories of French colonial agents in the Upper Volta from 1919 to 1960 as follows: 03 Lt. Gov., 01 A. Lt. Gov. 1919 to 1932; 02 A. Gov., 03 Gov. from 1947 to 1958 and 2 HC from 1958 to 1960 when the country obtained independence. The situation of NSAAML in view of adjusting the activities of the MWNA taking the case of Burkina Faso in West Africa as New Forces of Reawaking Against Western Subjective /Hegemony is very important with reflections to the previous actions of the former colonial agents above and post-independent French diplomatic representations alongside its Multinational Corporations in the sectorial exploitations to the detriment of the local populations plagued in abject poverty. The third decade of the 21st Century seems promising with the activities of the military leaders who

are ready to render more profitable services to the population than adoring again neo-colonial local leaders of their countries in West Africa. This draws our attention to highlight the importance of the Pan-Africanist Thomas Sankara as one time assassinated President of Burkina Faso in well-planned neo-colonial conspiracy mechanisms.

Presentation of Thomas Sankara in Relations to Contemporary Actions of NSAAML

The presentation of the former strong Pan-Africanist is more credible to the contemporary actions of NSAAML in Burkina Faso. In 1983, Thomas Sankara, a leftist and Pan-Africanist officer, led a military coup in the country when it was still known as the Republic of Upper Volta. Under his anti-imperialist agenda, Sankara introduced a series of progressive reforms that aimed to eliminate the dominance of French colonial power and

address social inequalities. He changed the country's name from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, which means "Land of the Incorruptible People. "As one of the most charismatic revolutionary leaders during that era, Sankara was often referred to as "Africa's Che Guevara [the iconic revolutionary from South America]" by his supporters. Many young people in Burkina Faso, the military coups in January and September 2022 brought back memories of Sankara's efforts to root out colonial influence from France in the country (Fighting Remnants of Colonialism in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2023. Online, consulted, 2023). "We are a generation of people who want to feel equal to other peoples in terms of education, health, economy, and affirmation of our identity. Yet our rulers, who are local lackeys of imperialism, are unable to satisfy our aspirations. This is the origin of the crisis," Koussoube said. The young activist went on to explain how the nation's previous leaders, who were supposedly voted into office through democratic elections, failed. "Power is centralized in the hands of a few individuals, while communities are manipulated and instrumentalized. We have been experiencing this for more than two decades. It is the inability of democratically elected rulers, due to corruption, mismanagement and nepotism. This is what led to the coup d'états that was generally welcomed by the general population who do not want more of those 'pseudo-intellectual' elites and politicians'," he said. In a similar vein to what happened in neighboring West African countries following political changes in recent years, one of the key demands of the new government in Burkina Faso was to ask France to withdraw its troops from the country. The French Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday that France planned to withdraw its troops from Burkina Faso next month, following continued protests against its military presence in the West African country (Burkina Faso Military Coup Reflects Wave of Insecurity in ... Borkena, <https://borkena.com> > Opinion).

The move came after a similar withdrawal of French troops last year from neighboring Mali, where two military coups took place in 2020 and 2021, respectively. As Burkina Faso has been battling Islamic insurgents in the northern part of the country in recent years, Western analysts expressed concern that the withdrawal of French troops, who were dispatched to fight the insurgency, could destabilize the security situation in the region further ([Burkina Faso Military Coup Reflects Wave of Insecurity in ... Borkena, https://borkena.com](https://borkena.com) > Opinion). However, Anti-colonial revolutionary Thomas Sankara struggled to free his country, Burkina Faso, from the domination of foreign corporations and neoliberal economic institutions. And in 1987, he was assassinated for it. Brian Peterson tried to present him as a complex individual who, in the most fundamental way, was a self-described patriot. He was completely committed to his people and put his energies into fighting for his country's political and economic sovereignty. In fact, Sankara rejected labels, but there were clearly some main strands to his thought. At the

core was his visceral opposition to injustice and a sense of moral outrage at oppression and inequality. This is reflected in his intellectual influences, like Marxism, Catholic liberation theology, and Third Worldist currents of thought (The 'Political Orientation' of Burkina Faso, JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org> > stable).

This bundle of ideological orientations was packaged in a highly charismatic individual who, ultimately, was a man of action. In his leadership style, I would emphasize Sankara's nonconformist and preternatural work habits. I also think he set a high bar in terms of moral rectitude and incorruptibility, and, because of these qualities, Sankara's legacy in Africa has been mostly positive. Sankara rejected labels, but there were clearly some main strands to his thought. At the core was his visceral opposition to injustice and a sense of moral outrage at oppression and inequality. In so many ways, Sankara went against the main political currents of the 1980s. As a revolutionary hero and political icon, he is often viewed as a virtuous political leader who, despite his errors, had the genuine interests of the people at heart. Reading your book on Mickey Leland made me realize how much the two men shared, in terms of their commitment to the people and their positioning within global politics. They both represented powerful counter-hegemonic struggles that were ongoing in the 1980s but have often been occluded by triumphalist neoliberal narratives. (Brian Peterson, 2021). We know that the revolutionary state was very successful in wiping out corruption and promoting greater self-reliance while redirecting far more state resources to rural areas, from the rather bloated civil service to the peasantry. This meant a countrywide improvement of basic health care, the "commando" vaccination drives, and expanded water access. We can also cite the impressive achievement of food self-sufficiency by the end of 1986, following a devastating drought and famine, and the concomitant shift to sustainable development and environmental restoration, which included mass reforestation drives. He sees Sankara viewed raising political consciousness as the most important long-term task, but admittedly the most difficult. It's not easy to change how people think, their consumption patterns, or entrenched attitudes around things like gender relations. And Sankara understood that this required a major overhaul of the larger cultural matrix, and there was only so much that any nation-state could do. The revolutionary state certainly launched numerous projects, such as literacy campaigns, building schools, mobile film units, and cultural festivals as a way of providing the scaffolding necessary for "decolonizing mentalities." But this was a long-term intergenerational struggle, and the forces at play transcended the nation-state, both in terms of culture and politics. In the months before his assassination, he redoubled his commitment to the peasantry, and took further steps to raise political consciousness. He also initiated a campaign of revolutionary "self-criticism" and of addressing the errors of the revolution. He was responsive to people's grievances and even called for a

revolutionary “pause,” a course correction. His enemies saw an opportunity, took advantage of his candor, and implemented their coup (Brian Peterson, 2021).

According to Benjamin Talton Thomas Sankara’s 1983 to 1987 revolution in Burkina Faso was part of a small group of national, radical political movements in the Global South during the heady but volatile 1980s. These movements were geared to achieve economic and political independence for their countries as the majority of Global South nations oriented their political institutions according to the prescriptions of North American and European patrons and the detrimental economic models of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Union College Professor Brian Peterson’s *Thomas Sankara: A Revolutionary in Cold War Africa*, published in February 2021 by Indiana University Press, is a timely, engrossing, highly informative history that is as much a biography of Sankara as it is a national memoir of West Africa during the Cold War of the 1980s. Peterson positions Sankara’s revolution as an example of the counter-hegemonic struggles during the 1980s’ neoliberal transition. In addition to his most recent book and articles on the intersection of Islam and colonial rule in West Africa, Peterson is the author of *Islamization from Below: The Making of Muslim Communities in Rural French Sudan, 1880-1960* (Yale University Press, 2011). In fact, Sankara’s Pan-Africanist legacies and what he did to the people of Upper-Volta there after Burkina Faso are encouraging factors to the present re-awakening against the neo-colonial policies of the 21st Century Africa in terms of 3Es mechanisms.

