

## Leadership Recruitment: The Challenge of Developing Systematic Patterns for Presidential Emergence and Reduction of Political Conflicts in Africa

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**Abstract:** This paper comes in three dimension. The first is to establish that there are actually problems with leadership recruitment in Africa and to identify some of those challenges. Second, to establish that those problems came as a result of some socio-historical circumstances which also need to be identified and properly situated. The third is to proffer some kinds of mitigation to the problems. Using narrative and historic lens, this paper examines Africa's challenge towards identifying the basis for the problems associated with presidential emergence in Africa that make it mostly violent, non-peaceful, unsystematic and unacceptable. This paper proffer some kind of suggestions amongst which is the call for the people to re-claim their responsibility and like good business principals; demand to be in-charge rather than continue to leave their businesses in the hands of bad agents.

**Keywords:** Leadership recruitment, Political conflicts, Presidential emergence and Democracy.

### INTRODUCTION

The submission in this paper is made in three strands. The first is to establish that there are actually problems with Leadership recruitment in Africa and to identify some of those challenges. Second, to establish that those problems came as a result of some socio-historical circumstances which also need to be identified and properly situated. The third is to proffer some kinds of solutions to the problems.

Essentially, presidential emergence in Africa has become a very problematic issue such that most societies in Africa are seen as states that have not what it takes to be democratic. This is because the democratic transitions in Africa, unlike what the situation in other parts of the world is, is usually experiences that one does not wish to keep remembering always. This is because it has always been loaded with traumatic experiences that thoughts of them remind many of inordinate processes, violence, conflicts and wars. Instances can be found in the aftermath of the June 12, 1993 presidential election in Nigeria. The Gambian last presidential election, numerous other different levels of elections that take place in many African states that usually end in terror attacks and threats of societal disorganisation have all made some persons to have sustained advocacy that the states of Africa are not ripped for democratic elections. It has equally prompted many into accepting their fate under sit-tight leaders so long as there are no wars or danger looming as it usually does during elections in the African countries.

The reason for the above thinking is rooted in the fact that preparing for elections in many African societies are usually akin to preparation for major wars. Specifically, preparing for the presidential elections

usually seem as preparing for war. As explained by Jega [1], the massive mobilization by the election commission is akin to preparations for a major war. In reality, what is experienced (in Nigeria) are physical attacks on (INEC) staff and facilities, attacks on security personnel on election duties, misuse of security orderlies by politicians, especially incumbents, attacks on opponents, attacks on members of the public, violence at campaigns, intimidation of voters snatching of election materials, kidnapping and assassination of political opponents [1]. All these made the elections not free, not fair and of course not credible.

In all ways, quite a number of things are going wrong with our presidential emergence in Africa. It has become so widespread that many observers have classified Africa as being 'undemocratic' in nature. Some other principal manifestation on African democracy as can be seen is the unsystematic nature of our elections, the dominant character of ethnicity and corruption and host of other ills. With the mix of all these ills, elections in Africa were not presenting the people with any right of choice. At best, according to Ake [2]; "what is foisted is a ... crude simplicity of multi party elections...which is not the least emancipatory ...because it offers the people rights they

cannot exercise, voting that never amount to choosing, freedom which is spurious and political equality, which disguises highly asymmetrical power relations". At worst, it can be represented as mere exercise as the decisions are usually made before the elections. Hence, common words like 'there are no vacancies' to inform interested contestants the positions they are aspiring for is already being occupied. The wise ones understand that averment while those that insist on contesting sometimes meet unexplainable situations in elections.

Our challenge here is to identify the basis for the problems associated with presidential emergence in Africa that make it mostly violent, non-peaceful, unsystematic and unacceptable and proffer some kind of suggestions on how to improve on it.

### **Leadership Recruitment in Africa: The Statements of Problem**

Leadership recruitment has to do with the method of bringing in people (young or old) into the leadership positions in a society. In this discourse, it includes selecting or electing into offices; the Presidents, Governors and other officers of the state into leadership positions in government. Specifically here, we are concerned with the process of emergence of the Presidents in Africa and by extension, other officers.

It is important to mention here that in the traditional African societies, different methods of leadership recruitments were and still in use. In many African societies, people ascend the leadership position through ascription. In other words, people occupy the position of their fore fathers by the mere fact that they were born into such families. We have much of that in most centralised political systems in the olden days and they still subsist in many African communities modelled along the centralised administrative systems. Take instance of the Sokoto Caliphate, Benin Kingdom, Ife and host of others in other parts of Africa. However, in many others political revolution have eroded the culture or limited their potency. Many have also opened, as the family ties expand to even becoming elective, even though among people of the same immediate and extended family.

The second popular method was through attainment by the individual whom through some kinds of achievement and charisma earn the followership of others. Such positions are very fluid as they are usually not scheduled. The Kikuyis in Kenya, the Igbos in Nigeria did and still have lots of this value retained in the leadership recruitment processes.

In some other societies, people emerge into leadership through attainment of certain age. In this circumstance, the leadership of the community is entrusted unto the hands of team of aged members of the society. It can be to the oldest members of the

society (gerontocratic leadership) or just some able bodied youths.

Some societies in Africa have for centuries relied on the dictates of the gods in anointing leaderships in their communities. Indeed, it is just by God or the gods decreeing. Another method is the method captured in the force theory of the state. Here, people or group of people forcefully assumes position of leadership. The practice established during the period of state formations in many African states adopted this method. What happened during Jihad in West and Central African societies can equally be captured under this thesis, even though certain order of transition succeeded the initial force.

In modern Africa states however, most states still maintains both the traditional and modern leadership format. Hence, we have some societies retaining very robust traditional administrative system with traditional rulers who emerged through their own accepted and developed process and at the state level, the modern process modelled towards the liberal democratic system. It is under this model that we situate the position of the Presidents.

Modern African states, as transitional societies have maintained trappings of all those traditional leadership recruitment patterns with variants of liberal democratic methods. Hence, you see them transcending through colonial introduced democracy at independence, through military dictatorship, sit-tight civilian authoritarianism, to developing democracy and now receding back to a variant of practice that is not definable within the popular literature of democracy. Larry Diamond [3] classified it as period of democratic recessions in Africa.

Leadership recruitment appears to be one of the greatest challenges of democracy in Africa. Indeed, records have shown that the inordinate processes of leadership recruitment embedded in democracy in Africa have rather thrown the countries into deeper conflicts than it tries to resolve the problems.

Democracy has been described as having the nature and capacity to generate conflicts and to provide solution to political conflicts. In its practice, it is adjudged the best political practice as it does not only provide platform for popular participation in leadership recruitment but also a very peaceful process of changing political leadership, usually in the method that fits in to the decision of the majority. Hence, it is described as containing in itself the voice and choice capacity in political process [4].

In its nature, it provides the people with choice of those to lead them, it makes leadership recruitment somewhat structured and procedural. Hence, even without gazetting it, people rise along the line of

leadership roles until the person eventually ascends to the position of the president of the country. Under democracy too, people are also giving choice over the state policies as the process of policy making encapsulated in democratic ethos allows them to consider the alternative.

Unfortunately too, the dominant literature, especially in Nigeria has come to the acceptance that the return to civilian rule in 1999 has multiplied the conflict situations in the country [5-7]. What came with democracy in Africa is war and echoes of war, violent conflicts, chronic crises, etc all linked to people's expression of their freedom to participate in the affairs of their community, their state and their country. Much as it may not be democracy in its practice that creates the conflicts but the freedom associated with democracy, especially in a society that experienced authoritarianism for a long time like most Africa states, on its own lays a foundation for maximisation of conflict of interests.

The answer to this why has been a subject of intellectual debates for a long time now. To some, it is a product of the ills transferred through colonial practices. To some others, it was simply the failure of African leaders to establish good leadership models for their selfish reasons. Yet to others, it was the inability of the Africans to distinguish between the leadership systems that existed/s under the traditional societies and the requirements of modern governance principles that create the problems.