Contributing Factors of Trade Union Against Neo-colonialism

Organised labour has long been an important social force in almost all African states. Trade unions often intervene in national politics beyond labour-related issues: they were active in the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, in the democratisation movements of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in protests against neo-liberal “structural adjustment” policies imposed by the international financial institutions, and in overthrowing political regimes, presidencies, and governments. However, in Africa as elsewhere, trade unions do not act in a political, social and cultural vacuum; they are embedded in political and social structures at different scales (local, national, and transnational). They raise their claims in alliances or in competition with other oppositional state or non-state actors (Bettina Engels, 2015). In fact, Trade unionism in Burkina Faso, outlining which claims were raised by the trade unions and how these claims were framed as follows: From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, trade unions were engaged in the struggle for democratisation and, after the first structural adjustment programme (*Programme de facilité d’ajustement structurel renforcé*) was signed in 1991, they protested against economic liberalisation, the privatisation of state-owned firms:

From the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, demands for human and civil rights became the main focus of the activities of the trade unions and their allies; nevertheless, socio-economic topics, in particular related to structural adjustment and its impacts, never disappeared from the trade unions’ agenda; In the second half of the 2000s, as a response to the global food and fuel price crisis, material issues (the high cost of living and the wage–price gap came to the forefront of trade union activities again. Finally, from 2011 onwards, the claims related to civil rights and democratisation became linked. The conflict between the oppositional actors accelerated rapidly and finally resulted in the dismissal of Blaise Compaoré from the presidency on 31 October 2014 (Bettina Engels, 2015). However, trade unions were not the main driving force of these protests and, at the same time, they continued their activities on topics such as the high cost of living, deficits in the education sector and the like. Those issues made future military takeover more evident in the country.

The populace used their popularity as musicians to mobilise large numbers of people for the protests against Compaoré. Rhetorically, at least, they place themselves in the tradition of Thomas Sankara: the broom symbolises the will to “sweep out” Compaoré and his ruling élite, as Sams’K le Jah declared to the press (Smith, 2014). “The broom is a tribute to Thomas Sankara, who had organised weekly street cleaning actions.” (Bettina Engels, 2015). In April 2021, a military court in Burkina Faso indicted former president Blaise Compaoré and thirteen co-conspirators for the murder of Thomas Sankara, the country’s revolutionary socialist leader from 1983 to 1987. Sankara was a pan-Africanist who was committed to continental unity and self-sufficiency for the Burkinabé people, including through the nationalization of Burkina Faso’s mineral wealth and precious metals. For his efforts, the French government conspired with Ivory Coast president Félix Houphouët-Boigny to remove him. On October 15, 1987, Compaoré (who up until that point had been a top advisor to Sankara) led the coup against him (Owen Schalk, 2021). As a reward for murdering his former ally at the behest of France, he spent a comfortable 27 years in power until popular uprisings in 2014 forced to him to flee the country. Guyanese intellectual Walter Rodney argues that the industrialization of Europe was dependent on the expatriation of surplus from the African continent. In short, he wrote, “the development of Europe [was] part of the same dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped.” When national liberation movements brought formal colonialism to an end across the continent, this underdevelopment continued, but under the guise of what Ghanaian independence leader Kwame Nkrumah called “neo-colonialism.” Nkrumah writes that “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty [but] its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.” The Global North applied pressure on the

newly freed countries to keep their markets open, forcing them, sometimes through the murder of popular leaders, to neoliberalism their economies for the benefit of Western capital (Owen Schalk, 2021). In recent decades, Canada has played an outsized role in this process of underdevelopment—not through the direct overthrow of socialist governments and the propping-up of right-wing dictatorships, but through its exploitative investment in countries which have already had this economic agenda imposed on them by more overtly imperialist powers.

Natural Mineral Exploitative Scandal of Canadian Agents in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is one of Africa's top gold producers—the precious metal accounts for approximately 60 percent of its global exports—and according to the Embassy of Canada to Burkina Faso and Benin, Canada is the largest mining investor in the country. By 2014 Canada became Burkina Faso's largest source of foreign direct investment. Canadian firms own half the gold mines in the country and mining assets worth over \$3 billion (about \$2.5 billion USD). For perspective, the Rwanda-based Africa Improved Foods (AIF) estimates that it would cost just \$5 billion USD to make the African continent self-sufficient in food production and eliminate hunger. A higher estimate, given by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), argues that an extra \$1 billion in aid every year until 2030 would end hunger in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. According to the latter figure, the value of Canadian corporate holdings in Burkina Faso is equal to two and a half years of hunger elimination in all seven nations. The Canadian mining industry usually brings social and ecological devastation wherever it chooses to set up shop, such as in the case of the Tarpako mine (owned by Toronto-based High River Gold), the establishment of which meant “the expropriation of peasant land; destruction of traditional gold mining, the main activity of the villagers; the emergence of a water crisis; rise in the cost of living; and intense monitoring by private security guards” (Yves Engler, 2020). These mines also fuel food insecurity as a result of the removal of peasants from their property and the subsequent destruction of their land, as well as the trafficking and forced prostitution of women from around Africa, especially Nigeria. The most prominent Canadian companies with investment in gold extraction in Burkina Faso are High River Gold (Toronto), Barrick Gold (Toronto), Iamgold Corporation (Toronto), Tajiri (Vancouver), Roxgold (Toronto), and Semafo (Montreal). Semafo in particular was known for its egregious practices across West Africa: it was very close with the Compaoré regime, engaging in violent strike-breaking in Niger, while evading nearly \$10 million in taxes in Guinea. In 2020, the scandal-plagued company was acquired by Endeavour Mining, a multinational based in the Cayman Islands. The Vancouver-based True Gold Mining Inc., which operated a gold mine in Burkina Faso, was also purchased by Endeavour in 2016 (Owen

Schalk, 2021). Partly due to the fact Canadian mining companies own \$2.5 billion of Burkina Faso's gold resources; the country remains one of Africa's most underdeveloped nations. Over 40 percent of people live below the national poverty line. Hunger rates are rising every year, and in 2020 the World Food Program reported that tens of millions people are facing acute food insecurity in Burkina Faso. Development is obviously not a priority of the state: since the overthrow of Sankara's revolutionary government, the country consistently ranks near the bottom of the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI). In 2019, Burkina Faso ranked 182 of 189 countries included in the Index—three places below Yemen, whose famine is commonly cited as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (Yves Engler, 2020).

First Phase of Direction Action of NSAAML in Burkina Faso January 2022

This time lower-ranking army officers staged a mutiny in Burkina Faso over the weekend of January 22-23, 2022 leaving millions domestically and throughout the region wondering who was actually in control of the landlocked agricultural country formerly colonized by France. During the afternoon on January 24, several soldiers appeared on national television saying they had taken control of the government removing President Roche Marc Christian Kabore who was elected during a transitional process in 2015. The deposed president was reportedly being held at a military camp where one of the mutinies occurred. Other officials including the president of the National Assembly, Allasane Bala Sakande, was also taken into custody by the coup makers. The military officers declared in their television statement announcing the takeover, that the parliament and the Constitution had been suspended while announcing the formation of a Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration which would govern the country indefinitely. Sakande was the leader of the ruling People's Movement for Progress (MPP) and had been considered as a possible successor to Kabore. The headquarters of the MPP was vandalized and partially burned by supporters of the coup. Due to the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, discontent with President Kabore and the military leadership has mounted over the last several years (Abayomi Azikiwe, January 2022). Between 2010 and 2020, Damiba was involved in the Pentagon-coordinated Flintlock Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises. In 2013, Damiba studied in the U.S. State Department sponsored African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance course. In 2013 and 2014, Damiba attended the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course for Africa. In 2018 and 2019, he trained in Burkina Faso with a U.S. Defense Department Civil Military Support Element.

The ostensible purpose of these numerous Pentagon training operations is to provide assistance to governments in Africa related to the enhancement of their internal security structures. However, with the

advent of AFRICOM beginning in 2008 and the escalation of military officers being trained by the Defense Department both on the continent and in the U.S., the actual security situation in Africa has declined precipitously. A delegation from the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) visited Burkina Faso on January 29 (Abayomi Azikiwe, 2022). Quite similar to the ECOWAS response to events in Mali and Guinea, the regional body has suspended the membership of Burkina Faso and is imposing economic sanctions. France has also condemned the coup amid rising anti-Paris sentiments throughout the Sahel where the presence of the former colonial power's military forces has drawn the ire of a broad spectrum of Africans. In the aftermath of the January 24 coup in Burkina Faso, people demonstrating in support of the coup waved Russian flags and called for Moscow to intervene to assist in defending the country against the jihadist rebels. A report published on the coup by Al Jazeera noted that: "Ghanaian President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, the current ECOWAS chairman, called the recent spate of coups in West Africa 'a direct violation of our democratic tenets'. The rest of the world is looking up to us to be firm on this matter,' he said.... Nicolas Haque reporting from Ouagadougou said, 'The heads of the military in the region will be meeting with the new strongman of this country, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Tamiba on Saturday January 30 to try to apply pressure on him.'... 'There were words from Niger's foreign minister. He said: 'We do not understand that military leaders – after having failed in the field of war – take political power and call on mercenaries to defend the integrity of their territory,' Haque said. 'He's referring to Russian fighters from the Wagner group that are active in neighboring Mali and the Central African Republic.'"

(<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/28/ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-after-coup>).

Although Burkina Faso has long been regarded as a land lacking in natural resources, over the space of just a few years, the country has been transformed into a mining player specializing in the production of gold. Among the reasons for this growth in the country's extractive industries are the tax breaks granted to investors and the arsenal of legal provisions put in place to make mining investment projects predictable and safer in the "Land of Incorruptible People." According to a report published in 2014 by the Canadian Fraser Institute, Burkina Faso is currently the sixth most attractive location in Africa for mining investors, beaten only by Botswana, Ghana, Morocco, Namibia and Zambia. The country's mining legislation provides for the extraction of minerals via three different routes: artisanal mining, semi-mechanized mining, and industrial mining. According to the Minister for Mines, a total of 12 industrial mines, 200 officially recognized artisanal mining sites, and around 800 illegal gold panning sites were operating in Burkina Faso in 2017 (Évariste Somda, 2018).

Conflicting Views of Extracting and Marketing of Minera Resources (Gold)

The gold exported by the industrial mines is sold to Metalor Technologies International, a Switzerland-based limited company, which specializes in the refining of precious metals. Artisanal miners, individual gold panners and holders of artisanal production permits are obliged to hand their gold over to an approved trading house for the purchase, sale and export of gold, which must keep a ledger of all sales and purchases, smelt the gold into pieces, ingots or bars, and have it officially assayed by the Office of Mines and Geology - BUMIGEB; as of 2015, there were 74 such trading houses. The overwhelming majority of the gold mined in Burkina Faso is exported. In 2017, 41.4 of the 46 tons of gold produced were sent abroad (estimates by the General Directorate of Mining). According to official data, 45.582 tons of gold – or in other words 99.09percent of the country's total production – was extracted by the 12 industrial mines alone. Mining output has an impact on budgets at both state and local authority level. In 2017, 226 billion CFA francs (344 million euros) was raised through various related channels (levies, Customs duties, and other taxes). Exports of gold are subject to a "proportional gold mining royalty," which is a tax collected by the Directorate General of the Treasury and Public Accounting. The level of this royalty varies depending on whether the gold is being exported by an industrial mine or a trading house for the purchase, sale or export of gold; in the case of industrial mines, it is charged at a rate of 3percent of turnover if the price per ounce for the gold extracted is less than or equal to 1,000 US dollars, 4percent if the price per ounce is between 1,000 and 1,300 US dollars, and 5percent if the price per ounce is above 1,300 US dollars. The trading houses are subject to a uniform rate of 5percent and benefit from tax relief of 100 CFA francs per gram of raw gold.

Exports of gold are allowed to leave the country freely, and Customs duties are charged at 1.75% of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) value of the product plus the cost of assays by the state laboratory at 0.2 percent the exporter must also obtain an export document from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, signed by Customs and the exporter's home bank which must hold a licence in Burkina Faso. This document provides the Burkina Faso authorities with information on the recipient of the goods, the nature of the goods, and the arrangements for the payment of export charges (in addition to Switzerland, the leading destinations for artisanal-mined gold include Belgium, France, Dubai, and the United States). Trading houses are obliged to repatriate funds from the home bank within a deadline of one month from the date on which payment is due, and to forward supporting documents within a deadline of 45 days. This document, therefore, serves as a means of repatriating currency flows that originate from commercial operations (Évariste Somda, 2018). In parallel to these lawful export channels, and prompted by

a desire to avoid the associated fees and obligations, gold trafficking circuits have emerged in recent years, which deprive Burkina Faso of several billion CFA francs in government revenues per annum. Most of this gold is exported illegally in travellers' luggage. In November 2014, for example, three people carrying 77 kg of gold in their luggage were intercepted by the Special Customs Brigade based at Ouagadougou Airport. Upon questioning, the gold seller found to be involved admitted that an average of two illegal export operations had been carried out each month for some time, with the traffickers carrying amounts of gold varying between 6 and 30 kg. He also admitted casting gold, which had been previously purchased from a number of gold panning sites (both approved and illegal). Gold traffickers also include individuals acting independently: in 2017, the Special Customs Brigade seized gold on three occasions (250g, 1,666g and 400g respectively) from travellers intending to resell it in Colombia and Turkey. Some of the trafficking circuits are more organized in nature (Characterisation of sandy stocks).

On 23 February 2016, the Mobile Brigade stationed in Tenkodogo (a town in central eastern Burkina Faso, which is a hub for significant trade flows to and from Togo) seized 16.55 kg of gold that a trafficker had hidden in the doors of his vehicle with the aim of exporting it illegally to Togo. According to Public Eye, a non-governmental organization (NGO), Switzerland imported at least 7 tons of gold from Togo in 2014 despite the fact that there are no gold mines in the country; this gold was traced back to artisanal mines in Burkina Faso. Many tons of gold produced by these mines (located mainly in the north and west of the country) are imported unlawfully into Togo each year, and this trafficking circuit alone deprives Burkina Faso of an estimated 3.5 billion CFA francs in tax revenues. Analysts also believe that some gold traffickers wish to place currency abroad without paying export taxes, or to purchase goods abroad, which can be imported at a lower face value or brought in as contraband in order to be sold in Burkina Faso, thus minimizing Customs duties or avoiding them entirely. Claims of this kind are difficult to substantiate, however. With a view to preventing the trafficking in mined minerals, Burkina Faso recently established a National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semi-Mechanized Mining (Agence Nationale d'Encadrement des Exploitations Minières Artisanales et Semi-mécanisées, or ANEEMAS), one of its aims of which is to organize gold panners into cooperatives so that they can benefit from a preferential rate for the proportional gold mining royalty (Data on All Import/Exports - Search Global Import Records, ImportGenius, <https://www.importgenius.com> > import-export > data).

On the ground, the National Anti-Fraud Brigade for Gold or BNAF has been specially tasked with investigating, identifying and prosecuting offences relating to the marketing of gold and other precious

substances extracted by artisanal and semi-industrial mines. This cross-agency body brings together officials from various services, including Customs, and takes responsibility for pursuing any court cases relating to gold, regardless of the authority which seized the trafficked goods. The level of insecurity affecting Burkina Faso as a whole means that the BNAF cannot gain access to individual mining sites, and so, for the time being, it can only monitor the trading houses which operate in towns. Its scope of action is further limited by a lack of funds to pay informants for valuable information in the fight against gold-related fraud. Nevertheless, the country remains determined to do what it can to prevent gold smuggling, thereby preventing the loss of much needed state revenue characterisation of sandy stocks (Data on All Import/Exports - Search Global Import Records, ImportGenius, <https://www.importgenius.com> > import-export > data).