Offering an intellectual shoulder to rest what happens in Africa, Diamond [3] explained the problem of Post-colonial African states as resulting from the "neo"-patrimonial practices in existence in almost all African states. This he explained is because:

*They combine the formal architecture of a modern bureaucratic state—constrained in theory by laws, constitutions, and other impersonal rules and standards—with the informal reality of personalized, unaccountable power and pervasive patron-client ties". These ties radiate down from the biggest "big man"—the autocratic president—to his lieutenants and allies, who in turn serve as patrons to lower-level power brokers, and down to the fragmented mass of ordinary citizens, who are trapped in relations of dependence on and support for their local political patrons. In such systems, he went further to explain that informal norms always trump formal rules and restraints. Thus, "the right to rule... is ascribed to a person rather than to an office" [16]. Subordinates pay loyalty to their personal patrons, not to laws and institutions. Powerful presidents (and their subordinates) use state resources as a personal slush fund to maintain political dominance, giving their clients state offices, jobs, licenses, contracts, vehicles, bribes, and other access to illicit rents, while getting unconditional support in*

*return (ibid P.61). State offices at every level become permits to loot, either for an individual or a somewhat wider network of family, ethnic kin, political clients, and business cronies. Where the resources are greatest—in the oil states (like Nigeria)—the looting has been colossal (p. 2).*

Richard Joseph has called such entrenched corruption 'prebendalism,' "where corruption, clientelism, and personal rule seep into the culture, making the system more tenacious. The main concern of neo-patrimonial, prebendal governments is not to produce public goods, increase productivity, improve human capital, stimulate investment, and generate development[17]. Rather, it is to produce private goods for those who hold or have access to political power. Contracts are not awarded on the basis of who can deliver the best service for the lowest price, but rather on who will pay the biggest bribe. Budgets are steered to projects that can readily generate bribes. Government funds disappear into the overseas accounts of office-holders. Government payrolls are swollen with ghost workers" [3]. In Africa, as contending patron-client networks organise along ethnic or sub-ethnic lines, and the president judges his ethnic kin as the most reliable loyalists in struggles over power. This makes the system unstable, as identity, power, and resource conflicts mix in a volatile brew, prone to explosion [8].

That is the situation in our continent and presidential emergence cannot get better or systematic under such circumstance. Indeed, it must continue to generate conflict as the contest is material and therefore fierce. Under this system, no one wants to leave office as leaving office to them means going out of the distribution line. Even if he must leave, he must hand over to a trusted ally to still maintain his interest and that of, his cohorts, ethnic group, etc., hence he must pervert the process. Otherwise, he stays unending in the office.

The history of African Presidents in office and the records of African transitions attest to this and you may ask yourself what else provides the impetus for African leaders to wish to continue hanging on to the presidency other than the above explained reason. Take for instance the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni who ruled for over two decades. His Gabon counterpart, Omar Bongo was in the office for nearly four decades. Robert Mugabe have reigned in Zimbabwe for over a quarter-century and still contesting another election now at his age. In Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea, presidents have also ruled for well over 20 years and in Burkina Faso for nearly that. Sudan's Hassan al-Bashir held power for almost 30 years, while Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Yahya Jammeh in Gambia ruled for almost two decades.

The patriarchs of African states were not free. Mobutu Sese Seko ruled Zaire for 32 years. Julius

Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and Daniel arap Moi in Kenya each held the presidency for about a quarter-century, and Abdou Diouf in Senegal for 20 years (after a similar stretch in power by his predecessor, Leopold Senghor). Even though some have been forced out recently, many others are not showing any sign of leaving office. Perhaps if not of the efforts of some persons seated here today, Olusegun Obasanjo would have continued in office even up till now.

In this circumstance, the preparations for elections, where and when they are allowed at all is equated to war, both by the government and the opposition parties as it is usually a do or die affair. Even the electoral bodies are not spared. As explained by Jega [1], the massive mobilization by the election commission is akin to preparations for a major war. All these made the elections not free, not fair and of course not credible, presidential emergence not systematic and therefore cannot reduce political conflict and the fundamental question to be answered next is why?

This presentation would direct itself towards the answers to the why and what and how do we restore sanity into Presidential emergence in Africa.

#### **African States and crisis of Democratic Transition: Absence of Market Democracy**

We have explained all that is happening in Africa, especially in the democratic transitions. The question is how we got there; what went wrong with our democracy that it has developed a defection in its leadership recruitments, especially presidential emergence.

The answer in my opinion can be found in understanding the emergence of liberal democracy in Africa and the nature of its institutionalisation, especially what is institutionalised. First, the nature of emergence of liberal democracy, especially democratic elections in Africa was very faulty. Of course, it was foisted on many African countries by colonialism. Democracies are better when they grow out of exigencies of political development. Even where and when they are created, they should emerge out of agreements and understanding by the members of the civil societies either directly or through their chosen and legitimate representatives. In that case, as there are multi-ethnic creations in Africa, the stability would have been better achieved if the unions were negotiated and the methods of leadership recruitment, especially the method that would serve the various interests discussed and agreed to. This is what Lijphart [9] captured as 'consensual democracy'. Perhaps, some of this dominant nature of African leaders would have been curtailed by the discussion.