The BRGM, with World Bank funding, conducted a regional geochemistry survey on stream sediments in south-western Burkina Faso. The aim was to identify potentially mineralised zones as targets for future prospecting programmes. (A Geochemistry survey, 2017). In order to maintain its mining sector, which is key to its economic development, Burkina Faso secured World Bank funding in 2011 to conduct a development support project for its mining sector. One of the work packages aims to improve the availability and promotion of geoscientific information. Burkina Faso's Office for Mining and Geology (BUMIGEB), which is responsible for the work package, selected the BRGM for one of the technical components, a geochemical survey of stream sediments, which includes knowledge transfers to Burkinabé geologists. The plan was to take one sample per 10 km² over a total area of 36 875 km² covering the South-West (Gaoua) and Cascades-Banfora administrative regions and the southern margins of the Hauts-Bassins region (Bobo-Dioulasso). 2 950 samples were actually taken, from a total area that excluded urban zones and the large marshy lowlands. The methodology applied for this regional geochemistry survey involved taking samples of fine sediment (mud) weighing a few kilograms from streambeds at a collection point that was representative of the catchment basin in each sector. These sediments, which had leached down from the surrounding hills, are of interest to geologists as they can contain abnormally high quantities of certain metals that reveal geological concentrations and therefore potential deposits (A Geochemistry survey, 2017).

The ground campaign lasted from October 2015 to February 2016. The samples were first sent to the BUMIGEB laboratory in Bobo-Dioulasso for drying, decompacting and sieving. The fine, dry fraction was then sent to the ALS-Minerals-Geochemistry laboratory in Ireland where it was analysed for gold and 48 other elements (including all the usual metals) using ICP-MS spectroscopy. The data were processed and results

interpreted in May-June 2016, with a feedback session organised in Ouagadougou on 18 August 2016. Altogether, over 200 geochemical anomalies were identified, of which 76 were of interest for their intensity, signature and litho-geochemical context. 56 indicate gold and the other 20 point to other substances including zinc, tungsten, tin, lithium and rare earths. The interpretation of the results shows the remarkable effectiveness of the methodology applied after just 4 months of relatively exhaustive surveys over a very large area. The survey results have produced a characterisation of large litho-geochemical units but have also defined and identified potentially mineralised zones. The maps produced - of the litho-geochemistry, geochemical anomalies and distribution of gold, antimony, nickel, lithium and other mineral concentrations - will be used to define targets for detailed exploration programmes aiming to identify economically viable deposits (A Geochemistry survey, 2017, Characterisation of sandy stocks).

Shartering of Continuous neo-colonial Military Expansion

While France has just completed its withdrawal from Mali, Paris is preparing to provide nearly €15m in budgetary aid to Ouagadougou. It is also considering a military support programme to strengthen Burkina Faso's armed forces as they face increased threats from Islamist militant groups (Pierre-Elie de Rohan Chabot, 2022). Before Captain Ibrahim Traore's 30 September coup, France had been relying heavily on Burkina Faso - and Niger - to reorganise its security presence in West Africa following its withdrawal from Mali. It had been preparing a major support plan for the authorities in Ouagadougou but this has now been largely compromised and its future presence in the country rendered uncertain (Burkina Faso -France Defence Diplomacy, 2022). Canada aid cut riles Burkinabe government but indirect funding continues Some officials in Burkina Faso have expressed dismay at Ottawa's suspension of its direct budgetary support in the wake of the coup d'état. But Canada, the country's leading foreign investor through its mining companies, is maintaining the bulk of its aid on 12 July 2022. Earlier on 2 June, 2022, a multi-stakeholder consultation framework for artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) was launched in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso with the support of the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) and the National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semi-Mechanized Mines (ANEEMAS) together with the financial support from the French Embassy. This sought-after initiative in the artisanal and small-scale mining subsector in Burkina Faso brought together thirty organizations (technical and financial partners, government agencies, national and international NGOs, civil society organizations, etc.) to jointly create synergies of action among ASM stakeholders in Burkina Faso (ARM, 2022).

Artisanal and small-scale mining has increasingly become an important income and employment generating activity in Burkina Faso, mainly for people in rural areas. Beyond its social and environmental impact, artisanal and small-scale mining has now emerged as an alternative to poor harvests largely due to irregular rainfall attributed to climate change. Burkina Faso currently has about 800 artisanal mining sites across 12 regions of the country, generating direct and indirect ASM-related jobs that impact the lives of more than one million people. In addition, artisanal and small-scale mining is at the heart of security given the sub regional conflict promoted by Hydra terrorists in the Sahelian strip. Since 2016, Burkina Faso has been facing tough security issues imposed by armed terrorist groups. Unfortunately, as terrorist activities expand, artisanal mining sites now represent interesting niches for intelligence gathering, recruitment, and also a source of funding. (OCB System signs partnership with ARM for mineral traceability). Considering the above scenario, this new security challenge makes artisanal and small-scale mining formalization a priority. Thus, in an effort to make artisanal mining an activity that contributes to the country's development, while mitigating its social, environmental and security impacts, the government of Burkina Faso has created an institutional and legal framework for mining supervision through the National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semi-Mechanized Mines (ANEEMAS) supported by the relevant sector documentation. This vision is shared by technical and financial partners (TFPs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which, committed at their respective levels, are working to make artisanal and small-scale mining a key element for sustainable development at local and national levels. With the conviction that synergy among the different stakeholders – donors, public institutions, non-governmental organizations, civil society, and artisanal mining associations – will lead to greater efficiency and optimization in artisanal and small-scale mining, ANEEMAS and the Alliance for Responsible Mining have worked together to create a multi-stakeholder framework for artisanal and small-scale mining in Burkina Faso (ARM, 2022).

While several stakeholders are involved in the artisanal and small-scale mining sector in Burkina Faso, it is not always clear that actions and ambitions need to be shared. For this reason, this multi-stakeholder consultation framework has been created. More specifically, this framework aims to: Create a space for dialogue among ASM stakeholders from donors to beneficiaries, including implementing agents, increase the visibility of the initiatives made by ASM stakeholders and bring ASM stakeholders together to facilitate the development of partnerships for project financing and/or implementation (Patrick Schein, 2023). The main points of this first meeting included the presentation on cross-cutting issues in the implementation of international conventions (Minamata

Convention on Mercury, OECD Due Diligence Guidance and Positioning in Burkina Faso), a mapping of challenges and opportunities for partnering, as well as group work on identifying issues of the sector. To that effect, it was stated that: "Having a framework to share and address ASM issues is essential to develop synergies of action for greater effectiveness, given the cross-cutting nature of the sector. This framework will be hopefully sustainable and closely followed up by all stakeholders to ensure this sector can play a role in development in the long run" (Patrick Schein, 2023).

Straight Diplomatic Offensive Towards the Exposure of France in Burkina Faso

According to Désiré Nikiema, National Africa Coordinator, Alliance for Responsible Mining, on behalf of the French Embassy, Mr. Franck Lalanne said that "artisanal mining is an opportunity and a source of wealth for Burkina Faso, which we need to transform into a driver for development. This sharing framework is mainly aimed to create a framework for interaction among stakeholders. We really hope this initiative to be repeated and taken further." In the words of the representative of the ANEEMAS Director, Mr. Gaspard Tiendrebeogo, "the ASM needs guidance and it would be interesting to address it with a synergy of actions. This ASM multi-stakeholder consultation framework is very welcome to continue to bring our actions together." The creation of this initiative clearly marks a new turning point in the implementation of ASM initiatives, which need to be made permanent. Therefore, ARM calls for continued commitment and motivation of all stakeholders so that they can contribute even more to the development of Burkina Faso. (ARM, June 28, 2022). In fact, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Burkina Faso via REUTERS - Burkina Faso Army Chief Colonel Adam Nere receives a flag from French Lieutenant Colonel Louis Lecacheur during a military handover ceremony to officially mark the end of French military operations on Burkinabe soil, at the base in Kamboincin, Burkina Faso on 20 February 2023. Captain Ibrahim Traoré writes off Operation Sabre, but seeks to maintain stable relations with Paris amid a remilitarisation campaign within the country (Álvaro Escalonilla, 2023).

The French flag no longer flies in Kamboinsin. The Burkina Faso armed forces on Sunday certified the withdrawal of French troops deployed on its territory with a "solemn ceremony" held at the Bila Zegré base in this town on the outskirts of Ouagadougou. The Chief of Staff of the Burkinabé army, Colonel Adam Neré, and French Lieutenant Colonel Louis Lecacheur, head of Operation Sabre staged a historic ceremony marking the definitive end of France's military presence in Burkina Faso more than six decades after its independence. A presence reinforced eight years ago by the Elysée to contain the advance of jihadist groups in the Sahel. It was only a matter of time. At the end of January, the most nationalist faction of the Burkinabe army prevailed and

convinced Captain Ibrahim Traoré to bring forward the end of the worn-out Operation Sabre, a decision that would entail the departure of French troops from the country. Days later, the French Foreign Ministry received a formal request to withdraw the more than 400 troops deployed in Kamboinsin. By then, the military junta had already annulled the agreement regulating the presence of French special forces in the camp, which had been in force since 2018 (Álvaro Escalonilla, 2023). The Elysée had a maximum of 30 days to carry out the complete withdrawal. "Most of the [French] soldiers have already left," a Burkinabe security source told Agence France-Press. The Elysée was aware that, sooner or later, the Burkinabe soldiers would strike the coup de grâce on Sabre. They had it all planned. That is why, a few hours after the military junta's announcement, the French armed forces began their withdrawal. Although there are still French military personnel in Kamboinsin, who are due to leave the military barracks this week, the parties have not set a specific date for security reasons. But there would be no relocation of troops to the region; instead, the half a thousand troops would return to France, according to analyst Seidik Abba. "There are already 1,500 French troops in Niger and [the Ivorian base in] Abidjan is too far from the Sahel theatre of operations. Hence the option of repatriation," he explains on the social network Twitter (Álvaro Escalonilla, 2023).

The decision by Burkina Faso's new military junta comes after months of bilateral tensions with France, the former metropolis. The October coup led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, a 34-year-old artilleryman from the town of Kaya with field combat experience against jihadist groups, soured relations with Paris over its rapprochement with Russia. Traoré seized control from Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who only nine months earlier had ousted Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, the former president elected at the polls, in the face of his inability to articulate a defensive plan against jihadist groups. Damiba avoided following the path of General Assimi Goita in neighbouring Mali, who had decided months earlier to switch security alliances, expelling French troops and hiring Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in their place. Half of the military establishment and a large part of civil society called on the lieutenant general to do so, but his immobility in the face of the uncontrollable advance of the jihadists led to Traoré's uprising (Abayomi Azikiwe, 2022). The young captain did not show as much restraint as his predecessor and, barely three months after taking command, he took the plunge. However, the decision "does not mean the end of diplomatic relations with France", government spokesman Jean-Emmanuel Ouedraogo explained in January on national broadcaster RTB. Traoré insists that "there is no break in diplomatic relations with France" following the expulsion of the Sabre forces. This is confirmed by Chrysoula Zacharopoulou, the French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs' Secretary of State for Development, Francophonie and International Partnerships. However,

in January, the Elysée withdrew its ambassador to Ouagadougou, Luc Hallade, at the request of the Burkinabe authorities.

It is undeniable those tensions persist and that the situation could worsen in the coming weeks depending on the course taken by Traoré's military junta. The Burkinabe military junta is seeking to reassure the mining groups that the security situation around its goldfields is clearly deteriorating, especially with the complete withdrawal of French soldiers, reports the confidential Africa Intelligence (Abayomi Azikiwe, 2022). This is the reason that forces Traoré to keep a cool head and not to blow up relations with France, as Goita did in his day, and as the dozens of demonstrators who demand an end to French influence in the country demand of him almost daily from the streets of Ouagadougou. The protests against the former metropolis, which they accuse of fomenting the jihadist threat, bring together nationalists, pan-Africanists, Russophiles and even Wahhabis. "The resentment against Paris is so strong that stirring it up has become for these military officers who have assumed the mantle of statesmen a way of uniting the population around their power, whose legitimacy is disputed", says analyst Morgane Le Cam for *Le Monde*. But Burkina Faso's interim president is threatening to engage Wagner's services as part of a new military strategy to combat terrorist groups operating in large swathes of the country. In fact, some believe the deal is already in place. Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo alleged in December that Russian fighters were on its northern border with Burkina Faso and that the Burkinabe authorities had handed over 'a mine as payment for their services', a standard consideration the Kremlin's private military contractor receives for its services in Africa. The military junta flatly rejected the allegations and decided to sever relations with Ghana by withdrawing its ambassador to Accra (Burkina Faso: Awakening from Neocolonialism, United World International, <https://uwidata.com> › 26876-burkina-faso-awakening).

"We hear everywhere that Wagner is in Ouagadougou, I even asked some people, "Oh really, where are they?," Traoré wondered in an interview with local media. "Our Wagner are our Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP, VDP, by its French acronym)," he said, referring to the 50,000 civilians recruited by the military junta to swell the army's ranks as part of the new anti-terrorism strategy. The interim president bases his military action on the concept of popular defence, as revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara did in the early 1980s. Civilians, however, have only received 14 days of training and there are many risks. Still, suspicions of his association with Wagner are not unfounded. A few days before requesting the withdrawal of French troops from the country, Burkina Faso's acting prime minister visited Moscow for a discreet meeting with the number two in the Russian Foreign Ministry. Apollinaire Kyélem de Tambèla, a

renowned Burkinabe lawyer and polemicist educated in Paris, made a declaration of intent when interviewed on RT: "We want Russia to be an ally in the fight against terrorism, like all our partners. We know that Russia is a great power and if Russia wants to, it can really help us in this area". Russia's military assistance in the Sahel is channeled through weapons and mercenaries. Captain Traoré stressed that the partnerships his government is seeking are mainly military in nature. "If we are not allowed to acquire military equipment in this or that country, we will go to other countries to acquire it, because we are not going to sit back and watch our people die", said the interim president, who pointed out that if a country comes "to colonise us, to dominate us, we will not agree" (Burkina scraps 1961 military aid pact with France, <https://www.france24.com> › France 24 › Live news). This seems to be the main demand of the demonstrators, who carried national, Malian and Russian flags, as well as posters with images of Traoré, Goita and Vladimir Putin.