Again, interests of the various groups could have been captured in the manner that would reduce pressure and bitter struggles for power and elections.

Absence of these systematic processes hindered the development of real democratic principle in many African states. This improper development and applications of democratic principles in the elections present a caricature of openness and offer a rather distorted platform which naturally impedes systematic leadership recruitment, especially the people and their choices. Of course, for democracy to have teeth, the value of individual contributions in democratic decision making through the choice of the elected would have to sufficiently improve. Such improvement begins with the value of the individual votes. It is the character of African elections which amounts to the devaluation of the individual votes that challenges the sanctity of the democratic system and impedes the democracy from consolidating and driving credible governance. Characteristically, it is lacking in the value of individual contributions in democratic decision making especially through the choice of the elected. For now, there are devaluations of the individual values and votes in African.

In Africa, as in most multi nationality third world, nay post-colonial societies, the greatest challenge of the state in their effort at building and governing their nation has been the issue of how to deal with the challenge of evolving credible democratic system. Yet, as Sen [10] observed, with the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, the idea of democracy as a universal commitment has continued to evolve as the most acceptable form of governance. It is in line with this that the wave of democratization started in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan African countries since the mid 90s.

There are reasonable number of benefits associated with democratic practices just like there have been identified vices in improper application of democratic principles. In countries where the first case applies, good governance naturally evolves out of the good practices. As much as we may agree too that there are no direct line between absence of democratic principles and un-development, it does appear that natural democratic institutions open the participatory stage in everything. This no doubt drives development. However, improper applications of democratic principles present a caricature of openness and offer a rather distorted platform. Of course, it would naturally impede good governance and development. Indeed, it does in many ramifications.

Unfortunately, that is the situation we find in the post military democratic Nigeria, where the governments in the words of Nwanegbo [18] remains exclusive and excluding, with the masses being the subjects and the ruled. It is apparent under this circumstance that the government makes the policies, rules and give orders, the masses obey. Absorption of the principle of democracy under this situation, no doubt became difficult and confusing. This is part of



what has been described the extant literature, as crisis of the democratization.

Indeed, conclusion has been reached on the fact that for democracy to engender good governance, the value of individual contributions in democratic decision making through the choice of the elected would have to sufficiently improve. Such improvement begins with the value of the individual votes. It is the character of Nigerian elections which amounts to the devaluation of the individual votes in our country (just like in many other African countries) that challenges the sanctity of our democratic system and impedes our democracy from driving credible governance.

To understand what went wrong with democracy and by extension, leadership recruitment in Africa, we have to first explain the importance of and concept of 'market democracy'. For clear understanding of what goes wrong with our democracy and by extension, delivery of social services, we ought to first understand both the centrality of votes in market democracy and its devaluation in countries of Africa, we must also understand the logic of capitalism and its particular manifestation in the periphery of the global system. That is better achieved from the analysis of the free market principle on the capitalist societies. Just as capitalism and free economy is established in the free transaction and movements of goods and services in the market uninhibited by the attachment to the producer and guided by the laws of demand and supply, in politics, the market finds political expression in elections and market forces are incarnated politically in the rule of law.

The capitalist production relations are normally constituted by an initial act of force (primitive accumulation). After that, they are reproduced more or less automatically, essentially as a result of the generalization of commodity production and exchange.

*In such societies, people are first and foremost commodity bearers, even if the only commodity they bear is their labour power, and market norms such as individualism, profit motive, competition, formal freedom and equality dominated social life. As commodity bearers, members of a capitalist society exist as separate, self-interested, formally free and aggressively competitive individuals. Market forces regulate this competition and everybody is equally subject to these seemingly neutral forces of demand and supply. Being socially atomized, formally free, equal and self-interested proprietors, these commodity bearers evolve a political architecture that is akin to the market. The same condition that activate the market economy also activate market democracy namely, thoroughgoing commoditization arising from the separation of the producer from the means of production and the separation of the individual from the*

*primordial community. The most critical aspects of this political architecture are elections and rule of law [11].*

While the market finds political expression in elections, market forces are incarnated politically in the rule of law. This explains why the laws of these market societies generally provide for the freedom of individuals to vote and be voted for, the equality of votes and freedom to choose between political platforms. In other words, election in market democracy assumes the existence of socially atomized and self-interested individuals, who have been separated from their primordial communities [11].

These conditions pervade the entire capitalist society at the economic, political and ideological levels of structure. As explained by Ibeanu [11], just as money is the medium of exchange in the market, the ballot (votes) is the medium of exchange in the political/electoral market. Respect for the rules guiding elections, particularly as contained in the constitution and electoral law, expresses the collective dependence of all candidates, electors and regulatory bodies to the rule of law. Consequently, the regulatory regime, like the forces of demand and supply, are seemingly dissociated from the interest of one party or the other and all are equally liable to the rules of the game. This is necessary to maintain public confidence in the elections through a high valorisation of votes.

The value of votes can be explained from three dimensions; promissory value, content value and psychological values. Promissory value of votes is conditioned by the extent to which the promises made during campaigns are kept by the politician through his activities in office. It can be linked to the promise behind the paper money as one has to trust and indeed get real value from the content of the paper as promised and as expected. Thus, the central question that promissory value raises is; are the promises made at elections kept?

On the other hand, Content value of votes has to do with the value of each vote measured against the value of another. Do the votes and opinions of some count more than those of others? Technically, the content value of a vote in a given market society is measured by the tendency towards zero of the comparative value of two votes. In other words, the lower the difference between two votes, the more content value of votes in a system [11]. The main question that content value raises is this: are all votes equal?

Finally, psychological value of votes refers to the value attached to the vote in the minds of the electorates. It is the psychological state of mind of the people/electorate that his/her one vote is significant and will make a valuable contribution to the entire choice.

For the democracy to be judged good, the value of votes in all three aspects tends to be high.

Concomitantly, at the political level, especially regarding elections, peripheral capitalist countries show all the characteristics corresponding to their economic base. This is particularly visible in what Ibeanu called the primitive accumulation of votes which has to do with winning of votes by use of both objective and structural violence, and disregard of the rule of law. Some of these actions by people that engage in primitive accumulation of votes are usually justified in the name of communal interests (clans, ethnic groups, religion, etc). Of course as we know, these actions were the efforts towards protecting and advancing the personal interests. This same set of situation has permeated all other sectors of African political life, hence the belief that the best and accepted way of capturing and securing political office is to steal it from the people.

On the part of the voters, they do not attach any value to their votes. The voters do not attach great promissory, content or psychological value to their votes. The vote is grossly devalued and the mandates claimed by politicians are therefore effectively dubious. This is because empty promises are made at elections and voters know that the deposits they are making in terms of their votes will worth little or nothing at the end of the election and yet they act in docility.

The content value of their votes is also challenged as both voters and politicians are aware that all votes are not equal. Infact, in Nigeria for instance, some 'votes' are pursued more vigorously than others. This is a case of one person's support determining an electoral victory. Again the opinions of corrupt INEC officials, party leaders, security agents and the presidency also count more in determining electoral outcomes in Nigeria and other African country than votes. Look at the drama playing out in the Kenyan election which the Judiciary has fought vehemently to restore. As we can guess, it is not yet 'Uhuru' for Uhuru and his supporters as there is a limit the electoral and even the Judicial system can with-stand the executive powers in a unstructured political systems in Africa.

This has a very negative effect on the value of democracy and democratic experiments in the continent. Now imagine the effect on the economy if the value of the Naira was dependent on the person holding it, such that the one Naira held by State Chairman of PDP in a state is worth one hundred Kobo, while that held by a school teacher in the same state is worth thirty Kobo. Based on this, a great number of Nigerian voters do not realise the importance of their one vote and that has impact on even the satisfaction one ought to get in voting, the psychological satisfaction of performing ones franchise.

What we can get from the above discussion is that just like in the economy; African politics is not in line with the basic capitalist principle. There are numerous distortions in the economy and but the distortions in our politics are very far reaching with serious consequences. For instance, one set of distortions arises from the contradictions between the primordial community and the individual. This is particularly important in the context of elections to political offices. For one thing, that sphere is regarded as the individual sphere and therefore subject to self-seeking calculations of individuals, including pecuniary ones. This becomes clear when we compare elections for political offices and selections of the leadership of communal associations, which may also involve election. The value that people attach to their votes in the two types of elections is remarkably different.