Concerning a new phase in the Sahel the departure of the French troops from Burkina Faso is a new blow to the geopolitics of the region. "The international alliances that have dictated the Sahel's response to violent extremism over the past decade are crumbling," condemns analyst Mathijs Cazemier on the Africa Is a Country website. The withdrawal also marks the beginning of a new phase in the anti-terrorist fight against Islamist groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State operating in the region, which have caused more than 2 million displaced people in Burkina Faso alone. From now on, it will be its own forces that will try to contain the threat, communication minister Rimalba Ouedraogo told RTB. For the Burkinabe daily *Le Pays*, Ouagadougou will now have "the opportunity to fully assume its responsibilities". "One thing is certain, it is another slap in the face for France, whose paternalistic, hegemonic and ambivalent policy has ended up anchoring in Burkinabe public opinion that the objectives of its military presence in the homeland of men of integrity have always been unclear and have never been in line with the country's interests," adds the newspaper on Operation Sabre. Civil society denounces France's limited military involvement, although under the terms of the 2018 agreement, troops based in Kamboinsin could only intervene if required by the local authorities. And it is not entirely clear when they have been called upon on the battlefield. President Traoré has pledged to hold elections in July 2024, a matter of great concern within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has decided to maintain its sanctions against Ouagadougou for the continuation of the military regime. But the young captain's main promise has been to take back the territory from jihadist groups. Unlike Damiba, Traoré has ruled out any negotiations with the insurgents: "They are attacking unarmed civilians, who are calmly sitting in their homes, or travelling ... they are arrested and killed. How can you negotiate with people who do that? Burkina

is a sovereign country, a secular country, and these values are not negotiable" (Burkina scraps 1961 military aid pact with France, <https://www.france24.com> › France 24 › Live news).

No Choice for France than to Sought for Immediate Military Withdrawal with the Scraping of 1961 Post-Colonial Military Accords

France deeply regrets the expulsion of Le Monde and Liberation correspondents from Burkina Faso a few days after the decision to suspend the broadcast of France 24 programs. France reaffirms its staunch and unwavering commitment to the freedom of the press and the protection of journalists. France said on Thursday that it was recalling its ambassador from Burkina Faso, a day after agreeing to demands from the ruling junta to pull out troops from the former French colony in Africa's Sahel region (26 January 2023 - France 24 - International breaking news, top stories and headlines). "In the context of the latest developments in Burkina Faso, we have decided to recall our ambassador to Paris for consultations on the state and perspectives of our bilateral relations," the foreign ministry said. Burkina on Monday said it had asked France to withdraw within a month its contingent of some 400 troops currently stationed in the country and on Wednesday Paris agreed to do so. It marked the latest scaling down of France's military presence in Africa after the junta in neighbouring Mali also insisted French troops leave and President Emmanuel Macron drew the curtain on the over decade-long anti-jihadist mission. Both Mali and Burkina Faso fell out with Paris after a military coup brought a junta to power and the French presence became increasingly unpopular among the public (Daily newsletter, 2023). Receive essential international news every morning). Jihadist activity continues in the region while concern grows over the increasing influence of Russia, in particular through the presence of mercenaries from the Wagner Group run by an ally of President Vladimir Putin. Burkina is one of the poorest and most volatile countries in Africa.

Thousands of troops, police and civilians have been killed and around two million people have fled their homes since jihadists launched an insurgency from neighbouring Mali in 2015. More than a third of the country lies beyond the control of the government, and frustration within the army at the mounting toll triggered two coups last year (Africanews, 2023). Ouagadougou (AFP) – Burkina Faso has scrapped a 1961 agreement on military assistance with France, a move that comes only weeks after it told the French ambassador and troops supporting its anti-jihadist campaign to quit the country. The Burkinabe Foreign Ministry advised the French Government that the country was "renouncing the technical military assistance agreement reached in Paris on April 24 1961," according to the correspondence, dated Tuesday. The accord was forged between the newly independent Republic of Upper Volta, as Burkina Faso used to be called, and its long-time colonial power.

It is one of the legal bases for French military support in the deeply troubled Sahel state. In the correspondence, seen by AFP on Wednesday, the ministry said Burkina was giving one month's notice for "the final departure of all French military personnel serving in Burkinabe military administrations"(France 24, 2023). Advertising The move marks a further downward spiral in relations since the military toppled Burkina's elected president last year. The breakdown mirrors to a large degree a bust-up between France and neighbouring Mali, which is also junta-ruled.

Both nations have been battered by a long-running jihadist insurgency that in Burkina alone has killed thousands and forced more than two million people to flee their homes. Anger within the Burkinabe military at failures to roll back the insurgency led to two coups last year. Separately, several thousand protesters gathered Wednesday in Diapaga, the capital of the eastern province of Tapoa, to demand better security. The rally was prompted by an attack on a nearby village on Sunday, which local inhabitants and a security source said left three dead. Protesters accused the government of inaction and said the security forces had abandoned the area before attack. "We can't be left at the mercy of hordes of terrorists," said protestor Issa Lankoande. The country's latest ruler is Captain Ibrahim Traore, who seized power last September. Aged just 34, he became the world's youngest leader outside monarchies. He has vowed to recover land seized by the jihadists but, as in Mali, emphasised national "sovereignty" over the strategy. In both countries, tensions with France at government level have been accompanied by anti-French demonstrations and criticism on social media. On January 18, Burkina asked France to withdraw its ambassador, Luc Hallade, after he made comments about the country's security problems. He was pulled out, ostensibly for consultations Burkina also gave France a month to pull out a special forces unit of 400 men that was based near the capital. The French flag was lowered on the base last month. France withdrew the last of its troops from Mali last year, climaxing a break-up that was largely triggered by the junta's growing alliance with Russia.2023 AFP. Demonstrators demand France withdrawal from Burkina Faso (Africanews, 2023). Hundreds of people in Burkina Faso's capital, Ouagadougou, marched to demand the departure of the French ambassador to the country. The demonstration was called by the Pan-African Leaders Collective, a political group that includes organizations who support Captain Ibrahim Traore, in power since the end of September. The participants want the withdrawal of the 400 French Special Forces stationed in the country. "The French ambassador, (Burkina scraps 1961 military aid pact with France, <https://www.france24.com> › France 24 › Live news). "we want him to go back, the soldiers in Kamboinsin, we all want them to go back. Let them free Burkina", demanded demonstrator Abdoul Karim Sawadogo. Another demonstrator, Souleymane Sawadogo, goes further. "We are Burkina Faso, an

independent country. Burkina Faso is a sovereign country. We have decided, we want to lead this fight, the war we are currently waging, Burkina Faso has decided to lead the fight with good partners (Editor's note: Russia). And we feel that France is not the ideal partner to accompany us to the final victory", he said. French troops withdrew from Mali last year, after a 2020 coup in the former French colony saw its rulers inch closer to Russia. Since last year's coup in September that strengthening ties with Russia has become a priority for Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso's military leader demands French departure (Neo-colonialism as a form of Patriarchy All-African People's Revolutionary Party, <https://aaprp-intl.org> › neo-colonialism-as-a-form-of-p...).

Specific Selected Exported and Imported Items with Disequilibrium to Structural Adjustment Objectives

In this section, tables No. 1 and 2 below brings out some selected important goods exported by Burkina Faso to France and imported goods during the 2021 fiscal year. It can be noted comparatively that the 50 and 84 items were exported and imported respectively. Those disparities were a clear indication that what were to the French coffers in contribution to National Revenue was higher than those injected to Burkinabe's National Revenue. Therefore, new generation of the country's leadership was likely inevitable through all means by using the military option to topple the man in power in 2022. In fact, State commitment to some pertinent SAPs objective are also highlighted with series of challenges which the young generation of Africans could no longer bear in the faces of their neo-colonial actors.

Table 3: Fifty Selected Types of Exported Goods from Burkina Faso to France in 2021 Value in Million U.S Dollars

No	Types of goods	Values
1	Cotton	14.80
2	Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruits	3.60
3	Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products	12.89
4	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	508.36
5	Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins	2.12
6	Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products	438.30
7	Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing	352.64
8	Edible fruits, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons	2.55
9	Lac, gums, resins	476.77
10	Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers	551.39
11	Furniture, lighting signs, prefabricated buildings	161.76
12	Vehicles other than railway, tramway	90.59
13	Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers	64.86
14	Aircraft, spacecraft	50.95
15	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	48.46
16	Milling products, malt, starches, inlin, wheat gluten	37.56
17	Articles of apparel, knit or crocheted	21.22
18	Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products	10.91
19	Articles of iron or steel	9.36
20	Manufacturers of plaiting material, basketwork	18.10
21	Articles of apparel, not knit or crocheted	9.03
22	Plastics	7.81
23	Tools, implements, cutlery of base metal	38.78
24	Musical instruments, parts and accessories	6.51
25	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	35.92
26	Paper and paperboard, articles of pulp, paper and board	5.68
27	Sugars and sugar confectionery	21.84
28	Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel good	4.14
29	Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible products	12.63
30	Clocks and watches	5.09
31	Soaps lubricants, waxes, candles, modelling pastes,	3.97
32	Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder	220.56
33	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	4.83
34	Printed books, newspapers, pictures	3.76
35	Electrical, electronic equipment	155.12
36	Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toileteries	44.12
38	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	10.81

No	Types of goods	Values
39	Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal	3.04
40	Vegetable, fruit, nut food preparations	253.73
41	Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories	1.29
42	Copper	58.35
43	Cereals	51.44
44	Ceramic products	1.28
45	Toys, games, sports requisite	949
46	Aluminum	418
47	Rubbers	527
48	Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage	173
49	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cemen	93
50	Optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus	286.63

Sources: By us with informations from different sources: United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Burkina Faso Exports to France - data, historical chart and statistics - was last updated on August of 2023. Burkina Faso Exports to France was US\$40.05 Million during 2021. *Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) - Burkina Faso from The World Bank: Data.* You've visited this page 2 times. Last visit: 11/08/2023. Trade (% of GDP) - Burkina Faso, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS>.

Total external debts within the year stood at 4974.20 billion US dollars, balance of trade at -205.10, GDP at -5.20, export with 729.10, imports 934.20 and terms of trade at 258.00.

Table 4: Eighty Four (84) Selected Types of Goods Imported from France by Burkina Faso in 2021 value in million U.S Dollars

No	Types of goods	Values
1	Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers	36.99
2	Milling products, malt, starches, inlin, wheat gluten	7.46
3	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	6.12
4	Pharmaceutical products	11.28
5	Plastics	82.64
6	Articles of iron or steel	6.66
7	Aircraft, spacecraft	2.96
8	Miscellaneous edible preparations	7.28
9	Miscellaneous chemical products	6.81
10	Cereals	56.88
11	Furniture, lighting signs, prefabricated buildings	3.74
12	Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible products	3.70
13	Rubbers	2.21
14	Printed books, newspapers, pictures	1.76
15	Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products	1.51
16	Tools, implements, cutlery of base metal	1.12
17	Optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus	6.78
18	Sugars and sugar confectionery	1.07
19	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement	966.50
20	Electrical, electronic equipment	26.98
21	Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing	5.38
22	Paper and paperboard, articles of pulp, paper and board	4.00
23	Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories	2.29
24	Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruits	979.02
25	Soaps, lubricants, waxes, candles, modelling pastes	943.37
26	Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products	48.23
27	Iron and steel	1.82
28	Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toileteries	1.70
29	Vehicles other than railway, tramway	12.58
30	Articles of apparel, not knit or crocheted	946.53
31	Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotope	853.50
32	Aluminum	798.76
33	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	744.26
34	Vegetable, fruit, nut food preparations	942.71
35	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	668.86

No	Types of goods	Values
36	Albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes	659.94
37	Manmade staple fibers	640.59
38	Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder	625.08
39	Organic chemicals	500.83
40	Glass and glassware	525.37
41	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment	495.55
42	Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, pyrophorics	485.05
43	Footwear, gaiters and the like,	456.36
44	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	423.36
45	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	395.39
46	Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, derivatives, pigments	391.20
47	Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	380.54
48	Live animals	366.64
49	Zinc	328.09
50	Articles of apparel, knit or crocheted	297.89
51	Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel good	264.55
52	Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage	242.03
53	Meat, fish and seafood preparations	223.92
54	Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products	216.71
55	Toys, games, sports requisites	213.11
56	Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric	201.24
57	Ceramic products	185.18
58	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	178.48
59	Copper	170.99
60	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	106.66
61	Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal	150.49
62	Headgear and	94.49
63	Fertilizers	68.04
64	Lac, gums, resins	48.07
65	Edible fruits, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons	36.38
66	Manmade filaments	26.03
67	Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates	114.61
68	Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins	56.17
69	Clocks and watches	12.86
70	Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry	12.15
71	Photographic or cinematographic goods	198.06
72	Ships, boats, and other floating structures	66.95
73	Products of animal origin	8.96
74	Musical instruments, parts and accessories	5.66
75	Cotton	5.63
76	Meat and edible meat offal	190.42
77	Base metals not specified elsewhere, cermets.	5.55
78	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	4.9
79	Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips	4.51
80	Vegetable textile fibers not specified elsewhere, paper yarn, woven fabric	789
81	Pulp of wood, fibrous cellulosic material, waste	154
82	Lead	264
83	Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers	335
84	Manufacturers of plaiting material, basketwork	660

Sources: By us with informations from diverse sources: United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Burkina Faso Imports from France was US\$367.91 Million during 2021, according to the. Burkina Faso Imports from France - data, historical chart and statistics - was last updated on August of 2023.

Burkina Faso Imports from France - 2023 Data 2024 ... <https://tradingeconomics.com/burkina-faso/france>
 Burkina Faso Imports from France was US\$367.91 Million during 2021, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade.

Strategies of Reviving Economic Policy Suitable for the Population of Burkina Faso

Another major handicap is the lack of energy resources. The country's principal local resource remains its flora, the over-exploitation of which is currently threatening the environment. Other energy sources are of foreign origin (hydrocarbons) and are available at very high prices (WTO, 1998, 2023). Burkina Faso nevertheless has some assets that offer hope of overcoming under-development and launching a process of sustainable growth. The first is doubtless its human resources, often reputed to be disciplined and hard-working. The second is political stability and relative social peace achieved by a Government which, since 1987, has instituted sweeping political and structural reforms constantly guided by the quest for consensus. With the adoption of the Constitution of 2 June 1991, Burkina Faso became a pluralist democracy (WTO, 1998). The trade reforms under way in Burkina Faso are part of the structural adjustment programmes launched in 1991. Although liberalizing reforms have been carried out in the import sector, a great deal remains to be done to promote exports, which are the heart of the country's major economic objective, namely, export-based sustainable economic growth. Some measures in force in Burkina Faso, especially in the area of trade policy, conflict with this objective as formulated. Burkina's land-locked situation already constitutes a natural barrier to international trade. In addition to being land-locked and having an inadequate communications network with the outside, the high cost of transport is also the result of landing and handling fees at Ouagadougou airport and the State monopoly of supply and even in certain cases distribution of energy. These factors work to hamper the international competitiveness of Burkina's exports (WTO, 1998). Burkina Faso imports its heavy equipment from developed countries, especially France, and its petroleum products from Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso's exports enjoy the preferential treatment given to developing countries by the European Union and developed countries. Between 1966 and 1990, the Burkina economy was tightly regulated under an economic strategy that relied on the public sector for investment and growth (Bourdet, 2001). The hoped-for results did not materialize. Since 1991, Burkina Faso has been implementing an economic liberalization programme with IMF and World Bank support. The Government's objective in that framework has been to foster an environment favourable to private initiative. Accordingly, steps were taken such as the elimination of import licensing, the removal of import and export restrictions and the realignment of laws and regulations to suit the new and highly liberal economic environment (Reform Policy, Growth and Poverty in Burkina Faso, JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable>).