Other distortions arise from corruption and misadministration of elections by electoral and judicial bodies, election violence and ideological confusions and/or sterility among the political parties. The ways these distortions impact on the politics in Africa do not need much explanation, as they are already in public domain. The point however is that they are at the heart of the devaluation of the vote all over the country. What it encourages is the situation where some persons or group of persons take ultimate control of an environment during elections and decide who takes what, how and when. The individual opinion in such circumstance does not count at all as the individual vote has no value. That breeds what is called machine politics of the so-called 'godfatherism' [12]. By its level of acceptance even among the established authorities in Africa, it clearly entails and can be described as the state sanctioning of abuse of state power. This as is the case is done through violence and infliction of both physical and structural injuries on the populace to press them into submission to individual authorities and overlordship [11].

When this kind of organization is put in place, the people in political offices see themselves first as representatives of their principal (s) and then of the corporate group. Satisfying them would be primary in his efforts and performance. If such principal is such that make as they usually do, personal demands, the public office holder is under a difficult condition as he would have not much to spare for the development of the state. Remember that for him to be free from such control, he ought to make as much money and influence as his principals. Satisfying those high needs automatically, hinders good governance and make elections and political transition very traumatic in the continent.

With the democracy operating this way, it becomes greatly impeded that it loses the potency needed to resolve conflicts. Rather, it deepens the problems in Presidential Emergence and escalates

instead of reducing political conflicts in Africa. That is in the hearth of the problem.

What we can get from the above discussion is that like African economy; the politics is not in line with the basic capitalist principle. There are numerous distortions in the economy and the distortions in our politics are far reaching with serious consequences. Consider the selections of leadership of communal associations, which may also involve election and see some sanity linked up with order in the pre-capitalist mode of production and the attendant super-structures. Indeed, the value that people attach to their votes in that is remarkably higher.

Other distortions arise from corruption and misadministration of elections by electoral bodies and judicial bodies, election violence and ideological confusions and/or sterility among the political parties. Consequently, some persons or group of persons take ultimate control of an environment during elections & decide who takes what. The individual opinion does not count at all. Individual vote has no value leading to what we call machine politics of the so-called 'godfatherism' [12].

With the democracy operating this way, it becomes greatly impeded & loses the potency needed to engender systematic emergence of presidents and other leaders. That is in the hearth of the problem.

The question which is the third in the list of our task is to look at the ways of improving on leadership recruitment, especially presidential emergence in Africa.

#### **Democracy and Leadership Recruitment: A Prescription of the way forward**

Having taken the problems serially, I feel that the solution also emerges technically from the why and how, Hence, making this part easier. We shall look at the solution to the identified problem from two perspectives. The first which is a fundamental solution attacks the problem of democratic processes from the foundation of the structural disorder among African states. The second which I classify as solutions to procedural misnomers attacks the identified problems of democratic practices serially.

From the onset, established rules guiding every facet of African life was founded upon very faulty principles. They metamorphosed from the framework that sustained colonial administration. These include but not limited to the following; delinking government from the governed, disarticulation of the views and the opinion of the people from the policy of the state and distortion between the people's main economic activities and the propellant of the country's economy, etc. Very important too is the philosophy behind the establishment of African states and the mechanism of

the creation were very artificial and hence not intended to survive. The reports of Lord Lugard to the Colonial office on the policy of Nigeria government attests to this [13].

Following the above mentioned challenges, African states need to recreate themselves, determine the basis of their existence and then sincerely decide and provide the basis for existence including the guiding principles, laws, rules and structures of performance. The structures of democracy as they exist today simply exist as there are no commitments to operating them. Indeed, you cannot even operate them to yield result as something, they say, cannot be put on nothing and be expected to stand. That gives credence for the several calls for referendum among African states to be coordinated by the international and supra-national organisations to firmly establish these states in the terms of existence. The failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan is predicated on its limited scope, which left the conclusion on Abyei region and its people out of final resolution because of its economic/natural resources importance. Indeed, as explained by Nwanegbo and Okoye [14] 'the 2005 Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) provided some unresolved ends that has great tendency for political disagreement...' and that negatively hindered the peace effort in that region [4]. Echoes from that region are basically what has sustained crisis in that region. Such discussions need to be comprehensive and exhaustive. Even regions/nations that would ordinarily survive if left alone should be allowed to decide their fate. Perhaps, from such discussions, some form of federalism, confederacies or unitary systems may be created and re-created in African continent.