Nevertheless, economic reform programmes were deemed necessary as reviewed by the WTO in relations to the previous challenges and prospective of improving the strategies of Structural Adjustment

Programmes (SAPs). In fact, trade policy was but one component of a broader policy encompassing investment, transportation, tourism, financial services, and a legal and regulatory framework for fostering and developing business and employment. These elements are all interrelated and interdependent insofar as they help to ensure the prosperity of the population as well as sustainable economic growth (Bourdet, 2001). During the 1980s, low national income and economic under-development had prompted the Government authorities to embark on a voluntaristic development policy characterized by increased public investment in both infrastructure and the production sector. Household savings and corporate profits were too low to generate sufficient resources to meet investment needs. That explained the public sector share of over half of total gross fixed capital formation. Yet these endeavours were not enough to offset the effects of a very high rate of population increase (almost 3 per cent per annum) and the structural weaknesses stemming specifically from insufficient savings and a chronic trade deficit (average rate of coverage of imports by exports being 35 per cent). The various adjustment programmes launched since 1991 in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank have been designed to stabilize the economy and restore conditions for sustainable growth and to improve the management of public finances. (Reform Policy, Growth and Poverty in Burkina Faso, JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable>).

To boost the population's earnings and accelerate the development of human resources and production potential, the Government used a letter of intent to set out a policy strategy for sustainable human development. The principal objectives of this policy for the 1998-2000 period can be summed up as follows: Ensuring average real GDP growth of at least 5.5 per cent between 1998 and 2000; containing annual inflation at 3 per cent per annum; reducing the external deficit on current account, excluding grants, to 10 per cent of GDP by 2000; stabilizing public sector investment at around 13 per cent of GDP in the 1990-2000 period and the component financed by domestic budgetary resources at 2.7 per cent of GDP for the same period; improving social infrastructure and increasing life expectancy from the current 48 years to 57 years by 2005; fomenting the private sector by reinforcing the legal system so as to provide an atmosphere of greater security for private sector activity; strengthening the role of women in the development process; continuing to overhaul the banking system; developing and diversifying export potential; completing the liberalization of the export and import sectors; pressing ahead with the programme of reform of public enterprises; conducting an exhaustive survey of Government holdings in enterprises and a strategic analysis of the Government's portfolio; opening the telecommunications sector to competition and putting in place a strategy for the partial privatization of ONATEL; pursuing regional economic integration; completing Burkina Faso's integration into the multilateral trading

system managed under the WTO agreements. To these ends, the Government has undertaken to promote investment and domestic saving while redirecting investment towards priority sectors (WTO, 1998, 2023). Between 1998 and 2000, export value is expected to increase by an annual average of 19 per cent and volume by 13 per cent, mainly owing to a steady increase in cotton output. In parallel, the external debt roll-back under the initiative to assist poor debt-ridden countries will restore the debt service / export ratio to a sustainable level. With the support of partners, the triennial investment programme will be pursued within the terms of the macroeconomic framework of reforms between 1998 and 2000, designed to enhance the Government's capacity to manage and rationalize its expenditure (WTO, 2023). Beside the above, there were general objectives concerning imports and exports below.

Concerning general trade policy objectives pertaining to imports and exports this drew our attention beginning from the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the challenges of the New World Order. Since 1991, Burkina Faso has carried out a series of economic reforms designed to end Government involvement in the competitive sectors and liberalize the economy. The private sector is now recognized as the engine of economic growth, which must remain above 5 per cent per annum if Burkina Faso is effectively to launch sustainable development. The Burkina Government strategy of private sector development is intended to create a competitive and productive economy driven by that sector. The Burkina Faso Government's general objectives in this regard were: To liberalize trade; to improve the regulatory framework for the creation and exercise of private enterprise by both nationals and foreign investors; to enable business to develop within a dependable legal framework in line with international standards; to put in place measures for rapid adaptation to the rules of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the WTO; to facilitate speedy adjustment to economic trends by making employment laws more flexible; to enhance the productivity and efficiency of private-sector support institutions, especially those run directly by the State; to combat fraud and corruption; to institute permanent and fruitful dialogue with the private sector; to reduce the cost and/or improve the quality of Government-run public services; to provide better conditions of corporate financing in general and for small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular; to lighten the tax burden on the formal sector; to ease customs duties on inputs; to strive to provide enterprises with more modern and efficient services; to foment the technical upgrading of the local workforce; to step up the creation and restoration of serviced industrial zones; to continue to develop serviced zones for different activities; to encourage the reduction of some transport costs; to improve the efficiency and fluidity of Burkina Faso's roadways. While the general description of the import and export regime related to the importation, exportation or re-exportation of non-prohibited goods is

free. The following legal instruments govern the general import and export regime: See Ordinance No. 91-069 of 25 November 1991 and its Implementing Decree No. 94-014 of 25 November 1991 and Law No. 15/94 of 5 May 1994 on competition and consumption. This Law institutes an autonomous advisory body, the National Competition and Consumption Commission (CNCC), which oversees the functioning of the rules of competition in the economy and ensures consumer protection. It authorizes the Minister for Trade to regulate prices provisionally under the conditions established by decree or dictated by crisis or emergency situations that may interfere with the free play of market mechanisms (WTO | Trade policy review - Burkina Faso 1998, World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/tratop_e/tp89_e).

CONCLUSION

The new generational military leaders in French speaking West Africa like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are very determined to give their Africans what they deserve after passing through different historical periods of slavery and slave trade practices, manifestations of 3Es exaggerated in the era of colonialism, implantations of neo-colonial actors and institutions in the name of unequal diplomatic relations with continuous looting of natural resources to mark an end in the third decade of the 21st Century and finally to pressurize the existing Multinational corporations to embark on internal transformation of raw materials to finish products in their respective countries. Accordingly, the application of Western democratic practices is a total failure and likely increases the rate of poverty in Africa as the majority are classified under Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives (HIPC) with prescriptions laid down by the same coalition of neo-colonial actors through the Bretton Wood Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Funds including other hyper exploitative agencies installed around the World. The dreams of Pan-Africanism are becoming realities which just require the formation of United States of Africa with a unique currency completely different from those of the former colonial powers. However, an inspiration of the present leader of Burkina Faso goes back to the era of the famous Thomas Sankara vision of the second half of the 20th Century. That positive patriotic stance against the neo-colonialists principal agents and actors is in favour of local and national objective developmental agenda of the entire country and its citizens who have long been relegated to syndrome of poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, a united Africa during the third decade of the 21st Century may likely push some European countries to the status of HIPC in the near future provided they are no longer having full access to African natural resources or as a condition, to transform all exploited to finish products in Africa, import on prices imposed by African countries and to make sure that the volume of commercial exchanges does not longer go at the deficit level but trade balance as positive contributions to Gross Domestic

Product(GDP) and State revenues. Finally, Glories goes to the new Statesman and his people as the 21st Century is theirs with realistic, objective and effective implementation developmental strategies to relief their country and people from the hands of whosoever unrealistic neo-colonial actors and mechanisms ever implanted to the detriment of their population for decades. Whatever the case, the inspirations of Thomas Sankara are gaining grounds in West African countries especially in French speaking countries formerly colonized by France with all mechanisms of 3Es implanted which are recently rejected by the citizens due to the latter's policy towards Africans in the 21st Century.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

Lt.Gov: Lieutenant Governors
 A.Lt. Gov: Acting Lieutenant Governor
 Gov: Governors
 A.Gov: Acting Governor
 HC: High Commissioners
 Amb: Ambassador
 CA: Chargé d'affaires
 UDV-RDA: Voltaic Democratic Union – African Democratic Rally
 FP: Popular Front
 ODP-MT: Organization for Popular Democracy – Labour Movement
 CDP: Congress for Democracy and Progress
 MPP: People's Movement for Progress

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