In the history of the world politics, nations have merged to form new states and have separated to form different countries and later re-merged again on their own terms. At the point of doing this, new terms of engagements are negotiated and made to work or fail. African states should not be afraid of separation as a matter of national policy. The sustained call for restructuring in Nigeria becomes therefore very attractive as it does not necessarily imply disintegration but can provide a basis for federating and leadership recruitments that may reduce pressure in the polity. The National conference (not dialogue) organised by the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan made it clear that no part of Nigeria want to secede, rather, they want to be part of the making of the federation, including the rules of engagement. From that, the method of regulating the ascendancy into and change of power would be discussed and coded. Individuals and group participation would be structured and the principles of co-existence (which would solve the problem of equity) would be streamlined. This would also deal with the control system (giving rise to transparency and accountability).

On the second angle, no challenge is more profound than controlling corruption; when public resources bleed profusely and officials serve their own ends rather than the public good, contest for public offices would be fierce and inordinate, intensifies conflicts. We shall deal with the issues of governance, even though as a palliative and temporary measure by taking the indices of good governance one after the other and looking at the ways we can move them out of there bad shape hoping that the required democratic values would improve with them.

First, there is the need for African states to work out their existence and how to accommodate the groups in the countries in their democratic representation. That which Lijphart called 'Consensus Democracy' has been placed above 'Majoritarian Democracy', which most other arrangements tend to throw up. With it, certain level of pressures would reduce giving room for the modern election planning.

Second, no region has more countries that straddle the divide between democracy and pseudo-democracy than Africa. Even though some African countries improved in their electoral administration & elections like South Africa, Ghana, perhaps too, Mali and Nigeria, many others are not. So there is the need to develop democratic governance that allows opponents a fair chance to displace those in power.

Third, the political struggle in Africa remains very much a contest between the rule of law & the rule of the person. Most African democracies also suffer to one degree or another from the concentration of power in the office of the president. We need to de-concentrate power at the presidency to give room for reasonable discussions on how to recruit presidents in Africa. Decentralisation of power to the constituent units of the state to arise from the discussions would also help to re-channel attention of the people to their units and reduce pressure at the presidency for reasonable process to be worked out.

Fourth, the democratic failure of our continent is rooted in the practice which is incongruent with the basic principles of liberal democracy, symptomatic with liberal capitalist principles that ought to be our guiding economic model. Though, as we observed, capitalism in Africa is equally sick. Achieving democratic development would go a long way into improving on the quality of governance. To Ake [15] the kind of democracy suitable for Africa should have the following four characteristics:

- A democracy in which people have some real decision making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice.
- A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights, as opposed to a liberal democracy that emphasizes abstract political right.

- A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights.
- And lastly a democracy of incorporation [15].

Fifth, on the interim, we call for the people to re-claim their responsibility and like good business principals; demand to be in-charge. Let us not continue to leave our businesses in the uncontrolled hands of the bad agents. This is a wakeup call to all of us, in NGOs, CBOs; Faith based organizations and community leaders to help us create Africa of our choice by standing up now to resist disorder and impunity as was experienced when the people rose to stop what was becoming the military's un-ending occupation of the city of Wukari in Taraba state of Nigeria and the curfews abruptly stopped.

### CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have looked at the nature and challenges facing leadership recruitment in Africa, especially the challenge of developing systematic patterns for institutionalising presidential emergence to help us in and reducing the barrage of political conflicts bedevilling Africa countries in their attempt at democratising. Looking the challenges, we tied the problems to the poor democratic culture anchored in the weak development of the market democracy. We therefore wish to conclude that if African countries are to achieve sustainable development, democracy cannot stand still, and freedom alone will not be enough. Democratic institutions will have to work better to control corruption and constrain the exercise of power, so that the chief business of government becomes the delivery of public goods, not private ones. Unless and until we achieve this, it may be a long walk to no end searching for a stable and peaceful continent. Conflicts will persist.

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### **Appreciation**

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